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ABSTRACT 
This study compares recruitment and career paths of women 
politicians in Australia and Taiwan. It is based on the analysis of 
biographical materials and interviews with women MPs. The thesis 
argues that access of women to political elites is influenced by social 
dynamics, especially the pattern of modernisation. Different paths of 
modernisation — 'even' in Australia and 'uneven' in Taiwan — are 
associated with different configurations of gender-related political 
opportunities and resources, and with different political career paths. 
Political opportunities concern the overall access to social statuses and 
crucial pools of 'political eligibles'; political resources refer to those 
characteristics which are pivotal to securing promotion to elite 
positions. 'Even' modernisation in Australia is marked by economic, 
political and sociocultural modernisation, growing individualism and 
equalisation of political opportunities for women. However, such 
modernisation does not necessarily give women equal access to 
political resources, which tend to be concentrated in political 
organisations. 'Uneven' modernisation in Taiwan is marked by 
persistence of many traditional cultural norms and values, especially 
those concerning gender roles and the family. Consequently, women 
in Taiwan have more limited political opportunities than women in 
Australia. However, they have access to political resources, some of 
them gender-specific, which are concentrated in family networks and 
local communities. The career structures of women politicians (MPs) 
in both countries reflect these differences. Organisational (party or 
union) activist careers are dominant in Australia; they involve early 
entries into organised politics and long political apprenticeships. The 
dominant political career path for women in Taiwan represents a 
family-sponsored type; it involves a period of intense local activism. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Jan Pakulski, the 
supervisor of this thesis, for his patience, experience, encouragement, 
valuable suggestions and his continued efforts to improve my English 
throughout the course of my postgradute studies. 
I also wish to thank Professor Malcolm Waters and Dr. Baogang 
He for their invaluable advice and comments, all of which have 
greatly improved the quality of this thesis. 
This thesis is a comparative study. Many friends have helped to 
make this study possible. I especially wish to express my gratitude to 
Miss Chung-Peng Bai of National Chengchi University, Miss Kwei-
Mei Lin, and all interviewees who have kindly provided information 
about their personal and political experiences. 
I thank Mrs. Louise Oxley for her helpful comments and 
linguistic assistance. 
My deepest appreciation goes to my parents and my parents-in-
law for their financial support and continuous encouragement. 
Finally, my deepest debt is to my husband Su-Ke whose continuous 
assistance and encouragement were an invaluable contribution to my 
work. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction 	 1 
Research Problem 	 1 
Source of Evidence 3 
Plan of the Thesis 	 3 
Reasons for Comparing Australia with Taiwan 	 5 
Chapter One 
Theoretical Framework: 
Elites, Modernisation and Women 	 8 
Elites and Political Recruitment 9 
Political Recruitment 	 13 
Political Elite Recruitment and the Modernisation Processes 19 
Patterns of Modernisation 	 20 
Women, Political Elite Recruitment and Modernisation 	34 
Summary 	 49 
Chapter Two 
Modernisation in Taiwan and Australia 	 51 
Historical Background 	 51 
Economic Modernisation 56 
Social-cultural Modernisation and the Women's Movement 64 
Political Modernisation 	 75 
Conclusions 	 86 
Chapter Three 
Family, Culture and Women's 
Opportunities and Resources 	 89 
Family, Culture and Women 89 
Women's Opportunities and Resources 	 103 
Conclusions 	 131 
Chapter Four 
Institutional Frameworks 
and Women's Political Career Structure 	 133 
Electoral System and Political Institutions 133 
Political Career 	 145 
Political Career Patterns 	 155 
The Patterns of Political Recruitment and Career Types 	165 
Conclusions 	 170 
Chapter Five 
Conclusions 	 173 
Women in Political Elites 	 173 
Implications for Modernisation Theory 	 175 
Implications for Theories of Gender Inequality 	 177 
Implications for Elite Recruitment Theories 178 
Recent Development and Future Research 	 180 
Bibliography 	 182 
Appendix 210 
TABLES 
2.1 Life Expectancy at Birth in Australia and Taiwan, 1972-1992 	65 
2.2 Female Students as Proportion of Total Students in Three 
Levels of Education in Taiwan, 1950-1992 	 67 
2.3 Full-time Educational Enrolment Rate by Age and Gender, 
Taiwan and Australia, 1992 	 68 
2.4 Divorce Rate in Taiwan and Australia, 1966-1992 	 71 
2.5 Single Parent Families as Proportion of Total Families, 
Taiwan and Australia, 1986, 1992 	 71 
3.1 Liberal Individualism and Confucian Familism 	 90 
3.2 The Average Length of Education by Gender, Taiwan, 1993 	94 
3.3 Female Membership in Major Political Parties, Australia (Y()) 	107 
3.4 Membership in the KMT by Gender CYO 	 109 
3.5 Women Office Holders within the ALP State Executives (1992) 110 
3.6 Women's Representation within the KMT's Central 
Committee and the Central Standing Committee 	 115 
3.7 Women's Representation within the DPP's Executive 
Committee and the Central Standing Committee 	 115 
3.8 Women as Proportion of Total Administrators/Administrative 
Executives, Managers, and Professionals (%) 	 116 
3.9 Women as Proportion of Higher Education Students, 
Australia and Taiwan, 1964-1991 	 122 
4.1 Structural Features of Electoral Politics 
in Australia and Taiwan 	 134 
4.2 Women Candidates and the Reserved-seat System (Examples) 137 
4.3 Women MPs with Political Family Background 	 147 
4.4 Education Attainment of Women MPs 	 148 
4.5 Occupation before Entering Parliament 150 
4.6 Women MPs' Political Party Affiliation, 1969-1993 	 152 
4.7 Age at Which Women Parliamentarians Were First Elected 	154 
4.8 Age at Which Women MPs Began Politically Active 	157 
4.9 Women MPs with Experience of Local Government Services 159 
4.10 Political Party Experience of Women MPs 	 160 
4.11 Involvement of Women MPs in Women's Organisations 	163 
4.12 Involvement of Women MPs in Voluntary Organisations 	164 
4.13 Political Careers of Women MPs 	 166 
FIGURES 
1.1 The Opportunity and Resource Model and 
Typology of Elite Recruitment 	 16 
1.2 Percentage of Women in Lower House in 25 Countries, 1993 	41 
2.1 Infant Mortality Rate in Taiwan and Australia, 1965-1993 	65 
2.2 Total Fertility Rate (Per Woman) 
in Taiwan and Australia, 1961-1992 	 66 
2.3 Women's Median Age of First Marriage 
in Taiwan and Australia, 1971-1993 	 66 
2.4 Numbers of Ex-nuptial Births as Proportion of Per 
Thousand Live Births, Taiwan and Australia, 1975-1992 (` )/0) 	70 
3.1 Female Labour Force Participation Rate by Marital Status 	118 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores the question of how women's recruitment into 
political elites is affected by social dynamics, especially the pattern of 
modernisation. The impact of social dynamics on the gender 
composition and paths of recruitment of political elites in Australia 
and Taiwan is analysed over the last two decades. The different 
patterns of modernisation in Australia and Taiwan are associated with 
different configurations of political opportunities and resources, and 
these configurations, in turn, shape the paths of women's recruitment 
into political elites and affect the changing gender composition of 
political elites. 
Research Problem 
The revival of the women's movement in the late 1960s brought to 
public attention the need for empowerment of the female half of 
population. The changing roles and status of women in public life 
become the subject of public debates and academic research. These 
debates highlighted the fact that among the most salient features of 
women's position in contemporary public life is their limited presence 
in political elites. However, the research results reveal that women 
politicians are rare. Women who are interested in political careers face 
barriers derived from patriarchal tradition, inequitable institutional 
arrangements, financial constraints and patriarchal organisation 
(Kelber 1994). 
A common view is that these barriers are stronger in less 
modernised societies and that women are more likely to succeed in 
political contests in more developed countries. It is assumed that 
modernisation helps in reducing gender bias. Modernisation is widely 
seen as woman-friendly, and women's presence in political elites is 
often seen as a product of modernisation (eg. Huntington 1968; 
Putnam 1976; Etzioni-Halevy 1981; Berger 1987). Variation in this 
presence is typically attributed to variation in modernisation level and 
path. The classic early version of this modernisation theory points to 
the overall level of societal modernisation as the key determinant of 
gender divisions and correlates these divisions with sociopolitical 
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processes of elite recruitment and party formation (eg. Apter 1965; 
Huntington 1968). More later and more complex versions of 
modernisation theory have qualified this view (eg. Nettl and 
Robertson 1968; Apter 1992). Although modernisation is global in its 
scope, the patterns of modernisation may vary in different societies. 
According to these complex versions of modernisation theory, 
different patterns of modernisation result in different social-structural 
and institutional arrangements and lead to differential elite 
composition. 
The classic version of modernisation theory has been challenged 
by some empirical 'anomalies'. In some advanced (modernised and 
industrialised) societies, women fare well. The female education and 
labour force participation rates are increasing and gender inequality is 
reducing. In some other advanced societies, however, the situation is 
more complex. Gender divisions are decreasing in education and 
occupation, yet, the representation of women in political elites 
remains low. Australia and Taiwan are good examples of such 
'anomalous' societies. In spite of high levels of modernisation, 
especially in the economy, both societies have a similar (and low) 
proportion of women in political elites. Clearly, the classic version of 
modernisation theory cannot provide a good explanation of the 
skewed gender composition of political elites in these societies. 
The thesis argues that in order to understand the gender 
composition of the two national elites it is necessary to explore the 
more complex versions of modernisation theory and to pay more 
attention to the institutional and socio-cultural factors that affect 
women's recruitment into political elites. A modified version of 
modernisation theory, which sees modernisation as a complex multi-
dimensional process, can serve as a good theoretical framework. Each 
aspect — economy, polity, and culture — may, or may not exhibit the 
same pace. In fact, an 'even' pattern of modernisation, whereby it 
progresses on 'all fronts' with the same speed, is relatively rare. It is a 
unique West European patternl. East Asian societies follow an 
'uneven' pattern, whereby economic modernisation exceeds in its 
speed and scope, while political and socio-cultural modernisation is 
1 Some, like Bendix (1967), argue that the USA retained many pre-modern features in 
its political system. 
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slower and limited in scope. Such an 'uneven' pattern is found in 
Taiwan. It results in a specific 'gendered configuration of political 
opportunities and resources which, in turn, is reflected in elite 
recruitment and gender composition. Thus an analytic model is 
preferable which modernisation is seen as affecting political 
opportunities and resources in political recruitment, and women's 
presence in political elites is, in turn, affected in these different 
combinations of political opportunities and resources and the resulting 
recruitment channels. 
Sources of Evidence 
This study uses a variety of quantitative and qualitative data on 
women's political recruitment and career profiles. These data include 
biographies of successful women politicians in Australia and Taiwan 
as well as statistics about the overall position of women in both 
societies. However, because the biographical data are less available in 
Taiwan, information from interviews of some Taiwanese women 
politicians are used to supplement the biographical sources. 
The analysis covers the political careers of 153 women politicians 
in Australia and Taiwan who advanced to national parliaments 
during the last two decades. It includes 52 Australian (34 Senators and 
19 members of House of Representatives), and 101 Taiwanese women 
politicians (70 members of the National Assembly and 35 Legislators). 2 
The information analysed includes their family backgrounds, 
education, occupation before political elevation, organisational 
affiliation and the sequence of political positions. The interviews fill 
the gaps in the political biographical data, as well as providing 
additional information on the nature of political campaigns and 
political resources utilised. 
Plan of the Thesis 
The thesis comprises four main chapters. The mostly theoretical 
Chapter One discusses elites, modernisation and gender inequality. It 
reviews the theoretical frameworks in each of these areas and 
combines them for the purpose of this analysis. The main argument 
developed in Chapter One is that the access of women to political elites 
2 One Australian woman politician has served in both Houses, and four Taiwanese 
women have served in the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. 
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is affected by social dynamics, especially the pattern of modernisation. 
The impact of social dynamics on women in political elites is mediated 
by and reflected in the paths of their recruitment. These paths reflect 
the differential composition of political opportunities and resources 
that are shaped, in turn, by the pattern of modernisation. The model of 
political elite recruitment is derived from Putnam (1976) and Pakulski 
(1982). Recruitment is seen as located within the social structure, as 
well as in institutional frameworks and specific institutional and 
organisational settings. The process of recruitment is conceptualised as 
a selection from the 'pools of eligibles' by the key selectorates according 
to specific criteria. The key concepts are those of political opportunity 
and political resources. The former refers to the overall level of access 
to crucial pools of eligibles. The latter means those characteristics that 
are crucial in securing promotion in recruitment and political success 
in selection from one pool to the other. The combination- of 
opportunity and resource is reflected in career path of women 
politicians. 
It is argued in Chapter One that the Western modernisation 
pattern encourages innovation and achievement in organisations, and 
that it draws a boundary between the public sphere, the economy and 
politics on one hand, and the private sphere, especially the family, on 
the other. This pattern of modernisation is characterised by growing 
individualism and equalisation of political opportunities. The East 
Asian modernisation pattern, by contrast, maintains many traditional 
norms and values, and integrates the family more tightly into the 
process of modernisation. It stresses individuals' subordination and 
duty to the family, and thus blurs the divisions between the public and 
the private spheres. This pattern of modernisation limits political 
opportunities for women but, paradoxically one may say, opens some 
gender-specific political resources for aspiring women politicians. 
Chapter Two analyses modernisation paths in Taiwan and 
Australia. The process of modernisation is examined in the areas of 
economy, society and polity. Taiwan and Australia share some 
common features of economic, demographic and social development, 
with some differences in the pattern of democratisation. They differ 
most in respect of socio-cultural trends. 
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These differences in the patterns of modernisation are reflected in 
women's recruitment into political elites. Different socio-cultural 
orientations associated with the different patterns of modernisation 
are labelled here 'Confucian' and 'Western'. They are discussed in 
more details in Chapter Three. 
Chapter Three examines family and culture in the context of 
modernisation paths and different combinations of political 
opportunities and resources. It also links social dynamics and socio-
cultural orientations with the more specific issue of political 
recruitment of women. As far as socio-cultural orientations relevant to 
study of political recruitment are concerned, Confucianism and 
Western liberalism can be contrasted along four dimensions: familism 
vs individualism, education vs performance, credentialism vs 
apprenticeship, and duty vs right. The combination of political 
opportunities and resources and women's political career types reflect 
these contrasts. The empirical data are employed to measure the 
opportunity and resource structures in both countries. 
Chapter Four analyses in more detail political recruitment of 
women in Taiwan and Australia. Women's political careers are 
analysed in respect of personal background and occupation(s) before 
entering the parliament, personal affiliations and working experiences 
in political parties and local government. The typology of recruitment 
paths is constructed. Biographies and interview data are used in 
analysing the patterns of women's political elite recruitment in both 
countries. 
The concluding chapter returns to the key questions addressed in 
the study: why and how are different patterns of modernisation 
affecting the composition of opportunities and resources and shaping 
the paths of women's recruitment into political elites? In the light of 
the findings, it evaluates the theoretical accounts and suggests future 
research. 
Reasons for Comparing Australia with Taiwan 
• By comparing two societies like Australia and Taiwan with similar 
proportion of women in political elites but different patterns of 
modernisation, we can assess the ability of the opportunity and 
resource model to explain the gender composition of, and recruitment 
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into, political elites. Such comparison follows the 'Weberian' model of 
global socio-historical method used in order to assess the viability of a 
theoretical account. In our case, the account links modernisation paths, 
opportunities and resources, and elite recruitment and gender 
composition. More specifically, modernisation is seen as affecting 
opportunities and resources in political recruitment. Women's 
recruitment into political elites is affected in these different 
combinations of opportunities and resources, and gender composition 
reflects these combinations. 
Australia is an advanced industrialised society, and it is a pioneer 
country in granting women full citizenship including the right to vote 
and to stand for the national parliament. Australia more or less 
follows the path of political development that modernisation theory 
would predict. It presents, with some qualifications, the main 
characteristics of Western modern societies and elites. Women's 
representation in Australian political elites increased from 1.1% in 
1970 to 13% in 1993 (Millar 1993), in line with progressive 
modernisation, especially of politics. Further increases resulting from 
the 1996 federal election follow the general trend. 
Taiwan is a latecomer in modernisation, and has experienced 
'uneven' modernisation. It is a typical Confucian society which is seen 
as patriarchal and woman-unfriendly. However, Taiwan has a similar 
proportion of women in political elites and shows a similar trend. 
After the general election held in 1992, women's representation in 
political elites has reached 13%— the same proportion as in Australia. 
However, the way in which Taiwanese women politicians are 
recruited is quite different from the Australian paths of recruitment. 
These differences in modernisation paths and political careers, and the 
similarity of outcomes, form the main research problem we address 
here. 
This similarity of outcomes may be seen as challenging the 
feminist assumption that women cannot benefit from modernisation 
without eliminating those existing traditional barriers of which 
familism is the central one. It is believed that 'genderised' social roles 
and domestic responsibilities must be eliminated before women can 
have equal access to the public sphere, particularly to politics. 
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However, Taiwan may be seen as an example of an uneven 
modernisation pattern, whereby politics has been igenderised' in a way 
that maintains unequal opportunities but gives women wider 
resources, partly derived from women's gender-specific roles. 
Although the family has been changing in the process of 
modernisation in Taiwan, the gender roles and the domestic 
responsibilities are still largely traditional with pronounced patriarchal 
elements. However, it is clear that these roles have been integrated 
into political recruitment in the way that at least partly can reduce 
women's disadvantage. Consequently, the ratio of women in political 
elites in Taiwan has been higher than the average ratio of women in 
politics elsewhere. 
One qualification should be made at the outset. The presence of 
women in political elites in both countries is also influenced by 
political promotion and various forms of affirmative action. In 
Taiwan, it takes the form of the reserved-seats system3; in Australia 
recruitment is influenced by informal preferences (mainly by the ALP) 
and semi-formal quotas. The thesis comments on these policy factors 
and argues that they, by and large, balance each other out. 
3 Some scholars treat the reserved-seats system as an analogue to affirmative action 
promoted by women's movements in North and Western Europe. It helps in expanding 
women's active participation in politics. See Chou et al. (1990). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
ELITES, MODERNISATION AND WOMEN 
This chapter draws together three theoretical frameworks in the areas 
of elite and political recruitment, modernisation, and gender 
inequality in the social and institutional context. The main argument 
is that access to political elites by women is affected by social dynamics, 
especially the pattern of modernisation. The impact of modernisation 
is reflected in diverse paths of political recruitment. These paths in 
Australia and Taiwan show the impact of political opportunities and 
political resources, which are shaped, in turn, by the different patterns 
of modernisation in the two societies. Thus the differences in the 
distribution of opportunities and resources in the context of different 
modernisation paths can explain the political career trajectories and 
gender composition of elites in Australia and Taiwan. 
It begins by contrasting the 'Western' and 'East Asian' patterns of 
modernisation. It is argued that the Western pattern of modernisation 
is characterised by the growth of industrialism and equalisation of 
political opportunities. But due to its promotion of universalism it 
also narrows down the bases of political resources available for 
women. The 'uneven' East Asian modernisation path is more gender 
particularistic, and maintains some traditional and collectivistic values 
and norms. It draws the family into the process of economic and 
political modernisation in a specific way by stressing individuals' 
subordination to the family and focussing on familial duties, thus 
blurring the division between the public and the private spheres. This 
pattern of modernisation results in narrower political opportunities 
for women, but it also opens some gender-specific resource bases 
which aspiring women politicians can tap. While the the importance 
of opportunities is widely recognised, the significance of political 
resources often escapes the attention of students of political 
recruitment. This siginificance is highlighted here in order to explain 
the differences in political career structures in Australia and Taiwan, 
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and to re-valuate critically the popular view of Western 
modernisation as necessarily woman-friendly. 
This chapter has four sections. The first section discusses elites 
and political recruitment. It outlines a model of opportunity and 
resource in the context of modernisation theory. The second section 
explores the relationship between modernisation and political elite 
recruitment. The third section analyses the reasons for different 
patterns of modernisation in Australia and Taiwan. The two patterns 
of modernisation are analysed in their different social-structural and 
historical contexts. The fourth section links gender inequalities and 
women's political recruitment with modernisation trajectories. 
Elites And Political Recruitment 
Political Power and Elites 
Political power and its social distribution are the central concern of 
classical elite studies. Classical elite theorists — Vilfredo Pareto, 
Gaetans Mosca and Roberto Michels — agree that the advent of 
democracy makes little difference to the distribution of political power, 
with democratic authority still resting in the hands of elites. 
Schumpeter (1942) was first to elaborate a realistic, empirical 
theory of democracy which was in line with the classical elite studies. 
He recognised that even in a democracy the elite had to rule. It was 
seen as 'the irony of democracy' that Id]emocracy is government "by 
the people", but the survival of democracy rests on the shoulders of 
elites' (Dye and Zeigler 1990: 3). 
The central concept of elite theory is 'power'. The possession of 
power defines elites. Consistent with conventional usage, power could 
be defined as: 
• 'the chance of a man or of a number of men to realise their 
own will in a communal action even against the resistance of 
others' (Weber 1948: 180); 
• 'a tool to get other social goods— wealth, economic influence, 
social status, educational advantages for their children (...) 
these become themselves powers' (Parry 1969: 32); 
• 'a positive social ability as a circulating medium, analogous to 
money, to complete communal ends and secure common 
aims of a social system' (Parsons 1986: 101) 
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• 'the capacity of a social class to carry out its particular 
objective interests' (Poulantzas 1986: 144) 
• 'the ability to affect the behaviour of individuals by the real 
or threatened use of rewards and punishments; a special form 
of influence; a relationship among individuals, groups, and 
institutions in society' (Dye 1990: 4). 
In these definitions, power subsumes the notions of influence, control 
and authority. It is exhibited in an interactive relationship, so it can be 
seen as a product of social interaction. 
To be a human being is to be an agent and to be an agent is to 
have power. 'Power' in this highly generalised sense means 
'transformative capacity', the capacity to intervene in a given set 
of events so as in some way to alter them. (Giddens 1985: 7) 
By and large, power can be seen as the generalised capacity to realise 
one's own will in a systematic way (Weber 1978). However, power is 
never fully institutionalised and seldom directly observable. The 
visibility of power comes from individuals' or groups' access to, 
mobilisation of, and control over, power resources. 
The main container of power resources in modern society is the 
state. Both the classical and contemporary elite theorists agree on this, 
and focus on political elites, that is, the incumbents of strategic 
positions in governmental organisations. Political elites are the 
principal power holders, and their power is regarded as most 
legitimate (authoritative). 
The common perspective of the classical elite theorists also 
includes their acceptance of the inevitability of elites, and their 
scepticism as to the development of democracy beyond periodic 
election and middle-class participation (Nye 1977; Nagle 1992; 
Bottomore 1993). All societies, in this perspective, are inevitably 
divided into the rulers and the ruled. The former constitutes an elite, a 
minority group. The latter comprises the masses, a majority category. 
Elites are largely self-perpetuating, autonomous and typically, though 
not necessarily, drawn from the top strata of society. Classical elite 
theorists are concerned with analysing elite cohesion, structure and 
circulation rather than elite backgrounds. Elites are potentially able to 
exploit their organisation, political skills and personal characteristics so 
as to preserve their domination (Parry 1969). The domination of elites 
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is regarded as a universal and ineradicable characteristic of all societies. 
This is explained either by psychological differences among people 
(Pareto) or by social organisation (Michels). 
According to Pareto, elites are 'a class of the people who have the 
highest indices in their branch of activity, and to that class give the 
name of elite' (1965: 552). In this view, elites are those with specific 
psychological attributes: Machiavelli's 'foxes' and 'lions'. All political 
elites comprise both 'lions' and 'foxes'. The struggle between the 
innovating, demogagic, persuasive, and cunning 'foxes' and the 
conservative, honest, and strong 'lions' leads to the circulation of 
elites, a mobility between elites and non-elites. There is no analysis of 
gender in Pareto's work, but his view on the circulation of elites is 
useful for theorising about the 'political opportunity structure' as 
shaped by overall processes of social development (Pareto 1969: 551- 
558). 
By contrast, Mosca (1939), Michels (1962), and Mills (1956) adopt 
an institutional perspective and place emphasis on organisations as 
the principal bases of elite power (Parry 1969; Bottomore 1993). They 
also analyse specific criteria of selection and recruitment, thus 
providing a useful foundation for the political resource model. 
Mosca scrutinises the constitution of the elite itself, particularly 
in modern democratic societies. He believes that political elites govern 
the masses because they are organised: 
the domination of an organised minority, obeying a single 
impulse, over the unorganised majority is inevitable (...) the 
minority is organised for the very reason that it is a minority. 
[1939: 53] 
Small groups find it easier than large ones to organise themselves and 
to act coherently. To elaborate the advantages of organisations, Meisel 
(1962) proposes the 'three C's' fomula: elite power is based on group 
consciousness, coherence, and conspiracy (common intentions). The 
elite, according to him, is internally homogeneous, unified, and self-
conscious. 
Weber's student, Roberto Michels (1962) further elaborates the 
links between organisations and elites. He argues that the organisation 
and bureaucratisation of modern political parties leads to the 
supremacy of the elite. The rise of elites derives from the very 
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structure of any organised group and the organisational ability to 
accumulate and enhance power. Monopoly of resources and skills 
gives elites the ability to manipulate organisations. Elite oligarchies, 
therefore, are unavoidable in all sizeable organisations and in all 
complex societies. As Michels puts it (1962: 333): 
It is organisation which give birth to the domination of the 
elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, 
of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organisation says 
oligarchy. 
In the studies of C. W. Mills (1956), elites acquire a ruling class 
complexion. Mills identifies the existence of the 'power elite' whose 
authority is rooted in the integration of socio-economic, military, and 
political power. He stresses the unity of elites, the homogeneity of their 
social class origins, and their strategies to preserve the status quo. All 
these help to consolidate the governing capacity of the rulers. Power 
elites are the product of institutions and reflect the institutional 
structure of society. Some institutions tie up 'pivotal positions' in 
societies. The top ranks of the institutional hierarchy own the 'strategic 
command posts of the social structure' (Mills 1956: 4). 
Contemporary elite scholars (eg. Higley et al. 1979; Dye 1990) share 
the 'modest' view of democracy (as an elite-controlled regime) and see 
elite structure and composition as key determinants of social and 
political outcomes. They mostly use the positional approach to identify 
elites their strategic decision-making locations in the largest 
organisations. By and large, they can be seen as the followers of the 
institutional approach. 
Both the classical and countemporary elite theorists see elites as 
controlling their composition through domination over recruitment 
and selection processes. Some studies (Matthews 1954; Miliband 1969) 
illustrate this process of elite reproduction by analysing elite 
recruitment paths and social (class) composition. The social 
exclusiveness of elites and the difficulty of obtaining entry into elite 
ranks result from this self-reproductive ability. Incumbent elites lay 
down the procedures, requirements and credentials for admission to 
the circle of rulers. These procedures, requirements and credentials 
may include intensive apprenticeship, conformity to standards of 
educational attainment and social background, similar values, 
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ideology, interests and loyalties. As Prewitt and Stone (1973: 142) 
argues, 'persons who have some control over the pathways to 
membership in the political elite tend naturally to favor persons of 
similar ideology, status, and background'. 
Political elites form the core element of modern elites seen here 
as those few who control organisational resources and who are capable 
of affecting organisational outcomes individually, regularly and 
seriously (Higley et. al 1979: 8). Non-elites are all others without such 
power. Political elites exercise authority or influence, and are directly 
involved in struggles for political office. In this thesis, we focus on 
national political elites. Political elite recruitment refers to the 
sequences of moves and positions that lead to the top political offices 
in the state. 
Political Recruitment 
In Pareto's view, it is necessary for political elites to open certain 
opportunities for upward mobility for the mass, so that those 
individuals who are born with 'elite psychological characteristics' can 
be absorbed into political elites. Otherwise elites decay. On the other 
hand, Mosca and Michels argue that political elites have to maintain 
some exclusiveness although they emerge from various strata. Elite 
members are able to entrench their position due to control over cucial 
political resources, organisational skills, and ability to coerce and 
manipulate. Weber (1948) links such organisational control with the 
historical process of bureaucratisation, especially of the state 
administrative apparatuses. He notes (1948: 103), 
Naturally power actually rests in the hands of those who, within 
the organisation, handle the work continuously. Otherwise, 
power rests in the hands of those on whom the organisation in its 
processes depends financilly or personally. 
This view associates the rise of modern elites with the concentration of 
command over organisational resources in the hands of political 
bureaucracies. Here, we adopt a model that combines the perspectives 
of Mosca, Michals and Weber. It has been elaborated by contemporary 
students of elite recruitment, especially Robert Putnam (1976). 
Putnam (1976) develops a political elite recruitment model in 
which channels, gates and gatekeepers, and credentials determine the 
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aspirants' recruitment into political elites. The aspirants come from 
various societal strata and form increasingly circumscribed 'pools of 
eligibles'. In premodern societies (with few exceptions, including the 
recruitment of civil servants in China), inheritance was the main 
channel to the top. In modern societies, institutional channels for 
finding, selecting, and socialising elite candidates differ quite widely. 
They may include educational institutions, labour or trade unions, 
political parties, state administrative bureaucracies, and local 
governments. However, these institutional channels do not determine 
who will fill political elite positions. They form a framework for 
recruitment within which gatekeepers and their policies shape the 
composition of elites. 
Gatekeepers are responsible for the way in which aspirants are 
selected. They include incumbent elites as well as the controllers of 
selecting institutions, such as exclusive schools and corporate 
hierarchies. Putnam mentions three techniques used by gatekeepers to 
select aspirants: automatic, quasi-automatic, and discretionary. The 
automatic technique is the premodern one and is the simplest. It relies 
on aspirants' ascribed status. In the quasi-automatic technique, 
including seniority and examination, achieved status replaces ascribed 
status. The discretionary technique is embodied in elections. In 
modern democracies, pre-selection in political parties is an important 
element of the gatekeeping process. The role of organisational 
gatekeepers is central in political recruitment, even under the 
conditions of representative liberal democracy. 
Credentials are those qualities which aspirants should have in 
order to be selected. They include political skills, education, 
knowledge, orientations, and affiliations. In modern societies, access to 
education and political skills seems to provide most individuals with 
relevant knowledge and skill credentials. Yet, orientations and 
affiliations also distinguish those who succeed. Both authoritarian 
regimes and democracies give priority to loyalty, and affiliations are 
vital resource for all elite aspirants. 
In Putnam's model, aspirants form hierarchical pools of eligible 
candidates. They are filtered out at every consecutive gate. The 
differences between pre-modern and modern systems of recruitment 
lie mainly in how aspirants enter the pools. The entry conditions are 
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analysed as opportunities, while the characteristics which determine 
selection from pools, and which are used by gatekeepers in 'filtering 
the winners', are refered to as 'political resources'. Putnam largely 
focuses on differential opportunities. This focus, which underplays the 
importance of resources, weakens the capacity of Putnam's model to 
explain the divergent recruitment paths to political elites. It cannot 
explain why recruitment patterns and outcomes vary so widely, and 
why, with open and gender-neutral opportunities, women still have 
difficulty in securing equal access to political elites. 
It is argued that political opportunities and resources can, and 
typically do, vary independently. Opportunities shape the overall 
social access to the pools of eligibles, and resources help aspirants 
succeed in consecutive rounds of selection. The former shape 
institutional openness that makes aspirants enter the eligible pools. 
The latter propel aspirants from one pool to the other and favour their 
elevation to political elites. The composition of opportunities and 
resources, that is, how open the opportunities are and how the 
resources are distributed, are the key parameters of elite recruitment 
systems. 
The opportunity and resource model is useful to explore 
women's recruitment into political elites in the context of 
modernisation. The composition of opportunities and resources in 
different societies with different patterns of modernisation can be 
compared and analysed. Similarly, the relationship between women's 
access to opportunities and resources and modernisation paths can be 
empirically examined. This relationship is reflected in the gender 
composition of political elites. 
The opportunity and resource model used in this study is shown 
in Figure 1.1. There are four types of political elite recruitment based 
on the different composition of opportunities and resources. 
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Figure 1.1 The Opportunity and Resource Model and 
Typology of Elite Recruitment 
• Type I: 'Achievers' are found in an environment with high 
opportunities and wide resources. They seek to run 
for political office because they can easily enter the 
eligible pools, through various channels, and have 
access to wide resources. The career paths are 
routinised. 
• Type II: 'Appentices' have high opportunities, but narrow 
resources, with the latter controlled by political 
organisations. They can easily enter the eligible 
pools, but need to experience apprenticeship in 
various organisations to accumulate enough 
resources to prospell themselves to political elite 
positions. Therefore, the career paths of this type are 
long and organisation-oriented. 
• Type III: 'Pioneers' face an environment in which 
opportunities are low and resources are narrow. 
Pioneers are obliged not only to seek available 
channel to the eligible pool, but also to accumulate 
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limited resources. The career path, thus, can be 
described as a breakthrough. 
• Type IV: 'Clients' enjoy wide resources but limited 
opportunities. With the powerful support of patrons, 
client aspirants can be channelled into the eligible 
pool; thereupon, the career path is sponsored. 
The Structure of Political Opportunities 
The concept of opportunity is doubly relative: to a social category 
(gender) and social goal (political recruitment). We use it here in a 
restricted sense; it means gender opportunity for political recruitment. 
Political opportunities are seen here as socially defined; they vary 
with the extent of institutional openness. Women's political 
opportunities, that is their access to the channels of entry to the eligible 
pools, can be analysed in three broad areas. The first is access to 
political organisations, including political parties and unions. The 
second is access to the the labour market, including participation in the 
labour force and access to those professional positions which form 
springboards for political careers. The third is access to education. This, 
in turn, is related to social-cultural norms and expectations, including 
gender role expectations. Education, it must be stressed, plays a dual 
role as an aspect of political opportunities and resources. Access to 
education provides women opportunities to enter political 
springboard occupations, that is, pools of political eligibles. Education 
credentials, especially higher education and postgraduate degrees, are 
also seen as a political resources. This is especially evident in Taiwan 
where highly educated political aspirants can achieve fast political 
elevation without intense political experience. This reflects the 
tradition of Chinese mandarins which had valued education above 
other political qualities. These three aspects of opportunities are inter-
related; they form a structure. Change in one aspect, as it is argued, 
affects other aspects. However, the structural change typically starts 
with some aspects altering 'ahead of' the other. Taiwanese society, as 
argued below, has experienced a rapid change in the political 
opportunity structure which started with accellerated access by women 
to education. We review these aspects in Taiwan and Australia in 
Chapter Two. 
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The Structure of Political Resources 
Political resources are those characteristics which facilitate political 
elevation. Political resources vary widely, and they can be material and 
non-material. They comprise those characteristics which enable 
aspirants to succeed and which favour their elevation from one pool 
of eligibles to the other. Political resources vary from society to society 
and from time to time. In traditional society they typically involve 
gender, lineage, religion and status; in modern society they typically 
involve money, influence, loyalty, political skills and experience, 
organisational affiliations, media exposure, education, and location in 
social networks. 
Some studies (Randall 1987; Chou et al. 1990; Rush 1992; 
Schlozman et al. 1994) associate access to political resources with 
political competition. Randall divides explanations for the small 
number of women in political elites into two broad categories: those 
stressing the supply factors, and those focussing on demand factors. 
She sees resources as a part of supply factors. Education, employment, 
social class and political experience are regarded as the key political 
resources. Chou et al. (1990) see political recources as including 
political organisational affiliations (with the KMT), previous political 
experience, and relationship to organised groups in society. Rush 
(1992) develops a supply-demand model of political recruitment. He 
distinguishes the primary, secondary, and territary opportunity 
structures. Resources are present in the secondary and tertiary 
opportunity structures; they include knowledge, skills, experience, 
time, money and ideological positions. Schlozman et al. (1994) divide 
political resources into two types: general resources and politically 
relevent resources. The former facilitate political activity and 
determine whether social processes prior to participation produce 
gender differences; they include money, time and civic skills. The 
latter, while they are not clealy defined, may be interpreted as 
including education, money, time, occupational and employment 
status, organisational affiliation and skills. 
These views place political resources in the public sphere, mainly 
in the spheres of employment and organisational affiliation. The 
different locations of political resources, the interaction between them, 
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and the impact of different political resources-source on political 
success, are not analysed comparatively in these studies. 
The sources of political resources are divided into three 
categories: organisations, local communities, and the family. The 
variation in the sources and patterns of political resources in different 
societies should be seen in the context of modernisation paths. In the 
Western path of modernisation political resources are concentrated in 
organisations. In the East Asian path of modernisation political 
resources are concentrated in organisations, local communities and the 
family. These two patterns of political resources and their impact on 
women's political recruitment are reviewed in Chapter Three. 
Political Elite Recruitment And The Modernisation Processes 
One of the central concerns for ruling elites is control over recruitment 
of new members. Forms of recruitment vary from time to time and 
from society to society. This section examines the relationship between 
different patterns of modernisation and different combinations of 
political opportunities and resources that affect political elite 
recruitment of women. 
The essential aspects of political elite recruitment are where the 
political elite derives from and how they are selected. These aspects 
define different recruitment systems. Mosca suggests, for example, that 
there are two kinds of elite recruitment. In an autocratic aristocratic 
society the elite consists of self-recruits drawn from the top social 
strata. In a liberal democracy, with more circulation between elites and 
non-elites, elite recruits rely on various forms of organisational and 
group sponsorship. 
With the breakdown of feudalism and the rise of capitalism, the 
intellectuals, industrial managers, professional workers and 
bureaucrats who comprised Mosca's 'new middle class' had gradually 
gained access to political elites (Bottomore 1993). Their power relied on 
their control of large and complex bureaucratic organisations. This was 
confirmed by Mills (1956, 1958, 1963). The lower ranks of the elite 
mediated between the core of the elite and the mass, and supplied new 
recruits to the core. For outsiders, these lower ranks formed the entry 
into the elite circle. Mills stressed that the elite recruitment reflected 
the openness of political opportunities for the mass. 
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Political modernisation increases elite circulation. The 
alternation of political elites can be seen as the result of growing social 
mobility. Under democratic regimes, the eligible pools of political elites 
are enlarged and the method of recruitment changes from ascription to 
achievement. Democracy can be seen as a modern achievement-based 
method of recruitment to political elites. Schumpeter (1942: 269) 
defines it as follows: 
the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people's votes. 
The democratic formula is that 'no one can decide by himself that he is 
better than others; it is the others who must decide this; and the 
method for ascertaining who is outstanding is election' (Sartori 1965: 
103). Political elites in a democratic system are selected through their 
competition in regular elections. 
Such a view of the democratic recruitment of political elites 
emphasises the openness of a political system to co-opt new members. 
Elites 'often [benefit] simply from the mere chance of being in the right 
place at the right time' (Higley et al. 1979: 105). This perspective seems 
to indicate a 'classless' recruitment of political elites. More 'classless', 
however, does not mean more 'genderless'. Gender imbalance seems 
to survive the modernisation process. Even the most egalitarian (in 
their class composition) modernised regimes show a remarkablely 
persistent gender imbalance. 
Patterns Of Modernisation 
Modernisation alters political opportunities and changes access to 
political resources. Different configurations of modernisation result in 
different composition of political opportunities and resources. This 
section explores the concept of modernisation and different patterns of 
modernisation, with special attention paid to 'even' and 'uneven' 
modernisation trajectories. 
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The Concept of Modernisation 
Modernisation is a general term to describe the process of change in 
societies. It can be understood in three ways (Sztompka 1993: 129). First, 
it is a synonym for progressive social changes whereby society 
advances according to some acceptable standards of improvement. 
Second, it connects with the concept of modernity. Change is seen as a 
series of transformations of social life — industrialisation, 
urbanisation, rationalisation, bureaucratization, democratisation, the 
supremacy of capitalism, the expansion of individualism and 
achievement motivation, the affirmation of reason and science. The 
momentum of this transformation is the appearance and growth of 
industrial capitalism. Compared with a given form of social life, the 
new form is named 'a modern society', and this is characterised by 
'machine technology, rational and secular attitudes, and highly 
differentiated social structures' (O'Connel 1976: 13). This process of 
transformation leads from traditional to modern social institutions. 
Therefore analyses of modernisation often concentrate on changes in 
the institutional orders: political, cultural and economic (Bryjak and 
Soroka 1992: 403). Third, modernisation may refer to endeavours by 
developing societies to catch up and overtake the top-rank. In the 
world-system perspective, it is the movement from the peripheries to 
the core of the modern world (Wallerstein 1974). 
In this thesis, modernisation is used in the second sense. By 
examining the transformations in society, economy and polity, we 
discuss the Western (even) and the East Asian (uneven) patterns of 
modernisation respectively. 
Classic modernisation theories claim that the development 
toward the final stage of modernisation is natural, and that the 
experience of the West is the blueprint for development of other 
societies. After a short eclipse in the 1950s and '60s, modernisation 
theory was revived again. Most of the 'new' modernisation studies 
have modified the old version, and focus more on the impact of 
cultural differences and various external factors. They acknowedge that 
tradition may be a helpful factor in modernisation, that the paths of 
modernisation may differ, and that the modernisation process may be 
affected by external factors such as wars and crises (So 1990). 
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The Western Modernisation Pattern 
The classical theories often adopt Darwin's evolutionary concepts to 
describe and explain social change. They focus on the different stages of 
social development. Society is viewed as analogical to a biological 
organism whose development is seen within a global, evolutionary 
scheme. The modernity vs. tradition dichotomy, in respect of 
complexity and adaptive capacity, is employed to categorise different 
stages of development, and to contrast the transition from one stage to 
the other (Parsons 1951 et al.; Levy 1966; Etzioni-Halevy 1981). Within 
these general types, perspectives on modernity vary: Comte focuses on 
the development of knowledge; Durkheim looks at the pressure of 
population growth and moral density; Weber connects the transition 
with the reformation and the rise of rationality; Marx points to the 
effects of commodification, capital accumulation and industrialisation; 
Spencer analyses a shift from militant to industrial society in the 
context of progressive differentiation; and Tonnies analyses the 
collapse of community (Gemeinschaft) and the extension of 
geoellschaftlich relations. 
The classical evolutionary modernisation model is based on 
some assumptions (Eisenstadt 1992: 412-13) which may be summarised 
as follows: 
• Structural differentiation is exemplified by the growth of 
specialised roles which leads to shifts of resources and changes in the 
social division of labour. 
• Society is seen as a relatively closed system. Social division of 
labour includes different levels of structural differentiation and leads 
to an increase in specialised roles in institutions. 
• An aligned differentiation in every area is a 'natural' 
consequence of the structural change. Any other development is seen 
as deviant or problematic. 
Structural functionalism inherits most of these assumptions and 
places more emphasis on internal changes in societies. The master 
concept employed to describe and explain social changes in 
differentiation. Modernisation is the process of unlimited functional 
differentiation (Levy 1966; Smelser 1968; Eisenstadt 1973), and the 
direction of this process is toward adaptive upgrading. 
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If differentiation is to yield a balanced, a more evolved system, 
each newly differentiated sub-structure  must have increased 
adaptive capacity for performing its primary function, as 
compared with the performance of that function in the previous, 
more diffuse structure. (Parsons 1966: 22) 
Structural functionalists view modernisation as a universal, worldly 
phenomenon. Parsons' five pattern variables not only illustrate the 
classical evolutionary view, but also indicate the results of 
modernisation: the fundamental social relations which are 'enduring, 
recurring, and embedded in the cultural system — the highest and the 
most important system in Parsons's theoretical framework' (So 1990: 
21). The pattern variables include: 
Affectivity vs Affective neutrality. Social relations in traditional 
society are characterised by affective orientation. Personal, face-to-face 
relations dominate people's social action. In modern society social 
relations show affectively neutral orientation. Social action is based on 
impersonal, indirect and discrete relations. 
Collective-orientation vs Self-orientation. In traditional society, 
collective interests are more important than individual interests and 
benefits. They are a useful means of reducing the social disequilibrium 
caused by individual variation and inventiveness. In modern society, 
individuals are released from collective constraints, encouraged to 
develop their talents, and prompted to pursue their own careers. All 
these are conducive to technological innovation and economic 
growth. Individual benefits have priority over collective obligations. 
Particularism vs Universalism. In traditional society people are 
immersed in their primary relationships — kinship, friendship, and 
neighbourhood. The relationships are particular to people who trust 
each other, and emphasise their specific duties. In modern society, 
urban life forces people to interact with abstract categories of strangers. 
Secondary relationships make them employ universalistic criteria in 
their interaction (eg. the rule of law). _ _ 
Ascription vs Achievement. In traditional society people are 
judged by, and benefit from, their inherited statuses, such as family 
background. In modern society, people use their achieved status, such 
as occupational position. 
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Diffuseness vs Specificity. In traditional society actors engage 
with others totally across a wide range of activities. In modern society 
actors participate in activities with specific, structured purposes. 
Pattern variables form a scheme of modernisation that suggests 
general convergence of modernisation paths, and stipulates that 
common characteristics will appear in all modernised societies 
regardless of national and regional variation. On the material level, a 
modern society is characterised by the wide use of technology, 
commercialised exchange, and machine power. On the non-material 
level, value orientations become universalistic. On the social 
structural level, highly bureaucratic organisations extend control over 
the functionally differentiated social units. 
Changes are also reflected in the physhological level, Inkeles and 
Smith (1974: 19-25) also point out twelve personal qualities of 'modern 
men': openness to new experience, the readiness for social change, the 
growth of opinion, getting information, time orientation, efficacy, 
planning, calculability, valuing of technical skill, educational and 
occupational aspirations, awareness of, and respect for, the dignity of 
others, and understanding production. 
Aspects of Western Modernisation 
Economic modernisation refers to the movement from a steady 
subsistence economy to self-sustaining commodity, production, 
market exchange and economic growth. It includes technological 
improvement, expansion of money economy, and the growth of 
extensive markets (Levy 1966). Rostow's take-off model (1971) provides 
a framework for the analysis of growth, although it is more descriptive 
than explanatory. 
Social modernisation comprises changes in social relationships 
and the differentiation of social structures. These changes in social 
relation are summerised in Parsons' five pattern variables (Parsons et 
al. 1951: 76-98). Structural change is manifest in the social division of 
labour, specialisation, centralisation, bureaucratization and a decrease 
in the self-sufficiency of social units. Modern society is characterised by 
a high level of urbanisation, literacy, health care, mass media, a low 
fertility rate and death rate, growing life expectancy, weakening 
kinship ties, prevalent nuclear family, and high levels of education. 
and literacy. 
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Political modernisation follows the general pattern as described 
by Huntington (1968: 34): 
Political modernisation involves the rationalisation of authority, 
the replacement of a large number of traditional, religious, 
familial, and ethnic political authorities by a single secular, 
national political authority (...) the differentiation of new political 
functions and the development of specialised structures to 
perform those functions (...) legal, military, administrative, 
scientific [areas] become separated from the political realm, and 
autonomous, specialised, but subordinate organs arise to 
discharge those tasks (...) [and] increased participation in politics 
by social groups throughout society. 
These three aspects of modernisation coincide, forming a widely 
recognised Western pattern: 
Differentiation, commodification and rationalisation, then, 
define the transformation of premodern into modern systems as 
well as the central internal processes of modern societies. The 
three processes are closely related: modern social systems have a 
high or complex level of differentiation and are equally 
characterised by progressive commodification and rationalisation. 
(Crook et al. 1992: 10). 
A modern Western society is a highly organised industrial society, 
which is characterised by complex differentiation and systematic 
organisation (Crook et al 1992: 15-16). Most advanced industrialised 
Western societies such as Australia more or less conform to this 
modernisation model. This model represents a pattern of 'even' 
modernisation which shall be called 'Western modernisation'. 
Critiques of Modernisation Theories 
While modernisaiton theories did chart well the path of development 
in Western societies, they did not describe and explain well the 
configurations and processes found in non-Western societies, such as 
the East Asian societies. These 'anomalies' provoked criticisms and 
subsequent revisions of modernisation theories. Most criticisms 
centred on their Western-centrism and the excessively rigid 
tradition/modern dichotomy (eg. Nisbet 1969; Tipps 1973; Huntington 
1971; Gusfield 1973; Baykan 1990; Lauer 1991; Eisenstadt 1992). Some 
critics also pointed to the neglect of external factors (eg. Frank 1967, 
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1969; Cardoso 1973; Wallerstein 1974). These critiques can be 
summarised as follows: 
Western-centrism 
Modernisation theories predict a convergent development. 
Scholars formulated stages through which all backward societies 
would pass on the journey to modernity, and they ranked nations 
by how far they had come according to their own particular set of 
criteria. Openness to Western economic and cultural forces has a 
positive, simulative effect on this process (Gold 1986: 12). 
Modernisation will overcome ideological and political differences 
between East and West. Therefore, for all non-Western societies, 
modernisation equals Westernisation. Indeed, ideas such as 'modern', 
'advanced', or traditional' are often criticised as ideological labels 
employed to legitimise Western superiority. This view is also 
challenged by the development of the East Asian countries which are 
'modernised' or 'modernising', but are not totally Westernised. While 
the capitalist market economy and democratic trend in East Asia have 
been Westernised to some extent, the development of social-cultural 
dimension in Asian countries is different from that in the West. 
The Tradition/Modern Dichotomy 
The dichotomous view tends toward rigid polarities and flat 
totalisations. Modernised and modernising societies are categorised 
into two contrasting categories, and each shows one set of pattern 
variables. Modernity and tradition are seen as two contrasting 
concepts. The former is set forth, but the latter is everything which is 
not modern (Rustow 1967: 12; Huntington 1971: 293-4). Critics point 
out that this rigid dichotomy is less than useful. Modern features 
should be seen not only as a matter of degree, but also as 'patterned' in 
a variety of ways. 
Overlooking the Impact of the External Factors 
Modernisation theories are also chastised for neglecting the impact of 
external forces, especially the world-market context. Frank (1967; 1969) 
proposes the 'metropolis-satellite' model to explain the development 
of the West. This model suggests exploitation of an economic surplus 
from the Third World. The exchanges between the metropolis and the 
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satellite regions are proceeding in an unequal global economic 
network. Wallerstein (1974) suggests a world-system model which 
divides the global economy into the core, the semi-peripheries, and the 
peripheries. He examines both development and underdevelopment. 
Both authors argue that modernisation theories fail to connect 
developments in the core and periphery within the world system. 
They stress that the systematic relations which affect development 
have an extra-societal scope. 'Modernisation' is specific to the 'core' or 
'metropolis' regions. 
Modernisation Package 
The view that modernising changes are simultaneous and inter-
related (eg. Huntington 1968: 32) is questionable. Although Parsons 
assigns the cultural system a leading role in the process of 
modernisation, the fact that different cultures have different social 
dynamics is often ignored. As Berger suggests (1987: 140-41), 
'modernity, even hyper-modernity, superimposed upon a civilisation 
that continues to be emphatically different from that of the West (...) 
East Asia has generated a new type, or model, of industrial capitalism'. 
Palley (1990: 1137) further points out the key difference that 'even 
though a nation's [economy] may become modernised, it does not 
necessarily follow that its social and political values (...) will be 
completely supplanted'. 
The 'modernisation package' is not an accurate description of the 
complex and diverse trajectories of change. It can, however, explain 
why 'those 'traditional' factors which used to be looked upon as a 
cause of stagnation have come to be picked up as a factor for promoting 
modernisation' (Sonoda 1991: 175), and the East Asian countries are 
labelled as 'atypical' or undergoing the 'miracle' (Berger 1987; Kim 
1994; Amsden 1985; Gold 1986; Clark 1989; Vogel 1991). East Asian 
modernisation is not only undermining the view of a 'modernisation 
package', but is also suggesting a posibility of variation in patterns of 
modernisation. 
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The Modernisation Pattern in East Asia 
The 'new' modernisation studies differ from the 'classic' versions in 
placing more emphasis on cultural differences and the impact of 
external factors. Economic modernisation in East Asian countries has 
attracted the attention of scholars' critical of the 'classic' model. (eg. 
Morishima 1982; Berger 1987, 1988; Gold 1991a; Hsiao 1988; Kahn 1979; 
Tai 1989; Vogel 1987, 1991; Winckler 1987; Wong 1988). In these critical 
studies, culture is seen as a major contributor to East Asian economic 
modernisation. This is different from the classical perspective that 
stresses the centrality of socio-economic factors (eg. Weber 1951; Levy 
1952, 1955; Eisenstadt 1968) and sees (Confucian) culture as a major 
obstacle to economic modernisation in East Asian societies. 
The role of Confucianism and the family is central to these 
arguments. The Weberian view on Confucian culture is that its 
kinship relations impede rationalisation, and the Chinese family is 'a 
highly particularistic structure' which is inimical to industrialisation. 
Some students of Asian modernisation disagree with this view. For 
example, Kahn's World Economic Development (1979) claims that 
many features of the Confucian culture, such as the high value placed 
on education and the work ethic, are conducive to modernisation, but 
that family loyalty is harmful to modernisation because it nurtures 
particularism, corruption and nepotism. Some recent studies (eg. 
Greenhalgh 1984, 1988) argue that the family has both a positive and a 
negative impact on economic modernisation. Its positive impact lies 
in the family being able to generate the very organisations which 
contribute to 'internal economic growth and external integration into 
the global economy' (Greenhalgh 1988: 231). Its negative impact lies in 
hindering the accumulation of capital and narrowing the scope of trust 
(Fukuyama 1995b). 
What these criticisms often ignore is the dynamic nature of 
culture. Tu (1985) distinguishes 'politicalised Confucianism' and 
'Confucian personal ethic' in East Asian societies. The former 
legitimised a hierarchical, stagnant political system in imperial China 
and communist China; the latter regulated people's attitudes towards 
work, education, family and other dimensions of everday life in East 
Asian societies. Tu argues that Confucian personal ethic, including 
traditional familism, strong ties and geographical affinity, is salient to 
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the processes of East Asian modernisation and contributes to East 
Asian economic success. Even Fukuyama (1995a: 26) acknowledges 
that: 
Chinese Confucianism [develops] an intense familism that took 
precedence over all other social relations, including relations 
with political authorities. That is, Confucianism builds a well-
ordered society from the ground up rather than the top down, 
stressing the moral obligations of family life as the basic building 
block of society. 
All these observations indicate that Confucian culture can be 
compatible with modernisation, including economic and political 
modernisation. While Confucianism does not support individualism 
and a transcendent law, its emphasis on respect for authority, high 
regard for education, and its relative tolerance may favour the 
development of democracy (Fukuyama 1995a). It must be kept in mind 
that one of the most important values in Confucian culture is a 
harmonious relationship within and between groups. It is believed 
that harmony can overcome chaos. Modifications also favour 
harmony. The family is also the basic social unit and the model for 
politics. If the family works well, then — it is believed — society and 
politics work well. The relationships between family members can 
change, and this is evident in the changes in gender relations and 
women's employment, and in closer ties with wives' natal families. 
This change has a potentially important impact on the resources 
available to women. When the family extends, women may get 
resources from both sides of the family, though some traditional 
family values may still confine women's access to politics (see eg. Lu 
1984; Gallin 1985; Yang 1978; Pye 1985, 1988; Winckler 1987). 
To sum up, the East Asian countries on the 'Confucian cultural 
rim' are characterised by 'uneven' modernisation. We call this East 
Asian or 'uneven' modernisation under the impact of Confucianism. 
It is a different pattern of modernisation from the Western one. 
Uneven modernisation juxtaposes modern and traditional features. 
This is most conspicuous in the development of East Asian 'dragon' 
societies to which we turn now. 
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Aspects of Uneven Modernisation 
In East Asian countries, the economy is highly modernised, while the 
political and social modernisation seems to be much less advanced. As 
some scholars point out, successful economic modernisation in East 
Asia has occured under authoritarian regimes (except for Hong Kong 
and Japan) and in the context of highly traditional cultures (eg. 
Cumings 1987; Robinson 1991; Eberstadt 1991; Pei 1994). There are 
many reasons for this 'anomalous' development. First, economic 
success is often seen as a legitimator of elite rule in Confucian societies, 
and this is especially true in the case of Singapore. Political elites are 
expected to look after the populace (see Pye 1988: 84-85; Fei 1991). When 
its economic growth persists, the political elites are 'naturally' 
justified. However, it must be kept in mind that in a 'real' Confucian 
polity like Taiwan scholar-officialdom is also seen as the top 
attainment, thus the real legitimate of elite rule. This is discussed in 
the subsequent chapters. Second, most East Asian countries developed 
while facing threats from both inside (ethnic strikes and communist 
insurgencies) and outside (invasion by neighbours). This is especially 
evident in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. Successful economic 
modernisation has been seen there as a key to not only internal 
political stability and cohesion, but also to external security. It has been 
fortified by Confucian values stressing cohesion and respect for 
authority. As mentioned above, Confucianism uses its personal ethic 
displine to achieve economic success and political stability. Thus one 
may argue that traditional Confucian virtues, such as familism and 
respect for authority on one hand, and modern economic 
development on the other are compatible and co-present in different 
instances of East Asian modernisation. 
East Asian countries incorporate the family into the process of 
economic modernisation. This is very different from the Western 
economic modernisation pattern that separates the family from the 
workplace and politics. In East Asia, especially in Taiwan, the family 
itself can be seen as an important part of the productive system, and 
the controller of productive organisations. This is obvious in family 
firms and export-processing zones in Taiwan. 
Thus the modernising East Asia has two faces. One is modern 
and the other is traditional. The modern side is represented by the 
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highly developed economy, modern technology, vibrant markets and 
improved standards of living. The traditional side is represented by 
dominant value orientations. One of the most significant features of 
these orientations is that they 'place more value on the collectivity and 
to be less sensitive than the West to the values of individualism' (Pye 
1985: 26). People in East Asian societies are more inclined to believe 
that greater wellbeing emanates from suppressing self-interest and 
acting for the benefit of the family and the nation. While many 
modern institutions are built, the family is getting smaller, and the 
rigid hierarchical relationships between family members are changing. 
The family is still strong and individualism is 'underdeveloped', but 
many patriarchal features are attenuated. 
The East Asian experience implies that individualism and the 
decline of broad family ties do not have to be either a precondition or 
an outcome of economic modernisation. Accordingly, it is not 
surprising that the tangle of tradition and modernity makes Parsons' 
five pattern variables problematic as a foundation for measures of 
modernisation in East Asia. 
Also the political modernisation in East Asia, while formally 
consistent with Huntington's model (rationalised authority, 
differentiated structures, and mass participation), occurs in a 
somewhat 'anomalous' way. This is especially visible in political elite 
recruitment. The differences are mainly rooted in different value 
orientations — collectivism in East Asia and individualism in the 
West — and in the impact of values on the composition of political 
opportunities and resources. 
It must be stressed, however, that these differences are a matter of 
degree. Individualism and collectivism are located on a continuum. 
Due to the greater stress placed on family-like collectivism, the 
leadership style in East Asia is inclined to be paternalistic. This is 
reflected in 'the East Asian political model' (Pye 1987: 84-5): 
Authority is expected to combined with grace and benevolence, 
both elitism and sympathy— that is, aloof dignity and nurturing 
concern. The cultures revere hierarchy, accepting gradations of 
rank and merit as natural, but they also expect rulers to be 
concerned about the livelihood of the masses. (...) 
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It therefore follows that East Asian governments are the 
unquestioned dominant institutions in their societies, but in each 
country the government is expected to manifest paternalistic•
concern for all the people. All segments of the society are expected 
to yield to the government as the guiding force of the collectivity, 
but in return rulers should be supportive of everyone who 
displays proper awe. 
Political leadership involves setting national goals and priorities, 
mobilising resources and public attention for collective tasks, and 
squashing debates that might dilute the national will. 
Government sees itself as the embodiment of the national 
destiny, and hence it has the obligation to tell everyone what 
needs to be done and censor divisive ideas and initiatives. 
Confucian culture stabilises authority by granting its automatic 
legitimacy, but also charges the government 'with heavy 
responsibilities for managing society' (Winckler 1987: 176). This is why 
the state can play a very active role in moulding society in all East 
Asian countries. However, due to this statism, most East Asian 
regimes may be labelled authoritarian. 'Economic miracles' are 
typically state-sponsored and often associated with a 'strong state' 
rather than a vibrant civil society. 
There is a paradoxical relation between Confucianism and 
politics. Confucian values and norms hinder political modernisation 
by legitimising patriarchal and patrimonial relationships. They also 
place emphasis on harmony and the interests of the collectivity; the 
latter usually identified with the state (Huntington 1984; Cotton 1990; 
Price 1990). Stress on harmony often results in the suppression of 
dissenters. According to the norms, individuals should not challenge 
the interests of the collective; and individual rights are seen as granted 
by the state rather than inherent in people. However, the same 
Confucian norms also pave the way for strong government 
interventions that underunderline the politically assisted forms of 
economic and social modernisation. While in the West the stimulus 
for modernisation came mainly from civil society (with modernising 
elites emerging out of the societal trends), modernisation process in 
East Asia have been led by interventionist and typically authoritarian 
states and elites. 
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In the East Asian path, the family is an important link between 
the state and society. Confucianism stresses that leading the family 
prepares for governing the state. Politics is seen as the enlargement of 
the family and as an extension of patriarchal power. The main tasks of 
the state are similar to those of the father in the family: providing 
security, cohesion, and solidarity. Pye's interpretation of the family and 
the state makes it clear that '[Confucianism] elevated government and 
the family to be the two key institutions of society, with each 
reinforcing the other' (1985: 61). This has a number of consequences. 
One is that the family is integrated into politics, thus becoming a 
legitimate resource-source. The other is that conflicts between different 
political groups are difficult to organise because 'family loyalties' may 
cross-cut political divisions. The kaleidoscopic realignments, which are 
common in the coalition politics in the West, are difficult to conduct 
in East Asian societies. 
The social dynamics leading to the Western modernisation 
originate from an emphasis on individualism which is a common 
feature of Roman Law and Christian morality. Many modern concepts 
such as contract, equality, and rights are based on individualistic ethic 
and outlook. Individualism has always been one of the mainstream 
values in the modern West. Weber's well-known work, The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, illustrates this centrality 
of individualism and rationalism well. This-worldly success has to be 
an individual success because individuals, rather than families or 
groups, are God's chosen. 
Uneven modernisation has a somewhat different social 
dynamics. The key role in the East Asian path has been played by the 
family and the state. Modernisation in society, economy and polity has 
been manipulated by the state, and has followed a familial logic, thus 
promoting a family-centred development. The family-centred 
networks have constituted a strong base for developments of 
individual and the key mediator-legitimiser of state interventions. 
These two patterns of modernisation are reflected in different 
recruitment of political elites, and in different configurations of 
political opportunities for women and the availibility of gender-
specific political resources. 
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Women, Political Elite Recruitment And Modernisation 
The strong universalism coded into the Western modernisation 
pattern has been conducive to equalitarian reforms, especially the 
elimination of various forms of discrimination, including gender 
discrimination. Under the impact of social trends, civil rights and 
feminist movements, the most salient forms of discrimination and the 
most conspicuous inequalities of opportunity have been gradually 
eliminated. 
The East Asian pattern of modernisation has not been conducive 
to such equalisation of opportunities. The gender gap in opportunities 
has remained wide in spite of dramatic improvements in standards of 
living, education and political participation. However, the persistence 
of this gender gap, tolerated and even encouraged by Confucianism, 
has some paradoxical effects. The persistence of gender specific roles 
also means the persistence of gender specific resources. Women in East 
Asian societies have access to such resources in pursuit of political 
careers, even though they have more restricted opportunities for 
political advancement than their sisters in advanced Western societies. 
In the latter, women enjoy much more equal opportunities than in 
East Asian societies. However, they cannot tap 'gender specific' 
resources, because the legitimacy of the latter is undermined by the 
very principles of universalism that have propelled egalitarian social 
and political reforms. Women have to compete as the equals of men, 
on the same terms as men. That is, women and men are equal 
individuals whose merits and achievements are judged by common 
criteria without gender-specific standards. Such competition, however, 
puts women at a disadvantage because of their limited access to 
political resources. 
Patterns of Modernisation, Opportunities and Resources 
Both the imperial tradition of educational meritocracy, and the state-
promoted modernisation drive, have made education an essential 
political and moral qualification in political contests. In the Confucian 
ethos, the top politicians should be well-educated people who are 
moral and intellectual models for the masses. It is not surprising that 
in East Asia access to education is the key element of the political 
opportunity structure, and Taiwan especially shows this feature. 
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Educational credentials, which are set by the electoral law in Taiwan, 
are one of the requirements for all legislative candidates at the 
national levell. 
Political resources are closely linked with the modern 
organisations and the family. Basically, there are two main sources of 
political resources. One is formal political organisations. The resources 
controlled by political organisations are similar to those in most 
Western political organisations. They include financial support, 
influence, campaign staff, mobilisation of organisational networks and 
media exposure. The other type of resources derives from the family 
and community; these include support, money and influence in local 
factions, geographical ties and acquaintanceship, and so on (Palley 1992: 
792; Nathan 1993: 428-29). Because the government is seen as the 
extension of the family, many familial ties can be easily transferred 
into politics and become powerful campaign resources. 
As mentioned above, Confucian societies have followed a 
modernisation path that has not weakened gender division and 
inequalities. Compared with Western modernisation, women have 
lower political opportunities due to the emphasis on their 
performance of gender specific familial roles, even though women's 
representation in labour markets and their education is improving. 
Yet, this does not mean women are totally confined by their familial 
roles because the family plays a dual role in women's access to political 
opportunities in the context of running for political office. It is both a 
confiner and a facilitator. It confines women to familial roles, but 
facilitates access to familial resources. Some studies (eg. Chou et al. 
1990, 1992) show familial socialisation is an important influence 
encouraging women to run for political office. On the other hand, the 
family is often reluctant to release women from their gender specific 
duties. This contradiction is sometimes revealed under a basic 
Confucian belief that to practice filial piety is to honour one's family. 
Women politicians (like their male counterparts) are thus defined as 
promoting the status and interests of the family. 
1 According to the Statute and Implementation Rules on the Election and Recall of 
Public Officials, all candidates (at the national level) must be graduates of senior 
high schools or pass the Junior-grade Civil Service Examination. 
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The point we stress is that if the role of a woman politician is 
defined in this way, she can tap the broad range of resources the family 
controls, and she can utilise gender-specific resources in political 
campaigns. For example, women politicians in Taiwan can evoke their 
status as 'good mothers' or 'wives' which reverberates well in 
traditionally family-oriented Confucian society. They stand as family 
figures and can mobilise strong local support. In this sense, women in 
Confucian societies can access wider political resources than their 
Western counterparts. The latter are, on average, less confined by 
gender-specific family roles, but also unable to utilise gender statuses 
in politics in any other way than claiming 'affirmative' privileges. 
Formal organisations play a similar role in Confucian societies to 
those in the West in distributing resources, such as financial support, 
political skills, and organisational affiliations. Women in those 
organisations face similar problems to those faced by women in 
Western societies. Yet, there are other resources, such as child care and 
financial support essential to women candidates that organisations are 
unlikely to supply. These resources are often available to women in 
Confucian societies via their wide family networks. Past studies 
suggest that lack of these resources hinders women's political 
recruitment in Western societies (McAllister 1992; Rogers 1993; 
Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1994). 
The family is a 'special' political resource for women in 
Confucian societies. Its role is enhanced by close association between 
the family and the government. The latter is often seen as an 
enlargement and extension of the family and family roles can be easily 
transformed into political resources. Thus while in the West women's 
domestic roles and responsibilities are often seen as an impediment to 
their political careers 2, in Confucian societies they may be seen as 
sources of political clout. 
In Confucian societies, women can transfer their 'successful 
familial roles' into political assets. Male candidates are not able to do 
that because their familial roles are vague. They cannot claim credit for 
2 Studlar and McAllister (1991: 477) write: "In advanced industrial societies, it 
appears to be a positive advantage for male candidates to be married and to have 
children. By contrast, for a female politician it represents a double burden which 
inhibits her electoral potential." 
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successful performance in the family because they are seen as general 
providers rather than essential runners of the family. 
Thus the family in 'patriarchal' Confucian society may become a 
rich resource provider for aspiring women politicians. In contrast, 
Western modernisation creates a woman-friendly environment with 
equal political opportunities, but seldom produces political resources 
widely accessible for women. This is reflected in the disproportionately 
low presence of women in political elites around the world. This also 
brings us to the wider topic of the nature and sources of gender 
inequality in politics. 
Gender Inequality and Modernisation 
Women's under-representation in political elites should be seen as an 
aspect of a broader societal pattern of gender inequality. Gender 
inequality in education, and occupational and organisational 
hierarchies lead to women's relatively unequal access to power 
resources and opportunities. As Western (1983: 133) points out, in his 
study of Australian society, 
Gender is having an independent effect (...) there are gender-
based differences within the society which importantly determine 
the manner in which valued resources are distributed among its 
members. 
One consequence is that women's career paths are different from 
men's paths. Women's working careers, for example, are more likely 
to be part-time, in low levels of authority, and in clerical, nursing and 
teaching occupations (Western 1983; Galvin and West 1988; Bradley 
1994). Women have fewer career choices than men, and fewer 
opportunities in political competition. 
Some feminist authors argue that gender inequality in modern 
capitalist societies is rooted in the distinction between the private 
sphere, relating to the domestic and familial activities, and the public 
sphere, relating to non-familial economic and political activities. The 
central concept in their analysis is patriarchy. It refers to a pattern of 
domination in the family, and a social system with different aspects of 
gender inequality (Walby 1990). Modern capitalism, according to this 
argument, plays a significant role in maintaining, consolidating and 
restructuring this patriarchal system of male domination. While 
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biological reproduction causes women's subordinate status, capitalist 
domination adds to patriarchal domination by aggravating market 
exclusion and limiting property rights (Firestone 1972; Mitchell 1971; 
Eisenstein 1979, 1981; Rosaldo 1974; Ortner 1974; Brenner and Ramas 
1984; Bradley 1994; Walby 1994). This is reflected in views on remedial 
strategies which stress that economic independence is the key to 
women's liberation (see Barrett 1980). Women's equal participation in 
the labour market is identified as the key condition of gender equality. 
However, it is limited when paid work is controlled by 'patriarchal 
relations in the workplace and in the state, as well as by those in the 
househould' (Walby 1994: 23). 
In fact, the structure of gender inequality can be seen as a series of 
gender-related pratices. Connel (1987: 91-118) points out that labour, 
power and cathexis reflect three dimensions of gender inequality, and 
they are differently arranged in different institutions ranging from the 
family, work place, to the state. Gender division of labour, according to 
him, women are posted in the position of disadvantage. Men can also 
gain control over women through kinship system, economic 
production, and state agencies. Similarly, 'the construction of 
emotionally charged relationships with objects' (1987: 112) which 
structures affectual relations of the members of a society, leads to 
stereotypisation and gender discrimination. This tripartite of gender 
domination structure constraint women's access to, and elevation in, 
society, economy and politics. 
Modernisation only partly reduces gender domination. While 
women are no longer excluded from access to certain occupations and 
political representation, they are still segregated and subordinated 
within modern capitalist economy and politics. There is a 'glass 
ceiling' limiting women's opportunities of promotion (Kanter 1977). 
As Walby (1990) points out, the shift from exclusionary closure to 
segregation can be seen 'in the institutional form of each of the 
structures'. 
Modern forms of gender domination shift from an individual-
familial to more collective-occupational form. Waters (1989) argues 
that the concept of patriarchy is unable to describe accurately these 
modern structures of gender inequality. He analyses what Walby calls 
public patriarchy as an 'extended viriarchy'. While in a patriarchal 
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system the senior men of extended kinship webs exert control over 
women, in a viriarchy all adult males enjoy collective advantage 
regradless of their location in the kinship webs. By and large, women's 
inferior status in gender relations is produced by the interaction of 
economic and non-economic viriarchal organisations in modern 
societies. The viriarchal patterns of inequality in the major 
institutional orders such as educational and the economy, form the 
framework of what we call political opportunity structure. 
While Marxist feminists stress the role of economic institutions 
and property relations as the main generators of gender inequality, 
others point to the importance of cultural and political factors (Berger 
1988; Hsiao 1988). Cultural traditions are typically reinforcing gender 
domination in public spheres that are defined as 'male domains'. Such 
views find confirmation in studies of gender inequalities in non-
capitalist societies (eg. China), and in the analyses of gender 
discrimination in politics. But they are also conducive to a view that 
the key aspects of gender inequality are eliminated, or at least 
weakened, in the process of modernisation. 
To sum up: gender inequalities are linked with sexual division of 
labour in the market, political organisations and the domestic sphere. 
During the processes of modernisation patriarchal forms of gender 
inequality are gradually replaced by viriarchal ones. The latter affect 
the career opportunities of women in public spheres of occupation, 
education and politics. In politics, women are stereotyped as less 
politically interested than men, as less active and capable than men, 
and as less skilled in political analysis. Due to such perceptions, 
women are often excluded from processes of political representation. 
Gender ineuqalities are evident in the composition of political 
elites. We argue that this gender-biased composition reflects women's 
unequal access to political opportunities and resources which are 
closely linked with their success in political recruitment. We examine 
this uneven access and explore gender inequality in political 
recruitment in the following sections. 
Women in Political Elites 
It is believed that the right to vote betokens access to political power, 
and the franchise makes up a certification of eligibility for political 
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leadership. Since the beginning of this century, women have been 
granted franchise in most countries. Women's franchise, however, 
does not open up access to political power, and it is demonstrated by 
the fact that the representation of women in political elites has 
remained very low for most of this century, and is still low in the 1990s 
both in modernised and modernising societies (Aberbach, Putnam and 
Rockman 1981; United Nations 1991, 1992). Australia was a pioneer in 
granting women's political rights both to vote and to stand for the 
national parliament in 1902, but Australian women were not elected to 
the national parliament until 1943. 
Gender imbalance in political power sharing is clearly reflected in 
the composition of political elites. Australia again provides a good 
example. 'Until 1980, when three women candidates were successful, 
there had never more than two women in the House of 
Representatives, and more usually there was none' (Kelly and 
McAllister 1983: 366). In other old democracies, such as the US and the 
UK, the proportion of women in political elites also remains low: 7% 
and 6.4%, respectively (The Economist, November 19th 1994). Even in 
Nordic societies, renown for their egalitarian policies, there is a 
considerable gender gap in politics. While women form a much higher 
proportion of political elites than in other societies, gender 
composition of political elites is still unbalanced (Eduards 1981; 
Haavio-Mannila '1981a, 1981b; Skard 1981; Bystydzienski 1988; Keranen 
1990; Parvikko 1991; Phillips 1991; Siim 1991; Skjeie 1991; Nicholson 
1993) (see Figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.2 Percentage of Women in Lower House in 25 Countries, 1993 
Source: The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
1994: 27-28. 
Note: The persentage in Taiwan refers to the proportion of women  in the 
Legislative Yuan. 
The imblance is much greater in Asian societies (Hargadine 1981; 
Darcy and Song 1986; Hooper 1989; Abeyasekere 1989; Miki et al. 1992; 
Fung and Teo 1993; Park 1993; Soh 1993; Yasuko 1993; Roces 1994) (see 
Figure 1.2). In order to increase the representation of women in 
political elites the quota system has been employed in some countries 
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(Chou et al. 1990) and some political parties have started to give 
women preferential treatment (see Gallagher and March 1988; Kelber 
1994). Such a system, however, is not 'absolutely certain of creating 
equality of representation between the sexes' (Valen 1988: 223). In 
Taiwan, the quota system, introduced in 1947, reserves for women 10% 
of legislative seats. Male candidates cannot fill these seats even if there 
are not enough women candidates. For several decades, women's 
presence in political elites in Taiwan has been at approximately this 
reserved 10% level. Some scholars (eg. Liang 1987, 1993; Lee 1990) 
criticise this quota system, arguing that it has become a barrier for 
women political aspirants because political parties treat the reserved 
10% as a 'maximum' and are reluctant to nominate more women 
candidates than the quota. 
While the quota system boosts women's recruitment into 
political elites, it does not eliminate gender barriers in political elite 
recruitment. Most studies of women's under-representation in politics 
focus on three types of factors responsible for gender imbalance: 
cultural factors, socioeconomic factors, and institutional factors 
(Currell 1974; Kirkpatrick 1974; Welch 1978; Mackerras 1980; Jones and 
Nelson 1981; Rasmussen 1981; Rule 1981, 1987; Sawer 1981; Nuss 1982; 
Kelly and McAllister 1983; Hunter and Denton 1984; Bernstein 1986; 
Studlar and Welch 1987; Gallagher and Marsh 1988; McRae 1990; 
Welch and Studlar 1990; Studlar and McAllister 1991; McAllister 1992; 
Rule 1994). 
Cultural factors mainly refer to traditional images, values and 
norms that constrain women's access to politics. Kirkpatrick (1974) lists 
four hypothetical constraints: physiological, cultural, role constraints, 
and male conspiracy, as the main barriers to women's pursuit and 
exercise of power. After studying 46 women incumbents at the state 
level in US, she concludes that physiological constraints, male 
resistance, and even cultural constraints are less inhibiting to women's 
participation in decision-making than the traditional sex role 
requirements. The confinement of gender roles is regarded as being 
responsible for women's reduced access to politics and as leading to 
their underrepresentation in political elites. An obvious factor is that 
women have been burdened with disproportionate and heavy family 
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responsibilities, and these are seen as inhibiting their electoral 
potential and political success. 
Socioeconomic factors are mainly associated with women's 
employment and occupation. In her study of British women MPs, 
Currell (1974: 166) suggests that women are different from men in that 
they are less frequently successful in business. Lovenduski and Hills 
(1981), in conclusion of their book of women in twenty countries, 
point to a strong association between political activism and women's 
participation in the labour market. Occupational credentials are often 
treated as essential for success in elections. Women's access to 
professional jobs is limited and that limits their opportunity to get 
'membership' in the eligible pools from which political elites are 
typically recruited. 
Institutional factors refer mainly to the effects of electoral systems 
on women's political recruitment. The impact of party lists, 
proportional representation and the type of electorate are seen as the 
most important influences on women's recruitment into political 
elites. Some studies (eg. Duverger 1955; Currell 1974; Rule 1987; Darcy 
et al. 1994) show that there is a positive relationship between 
proportional representation (PR) and women's chances of election to 
political elites. Also, multi-member electorates are likely to be more 
advantageous to women than single member ones. Many scholars 
believe that women's recruitment into political elites is influenced 
mainly by the electoral system. In this view, women fall victims of a 
vicious cycle: they are not elected because they are not incumbents; and 
because they are not elected, they cannot be incumbents. 
However, some studies dispute these conclusions, Gallagher 
(1988: 268) for example, stressing the role of gatekeepers. He argues that 
[w]hile a PR electorate system obviously makes the selection of 
women more likely, it is not the electoral system which does the 
selecting. The selectors are not the prisoners of the electoral 
system. The active role of the selection process in determining 
how many women enter Parliament should not be overlooked. 
The final decision about candidate selection and placement is 
frequently made by the most senior party leaders (Putnam 1976: 54). 
This means that the process of selection by the leaders-gatekeepers 
rather than the electoral system itself is crucial to understanding 
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women's access to political elites. To stress women's political force, 
Matland (1993) argues that party size should be considered in the 
context of the entire political environment. Since women become a 
major political force, the impact of the electoral system alone is no 
longer significant. This view is also reflected in recent studies. As Rule 
(1987: 494-5) points out 
Women's political activity is very important for increasing 
women's recruitment in parliament in various electoral systems. 
Negative impacts of the electoral system have been overcome by 
women's political mobilisation. 
Affirmative action and changes in electoral laws are also seen as an 
effective way to enhance women's representation, although the 
Australian Labour Party experience in the last federal election would 
be evidence against this view. Especially in most advanced 
industrialised societies women's movements are so strong that they 
may successfully change traditional gender divisions and reduce the 
extent of gender inequality. They do it typically by seeking state 
intervention, such as the introduction of Equal Opportunity policies 
and laws. Yet the impact of institutional factors on women aspirants 
has not diminished. This seems to be in line with the disappearance of 
patriarchy and the formation of viriarchal organisations in Western 
societies, like Australia, and with the continuity of patriarchy and 
viriarchy in East Asian societies, like Taiwan. 
Women's Political Recruitment and Modernisation 
All elite studies imply that there is a connection between women's 
recruitment into political elites and modernisation. Modernisation 
leads to alternations of gender roles and stimulates growth of women's 
paid employment. It also creates more channels of political 
recruitment, equalises opportunities, and establishes rationalised and 
universalistic criteria of selection. This is especially important for 
women aspirants for two reasons. First, the ascribed status, such as 
gender, is no longer an unassailable barrier. Second, the political 
opportunities for women improve together with increasing 
opportunities for education and employment. In this sense, women 
are more likely to be incoperated into 'the circulation of elites'. The 
openning up of political opportunities for women follows 
44 
modernisation. Women's participation in the labour market also 
provides opportunities of access to status granting and resource-rich 
organisations. This means that women can hold positions in 
organisations with access to, and control over, political resources. This 
view, although widespread among students of elites, has been heavily 
qualified by some feminists, who point to the remarkable persistence 
of gender inequalities in highly modernised societies. The two views 
on women and modernisation — the optimistic and the qualified — 
deserve more careful scrutiny. 
Most scholars believe that modernisation is essentially beneficial 
for women suffering from various forms of traditional-patriarchal 
domination. Modernisation is believed to erode patriarchal traditions 
and make society gender-neutral, open, equal and merit-based. Thus 
the key improvements in women's access to the public spheres are 
results of modernisation. This view reflects a dichotomous 
perspective: 'traditional societies are male-dominated and 
authoritarian, and modern societies are democratic and egalitarian' 
(Jaquette 1982: 269). 
With the exception of Marxist feminists, this view of 
modernisation as woman-friendly is virtually taken for granted. 
Industrialisation, technology, and changes in social values and norms 
are closely related to women's access to the public sphere (Lengermann 
and Wallace 1985; Lauer 1991: 342-50). Industrialisation extracts women 
from the confines of domestic-familial roles, and reduces the negative 
social consequences of traditionalism. Demographic changes, 
combined with contraception, release women from uncontrolled and 
long-term child-bearing. Access to education widens their 
opportunities to obtain skills and to participate in paid work. Modern 
liberal democracy creates more opportunities for women to exert 
influence on government policies than pre-modern forms of polity 
(Lovenduski 1992: 610). The transformation of the familial roles and 
structures (especially the weakening of kinship ties) gives women 
more access to out-of-home activities. Achievement motivation, as an 
essential feature of modernity, is seen as an important element to push 
women into the public sphere. Paradoxically, the traits of 'modern 
men' (Inkeles 1964), maybe more of the features of :modern women', 
who become the main beneficiary of modern trends. Universalism and 
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egalitarianism gradually weaken patriarchal values and norms, and 
undermine institutionalised forms of gender discrimination. Women 
gain control over reproduction and access to information that together 
help them in altering unequal gender relations. 
This view is challenged by some feminist studies based mainly on 
empirical data from the modernising societies (Boserup 1970; Rogers 
1979; Chandler et al. 1988; Marshall et al. 1988). The authors of these 
studies argue that this woman-friendly view of modernisation over-
emphasises the positive effects and exaggerates women's access to the 
public sphere (eg. Black 1976). The consequences of modernisation that 
are detrimental to women are ignored. Improved technology in 
farming may decrease women's access to productive work and thus 
lower their status. Women's kinship support networks, as well as their 
traditional economic and social roles, are thus reduced Women start to 
occupy lowly paid and low-status positions in modernised economies. 
Opportunities and Resources 
These debates suggest that the relationship between women's 
opportunities and resources on one hand, and the process of 
modernisation on the other, are more complex than is suggested by 
both apologists and critics of modernisation. In order to capture this 
complexity, we have outlined a model of recruitment in which 
women's access to political elite positions is seen as a product of both 
social opportunities and available political resources. The former refer 
to societal patterns of access to those social characteristics which 
determine political selectability, in particular social status. The latter 
refer to those characteristics which constitute political assets and which 
allow political aspirants to pass each gatekeeper's selection. While 
opportunities reflect the broader patterns of stratification, resources are 
more politically circumscribed — they make successful political 
competitors. 
Modern democracy is a type of society in which the opportunities 
are widely open and equal in principle, and elites are recruited from 
different social strata and categories on the basis of individual merit 
(Bottomore 1993: 9). Women's access to politics opens up and becomes 
more equal. But why, in spite of this opening up, do those women 
who seek to run for political office in modern societies still experience 
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considerable difficulty? There are two possible answers to this 
question. First, political opportunities are open to all individuals, but 
'late corners' need to make greater efforts to modify, balance or be 
accustomed to the rules of competition. Second, women do not have 
enough political resources that are essential for political success. We 
discuss these two possibilities respectively. 
While women share the same rights as men in political 
participation, they are 'late corners'. They follow 'man-made' rules in 
political contests. Many studies indicate that women are sifted out 
from the 'eligible pools' not necessarily because they have lower skills 
and capacities, but also because of party selectors' bias (eg. Mackerras 
1980; Rasmussen 1981; Sawer 1981; Kelley and McAllister 1983). The 
established elites, which are predominantly male, are reluctant to 
share political power with women 'late corners'. Therefore, in order to 
enter political 'springboard positions', women have to resemble male 
elites. Women have to prove that they share the values, priorities and 
the behaviours, of their male superordinates (Chafetz 1990: 221, 226). 
They have to play the 'male game'. This pushes women into 
disadvantageous position of being forced to be man-like and to play 
under the man-made rules of politics. These rules reward aggressive 
behaviour and 'macho' attitudes which women have learned to abhor. 
There is also an argument that the equalisation of opportunities 
has not been acomplished. Women's status is still lower than men's, 
especially in the crucial areas of occupation and in the political 
organisations. Comparative data from East Asia, in particular, show 
• the slower pace of egalitarian trends, as far as gender gap is concerned 
(United Nations 1991, 1992). 
In the process of Western modernisation political resources 
change, shifting from the private to the public spheres. Rationalised 
authority replaces most traditional, religious, and familial authorities. 
Modern bureaucracy based on meritocratic principles becomes the 
dominant organisational form (Weber 1948: 197). While in traditional 
patrimonial and patriarchal systems of authority lineage, age and 
status constituted the key political assetts, modern political 
bureaucracies are increasingly education and skill oriented. Promotion 
in such organisations also requires specific, political connections, 
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media exposure and, last but not least, money, especially when 
political elevation follows long public campaigns. 
Thus political resources in modern politics are highly organised 
and increasingly controlled by organisations. Access to political 
resources relies on aspirants' affiliations with formal organisations, 
such as poitical parties, trade unions, lobby groups and interest groups. 
Modernisation does not necessarily increase women's access to 
resources. As many of these resources are transferred from the private 
to the public areas and to large organisations, they may, in fact, move 
out of women's reach. In pre-modern societies, the family performs 
multiple functions. As Stacey and Price claim (1981: 13) 'Women have 
had power before, but always as members of families.' In modern 
societies, many functions, such as education and economy, are played 
by specialised institutions. The family shrinks and is increasingly 
separated from the public sphere. Individuals develop their capacities 
to accumulate, organise, and allocate resources in formal 
organisations. 
Women share the value of individualism 'which became the 
right of men as a concomitant to industrial capitalism' (Stacey and 
Price 1981: 13). Ironically, they rely heavily on male-dominated 
organisations. As a result, women suffer the disadvantage of difficult 
access to crucial political resources. As Cahfetz (1990: 222-3) claims: 
The possibility of enhancing women's representation among 
elites rests upon their increasing control of resources due to their 
greater labour-force participation and upon the equitable division 
of household and familial labour (...) To gain entrance in more 
than token numbers, women will probably have to employ their 
resources collectively and coercively (...) In order to run, 
especially for state or national office, extensive resources are 
required. 
Complex bureaucracies operate according to regular procedures and 
rules clearly defined within a hierarchical authority structure. 
Bureaucratic power rests in positions, regardless of who occupies these 
positions. Western modernisation leads to the domination of 
bureaucracies, and encourages professionalisation of political 
leadership. Bureaucratic organisations become a key supplier of 
political resources that affect aspirants' success in running for political 
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office. Women may not benefit from these changes to the same extent 
as men do because the criteria of bureaucratic selection and promotion 
centre around the lifestyle of men and are a musculine construction 
which marginalises women's life cycle (Pateman 1988; Gordon 1994). 
For example, a continuous occupational career is seen as a prereqisite 
for senority which is the key criterion of promotion in bureaucracies. 
Because women's careers are often disrupted by childbearing, women 
may suffer a serious disadvantage. 
By and large, modernisation lessens patriarchal discrimination 
and generates more equal political opportunities. But because 
women's success in political recruitment relies heavily also on their 
access to resources, the woman-friendliness of modernisation is an 
open question. Their access to political elites may or may not increase 
with the waning of patriarchy and gradual errosion of viriarchal 
patterns. The following chapter will examine the way women's 
political opportunities widen, and how their resources are 
accumulated in two paths of modernisation. 
Summary 
The present discussion of women, elites and modernisation suggests 
four propositions: 
1. Women's access to political elites depends on opportunities 
and resources. The former reflect the overall position of women in the 
societal structure; the latter reflect access to specific political assets. 
2. The society-specific combinations of opportunities and 
resources form in the process of social and political change and reflect 
the overall pattern of modernisation. Different paths of modernisation 
produce different gender balances of political opportunities and 
resources. 
3. Australia and Taiwan represent two very different paths and 
patterns of modernisation labelled here 'Western' (liberal 
individualistic/even) and 'East Asian' (Confucianised/uneven). The 
former reflects in equalising and widening opportunities for women, 
but does not necessarily open access to political resources (controlled by 
bureaucratic organisations). The latter does not lead to such rapid 
opening up of opportunities, but gives women access to some 
important political resources which are controlled by families. 
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4. These differences are reflected in (1) a similar levels of gender 
(under-)representation in political elites, and (2) different political 
career structures of successful women politicians in Australia and 
Taiwan. In Australia organisational careers of 'apprentice' type should 
prevail, while in Taiwan one should find most women following 
family-sponsored, 'client' type careers. 
50 
CHAPTER TWO 
MODERNISATION IN TAIWAN AND AUSTRALIA 
This Chapter focuses on modernisation processes in Taiwan and 
Australia. These two societies exemplify two different patterns and 
paths of modernisation: the East Asian (uneven) and Western (even) 
paths. The Chapter starts with a brief historical background and is 
divided into three sections: on the economic, social and cultural, and 
political aspects of modernisation. 
Historical Background 
In order to understand the different patterns of modernisation in 
Taiwan and Australia, it is necessary to look at the historical 
backgrounds of the two societies. Social dynamics of modernisations 
emanated from quite different historical legacies. Women's roles and 
positions in societies have been shaped and changed in the context of 
these different legacies. 
Taiwan's history was a history of colonisation and migration, and 
so was Australia's. The early settlers in Taiwan were fishermen, 
traders, and gangsters. In Australia, they included settlers, convicts and 
colonial administrators. In both cases the colonisers had displaced and 
marginalised aboriginal populations. 
Taiwan had been colonised by Portugal, Spain, and Holland for a 
short period, then controlled by China (1662-1895), then ceded to Japan 
(1895-1945), and finally taken back by China to become a province of 
the Republic of China (under the KMT government) after the Second 
World Warl. Historically, the Western impact on Taiwan was 
negligible until the World War II. While Japan occupied Taiwan for a 
half century, the influence of Japanese culture was alleviated because 
Japan had also been a Confucian society. The mainstream of Taiwan's 
culture has always been Chinese Confucianism. 
Such a multi-colonial historical background has triggered debates 
about national identity issue. The issue of unequal distribution of 
1 Taiwan became a province of imperial China in 1884 (the Ching Dynasty). In 1894, 
China and Japan went to war. Due to the defeat of the war, China ceded Taiwan and 
the Pescadores to Japan under the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. 
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political power between mainlanders and native Taiwanese has 
continued to be a crucial element of these debates. Under these 
circunstances, clarifying what constitutes the national identity and 
reducing the conflict between the native Taiwanese and mainlanders 
have become a critical issue, thus overshadowing the importance of 
gender issues. 
Unlike Taiwan's 'multi-colonial' history, the past of Australia 
has been shaped by British colonisation and British heritage. The 
traditions of convicts, pioneers, and the mateship ethos of the 
bushman's life, have shaped White Australia's culture and identity 
since the nineteenth century. The key elements of this identity were 
individualism, self-reliance and strong egalitarianism. The harshness 
of the early years of settlement also promoted conformism as a means 
of collective survival and the unusual role of the state as a natural 
arbitrator in society. All these factors have contributed to shape the 
character of Australian society and Australians' political outlooks 
(Hancock 1961; Horne 1965; McGregor 1968, 1980; Ward 1978; 
McAllister 1992; Connell and Irving 1992; Lovell et al. 1995). These 
cultural legacies already defined gender identities, and placed the 
emphasis on masculine domination. Colonial women experienced 
exploitation, exclusion, hardship and isolation. Women were 
stereotyped as 'damned whores' and 'God's police', and they were also 
described as 'the doormats of the western world'. The conditions of the 
colonial settlements were seen as factors determining the continuing 
low status of Australian women (Dixson 1976; Grimshaw 1990; 
Summers 1994a). 
Unlike Australia, Taiwan has never been a stable, self-governed, 
independent polity until the KMT's retreat. The civil war between the 
KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) caused turmoil in 
Taiwan's economy and slowed down the development of the island 
society in the early 1950s. In addition, the Taiwanese 2 were initially 
totally excluded from the government. Since Taiwan had been 
2 All Taiwanese and mainlanders are Chinese. Mainlanders refer to the post-Second 
World War immigrants and their Taiwan-born offspring; they account for about 15% of 
the total population. Taiwanese refer to native born and their decendants. In fact, the 
Taiwanese are the decendants of people who migrated to Taiwan from the Chinese 
mainland before 1945. The only indigenous Taiwanese are aborigines whose population 
is about 300,000. See A. Y. L. Lu (1985: 1085-1092). 
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colonised by Japan for 50 years prior to the civil war, the incoming 
mainlanders distrusted the Taiwanese. A gap and a tension between 
the Taiwanese and the mainlanders were created. The most serious 
conflict between the two was the 2-28 Incident, which erupted on 
February 28, 19473 . It happened in Taipei, and very soon the protests 
spread to the whole island. The KMT army suppressed the protests 
eventually, but the political wound has never healed. This incident 
had sowed the seeds of the tension between mainlanders and the 
Taiwanese, and the political opposition movement in subsequent 
decades reflected this tension (Lu 1985; Moody 1992). 
The KMT lost the civil war and retreated to Taiwan in 1949. 
However, it has still seen itself as the successor of the Republic of 
China. The KMT sensed that Taiwan was the last line of defence, and 
the greatest preoccupation of the KNIT leaders was to rebuild its regime 
in Taiwan. First, the KMT devoted itself to stabilisation of the 
economy and maintenance of social order. Second, it secured its rule by 
tightly controlling military and political power, and by strengthening 
its political legitimacy (Hu 1989; Cheng 1989; Nathan 1990). Because the 
legitimacy of the Republic was rooted in mainland China (Dr Sun Yet-
sen built it in 1912), bringing the legitimate authority back to the 
mainland became the goal of the KNIT regime. The KMT leaders have 
been preoccupied by issues of national security, political stability and 
economic growth for four decades. By so doing, they hopes to 
strengthen their legitimacy and, ultimately, restore national unity by 
extending their rule to the mainland. 
Two strategies were adopted to reach these aims. One was to stress 
the common Confucian cultural tradition and the historical tie 
between Taiwan and mainland China. The other was to develop an 
efficient and competitive market economy. Both strategies not only 
helped the KMT in securing its rule in Taiwan, but also served the 
political aim of recovering mainland China. As the late Premier Yen 
Chia-kan (served 1963-72) asserted, 
3 The 2-28 Incident started with police harassment of an old Taiwanese woman 
cigarette-seller. Many Taiwanese people thought that the policeman unjustly treated 
this woman, and it triggered ethnic conflict between mainlanders and native 
Taiwanese. See Gold 1986: 50-51. 
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We believe that in the present situation, accelerated economic 
development and the establishment of a prosperous, stable, 
profit-oriented, modern economic society in this country not only 
can internally strengthen the loyalty of our people (...) Economic 
development also can serve as the force of propulsion in 
prompting the people of the mainland to rise against the Peiping 
lie. Beijing] regime at an early date. (China Yearbook 1972-1973: 
783) 
In fact, the KMT government in Taiwan faced a triple threat. The first, 
and the most serious threat, came from the CCP. The KMT 
government developed Taiwan as an anti-communist base, thus 
directing most resources in consolidating defence. The second threat 
came from the Western culture, especially the US. To contain the 
communist bloc, the US built military bases in Taiwan during the cold 
war period. It recognised the KMT government in Taiwan as the only 
legal government of the Republic of China, and provided a large 
amount of financial aid from 1951 to 1965 (Ying 1985: 58; Jacoby 1966). 
With the building of American military bases and the flow of financial 
aid, American values and popular culture were unavoidably 
permeating Taiwan society. Under the impact of this cultural threat, 
the KMT government deliberately preserved and emphasised the 
Confucian cultural tradition. Since Confucian culture articulated 
Taiwan's ties with mainland China, the KMT government could 
effectively consolidate its political legitimacy by protecting Confucian 
culture and tradition. Confucian culture also provided a basis . for 
popular trust and legitimation. This legitimation was also based on 
very high educational backgrounds of the KMT technocrats. For 
example, in the 1950s and 60s 43 out of 44 top economic planners were 
university graduates; 52% of them had postgraduate degrees from the 
US, and 9% had postgraduate degrees from Europe (Vogel 1991: 26). 
The third threat came from the inside of Taiwan. In order to survive, 
the KMT government had to ease the domestic tensions, and seek the 
support from the native Taiwanese. It adapted two methods to achieve 
this goal. One consisted in incorporating local elites as civil servants in 
the government. The other consisted of a land reform (1949-1953) in 
which many previous land owners were transformed into industrial 
shareholders (Hsiao 1991: 128). 
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These threats, and the responses of the KMT leaders, affected 
women's traditional roles and statuses, and they prompted women's 
access to politics. First, the Chinese Women's Anti-Aggression League 
was established in 1950 by Madame Chiang Kai-shek. The Women's 
Department of the KMT was established in 1953 (also directed by 
Madame Chiang Kai-shek). These women's organisations originally 
aimed at mobilising women to entertain troops, to help the war effort, 
to do social work and charity, to establish contacts with various other 
women's groups, and to boost grassroots support for the KMT (Chou 
and Chiang 1989). While these activities may look like 'party's 
housewife' roles, they encouraged women to participate in social 
activities. More importantly, women activists became practically 
involved in political campaigns as the KMT's staff at the grassroots 
level. This was a starting point for weakening the gender constraints. 
Confucian culture stressed the fulfilment of women's familial 
roles as a major social value. Paradoxically, the private and the public 
spheres were bridged by these familial roles. Further, the strong 
emphasis on the value of education helped to reduce the traditional 
gender discrimination against women. Well-educated women were 
seen as 'elite' candidates rather than 'women' candidates. 
Also, land reforms substantially improved the economic 
condition of women in rural households. The better the economic 
condition, the more opportunities for women to gain access to 
education. Without access to education, women's political 
opportunities were almost nil. 
These factors combined in forming the background for 
modernisation in Taiwan. The momentum to modernisation derived 
from the state, and it was state elite-led. It served the KMT's political 
purpose — to maintain anti-communism and to recover mainland 
China. The well-known slogan, 'all strength is used to anti-
communism; all preparation is for recovering mainland China', 
illustrates well this political orientation. Such orientation, as suggested 
above, was conducive to uneven modernisation with strong economic 
development combined with limited social, cultural and political 
aspects of modernisation. 
This process has been continuing throughout the 1980s and 90s. 
As Chiou (1993a: 17) points out, 
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In the last four decades Taiwan has made startling economic 
progress under the authoritarian rule of the Nationalist 
government, increasing its per capita Gross Domestic Product 
from about U.S. $50 in 1945 to about $8,000 in 1991. Politically, 
however, Taiwan has moved with great caution, reluctance, and 
conservativeness, maintaining martial law and ruthless 
militarist control until 1987. 
Economic Modernisation 
As in other societies, the economy in Taiwan and Australia was 
transformed in the process of industrialisation. Both countries became 
modern industrial capitalist societies. The foundation for their 
economic development was laid in the colonial period. Taiwan was 
paving the way for economic modernisation under the rule of the 
Chinese Empire during the late nineteenth century. Some public works, 
the sugar industry, mining, tea trade associations, and modern schools 
were developed. Modern capitalist relations were established by 1905. In 
Australia the initial economic progress was accelerated by the gold rush 
and wool booms. Both contributed to the establishment of financial 
markets and the development of a transport system and construction. 
Increasing population, extending pastoralism and mining changed 
Australian economic life dramatically (Ho 1985; Lin 1987; Waters and 
Crook 1993; Connell and Irving 1992). 
Women's roles and status had changed in this process. However, 
these changes had been slow. The first impressive changes, in terms of 
growing female participation in paid employment, did not happen until 
Australia's entry in World War II, and until the establishment of the 
export-processing zones in Taiwan (Encel et al. 1974; Eccles 1984; Bian 
1985; Lee 1985; Tsai 1989). Women's paid employment was an important 
indicator of their growing involvement in public life, in particular their 
improving access to politics. 
Taiwan and Australia developed their economies along different 
paths, and women were integrated into each economy in a different 
way. Australian women were encouraged to fill vacancies left by men 
who were recruited into the army during World Wars I and II. The 
Taiwanese women were encouraged to participate in paid work and to 
accumulate wealth for the family in the politically prompted economic 
modernisation drive, mainly in export-processing zones. The most 
important difference between Australia and Taiwan was in the role of 
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the family. The family in Taiwan was more fully integrated into paid 
employment while the role of women remained circumscribed by 
patriarchal norms. In Australia, the process of modernisation resulted 
in individualisation, exclusion of the family from production and the 
public sphere of politics, and the erosion of a gender-specific division of 
labour in the domestic sphere (Encel 1974; Winckler 1987; Greenhalgh 
1988; Redding 1990). 
Industrialisation, the Family, and Women in Taiwan 
Large scale and planned industrialisation in Taiwan was based on the 
growth of the agricultural sector after the Second World War. The 
KMT government introduced economic reforms4 and rural reforms 5 
which boosted the agricultural sector and increased income equality, 
improved the infrastructure 6 , and started the import-substitution 
industrialisation (Myers 1984; Gold 1986: 56-73; Chou et al. 1990: 38; 
Hsiao 1991: 129). The KMT government adapted the strategy that 'the 
agricultural sector is used to nurse the industrial sector, and the 
industrial sector helps to develop the agricultural sector'. It 
implemented land reforms, developed agriculture and promoted then 
import substitution industrialisation. The majority of the labour force 
was absorbed by the agricultural sector during this period. While the 
female labour force increased from 848,000 in 1953 to 1,009,000 in 1964, 
the average annual growth rate of the female labour force was only 
1.6% during the same period (Lee 1985: 3). Women's paid employment 
was rare because of the social norms, high fertility rates, and few 
employment opportunities. 
4 Economic reforms included the introduction of the New Taiwan dollar, reduction of 
interest rates, rigid control over the financial system to control the increasing of money 
supply and credit, and unification of the foreign exchange rate. 
5 Rural reforms include the land reform, the improvement of agricultural techniques, 
and social reforms in villages. Among them, the land reforms played a key role. From 
1949 to 1953, there were three-stage land reforms: farm rental reduction, the sale of 
public farming land to farmers, and the "land to the tiller" plan which helped tenant 
farmers become owner-farmers. See Huang, T C. (1986) The Retrospect of Rural 
Development in Taiwan, in C. L. Chu (ed.) Social Change and Development in Taiwan. 
Taipei: Dongta. (in Chinese). 
6 These infrastructures included some light industries, mining, electric power and 
transport system which were built by the Japanese but destroyed during the Second 
World War. In addition, the textile and fertiliser industries as well as electric power 
were also developed. 
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The establishment of export processing zones in the mid-1960s 
was a milestone for women's employment. Young peasant girls 
comprised one-third of the total work force during this period (Kung 
1981; Kuo 1983; Gold 1986: 89). These export-processing zones 
concentrated on labour-intensive export industries. They had grown 
fastest in 1966-73, and increased the proportion of employment in the 
industrial sector from 22% in the 1940s to 34% in the mid-1960s. The 
female labour force participation rate also rose sharply from 33% in 
1966 to 42% in 1973. Women provided a flexible supply of unskilled 
labour at low cost (Council for Economic Planning and Development 
1984: 104). 41% of employed women worked in manufacturing 
industries in 1973. They were concentrated in textiles, electronics, and 
plastics. The female labour force grew from 1,028,000 to 1,837,000 
between 1965 and 1973. Its average annual growth rate reached 7.5% 
which was more than twice the rate of growth for the male labour 
force (Lee 1985: 8). In other words, the female labour force increased by 
66% from 1966 to 1973. The labour-intensive industries not only 
absorbed the growing number of female workers, but also encouraged 
mobilisation of the new 'womenpower' gradually relieved of domestic 
duties. 
Because of women's growing participation in paid employment, 
low income families could improve their economic position. The rise 
in incomes, in turn, facilitated women's access to longer education. 
This growing access will be discussed later in the section on social 
modernisation. 
Women with pre-school age children worked in their homes. 
The state-sponsored 'living room factories' program encouraged those 
who could not work in factories to do piece-work at home (Cheng and 
Hsiung 1992: 243). In fact, by associating domestic duties with paid 
work at home, not only women, but also other family members were 
mobilised to take up paid work. The family was tightly integrated into 
the labour market. 
Families not only supplied a flexible labour force, but also utilised 
their networks to build small and medium size family firms, especially 
during the economic boom. Business families heavily depended on 
their own savings to start or expand businesses, and many got loans 
from friends- and relatives or, in rural areas, from local credit 
58 
associations. Most employees in these family enterprises were family 
members. The small and medium-sized family businesses played a 
critical role in Taiwan's economy and contributed to relatively equal 
distribution of household income. They have been mushrooming 
since the early 1970s. A very high proportion of private industrial 
firms have been organised along familial lines. Their success has 
depended on the mobilisation of the family resources and social 
networks (Greenhalgh 1984; Vogel 1991; Gold 1991b). 
The family continued to play a vital role in the transformation of 
Taiwan's economy in the 1980s, from a labour-intensive to a capital-
intensive, high-technology one. In 1981 the Hsinchu Science and 
Industry Park was set up. It was modelled on Silicon Valley in 
California. Many scientists who had worked in the US came back to 
Taiwan to assist their families or friends in funding new firms. While 
staying in their American companies, some organised subcontracts 
with their former cousins, classmates or friends who worked in 
Taiwan's companies (Vogel 1991). Family-centred business links have 
never been an uncommon strategy in Taiwan. Even in the 1990s, 
family firms are still the dominant form of enterprise, although the 
proportion of the unpaid family workers is decreasing. 
This family-based economic transformation had a strong impact 
on women. While the growth rates of the workforce slowed down, the 
growth rates of female workforce remained higher than men's (3.4% to 
2.7%) (Chiang 1989: 98-99). The proportion of white-collar women 
workers has exceeded the proportion of blue-collar females since 1982. 
Like Australian women in the 1970s, The The Taiwanese women have 
moved to the tertiary sector, and started to enter male dominated 
occupations. This has given women access to a greater diversity of 
careers (Eccles 1984: 85; Lee 1985). 
The 'transformation of women's employment' in Taiwan in the 
1980s was mainly promoted by women's increasing access to education. 
With the demographic changes and the successful integration of the 
family into economic modernisation, the traditional Confucian gender 
order started to weaken and women's access to the public sphere of the 
economy started to increase. Women could not only legitimate their 
aspirations to paid employment (increasing family wealth), but also 
demanded a more equal share of family resources for access to 
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education. Education was, in turn, a useful means to gain support for 
participation in political activities. 
Greenhalgh (1984: 529) found that Thamily networks undergird 
both the society and the economy of Taiwan.' This means that the 
family has the ability to link the private and the public spheres, and to 
change the public spheres. Thus, the economic modernisation in 
Taiwan has prompted the integration of women into the economy, 
and, gradually, also the public sphere of politics. 
Industrialisation, the Family and Women in Australia 
Australia began industrialisation earlier than Taiwan. The industrial 
revolution started in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
boosted by the gold rush and based on technology imported from the 
UK, the US and Germany (Jones 1989: 118). Employment in the 
manufacturing industry was tripled in the 1870s. The factory system 
developed, mainly in Sydney and Melbourne. Following the recession 
in the 1890s, mechanisation increased rapidly (Fox 1991). With the 
advancing rationalisation of a capitalist economy, the domestic sphere 
was gradually segregated from economic production. Businesses 
activities were progressively removed from the sphere in which 
women were increasingly confined. 
It is noteworthy that early industrialisation in Australia was not 
associated with a rapid increase of female labour force participation, as 
in Taiwan. Women did not benefit from early industrialisation in 
Australia. 
Industrialisation separated the workforce from the domestic 
sphere. The family became a private domain, and lost connection with 
the public, productive sphere. It had to buy commodities and pay for 
these commodities by selective earning income. This has been done 
through (male) involvement in the labour market (Probert 1994: 161). 
The lives of predominantly male factory workers illustrated this 
change. They were confined to factories while women were confined 
to domestic duties. Women were subjected to patriarchal domination 
attenuated by liberal ideology and egalitarian ethos. A married 
woman's place was at her home: raising children, and catering for her 
husband's needs. The gender division of labour is rigid; married 
women were excluded from paid work, and men were excluded from 
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women's labour at home. Thus the early industrialisation separated 
women, especially married women, from the economy and thus from 
the major source of social status (increasingly engendered in 
occupational roles). 
The capitalist development in Australia speeded up at the turn of 
this century. Technological changes and innovations, especially in 
transport and food processing, pushed the development in 
manufacturing and agriculture. Women started taking jobs in some 
light industries, such as food, textiles, and clothing. A large proportion 
of Australian female labour force became concentrated in routine 
tasks, such as folding sheets of newspaper, sewing, painting cardboard 
boxes, and so on. For the first time, women started to enter the public 
sphere of the economy in large numbers (Fox 1991; Waters and Crook 
1993). However, women's labour force participation rate was still very 
low. The ratio of economically active women to total female 
population was 17% in 1911 (Encel and Campbell 1991: 38). Needless to 
say their political opportunities were also very limited. Politics, like 
the economy was a male business. This was reflected in women's 
education. The curriculum was designed to favour girls receiving 
household arts and preparing for domestic futures. The equation of 
femininity with motherhood influenced educational provision for 
women until the Second World War (Western 1983; Blackburn 1984; 
Summers 1994a). An article in the Bulletin demonstrated such views: 
Women cannot too much learned, provided the learning she has 
helps her to fulfil her varied functions of mother, nurse, educator 
and trainer of her children (...) Woman, as woman, cannot be too 
much or too well educated; but her education must have the 
future well in view (...) Any education which unfits her for the 
fulfilment of her maternal responsibilities is not only useless — it 
is most emphatically a curse. (The Bulletin, 10 May 1890, cited 
from Summers, 1994a: 373) 
World War II changed Australia's economy. It changed the social roles 
of women, and created new employment opportunities for Australian 
women. 'Prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, the social roles of men 
and women were regarded as inflexible: the men brought home the 
wages to maintain the family, while the women bore and brought up 
the children' (Curlewis 1984: 97). War labour shortage changed that. 
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New industries emerged, including manufacturing of aircraft, cars and 
trucks, weapons, optical instruments, pharmaceuticals and electronic 
gear. Fox (1991: 125) described the transformation between the Great 
Depression and the War as 'from one where hundreds of thousands of 
workers could not find jobs to one in which there were not enough 
people to fill the jobs created'. Women were recruited to the labour 
force to replace men who entered the armed forces. They were pulled 
into the occupations for which they had not been trained. Female 
labour force participation rose from 25% in 1939 to 34% in 1943. While 
initially single women were targets of recruitment, after 1942 married 
women were also recruited; 11% of married women held paid jobs by 
1943. Women workers were primarily channelled to three areas: 
auxiliary services, heavy industry, and agriculture. This meant that 
women were entering men's jobs (Richmond 1974; Curlewis 1984; 
Encel and Campbell 1991; Fox 1991). 
After the Second World War, Australia enjoyed more than 20 
years of continuous economic growth — 'the second long boom'. GNP 
was growing 4-5% annually (Jones 1989). 'The economy continued to 
ride safely and comfortably on the sheep's back' (Lees and Senyard 
1987: 9). Ironically, women did not benefit from 'the second long 
boom'. They were pushed back to 'their' place as decommissioned 
men were re-claiming their jobs. This return to patriarchal status quo 
was based on the assumption that '[women's] fulfilment lay in the 
domestic sphere, with the care of children and the home' (Probert 1994: 
154). 
This trend was mirrored by low access to parliamentary positions 
and political elites. Only 2 out of 110 federal parliamentarians were 
women in 1946. The proportion of women federal parliamentarians 
never exceed 3% throughout the 1950s (Macintyre 1991). 
With the creation of a large number of new jobs in community 
service sector, finance, property and business services sector, and the 
wholesale and retail trade sector, Australian women started to re-enter 
the labour market in the 1960s, 70s, and the 80s (Probert 1994). The 
rapid growth of the welfare state in the 1970s boosted women's 
opportunities in the 1970s. While the female labour force participation 
grew from 25% in 1947 to 41% in 1972 (Eccles 1984: 80; Foster and 
Stewart 1991: 152), occupational segregation did not diminish. For 
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instance, in 1971 all stenographers, typists, and receptionists were 
women, but all plasterers, electricians and bricklayers were men. 
Gender segregation in employment was seen as a natural 
differentiation of roles (Western 1983: 149-57; Eccles 1984: 87; Fox 1991: 
147-8). Australian women worked disproportionately at the lowest 
level of authority, and held part-time jobs. According to Western (1991: 
73), Australian women today 
are more likely to be expert non-mangers than men, noticeably 
'lower' professionals, nurses, other health workers and teachers, 
and unskilled managers and supervisors. 
While Australian women's economic roles were changing under the 
impact of their increasing participation in the labour market, their 
familial roles were not publicly recognised. Before the rise of the 
second wave feminist movement, Australian women were often seen 
as domestic labourers and treated as the 'reserved army of industrial 
labour'. When the economy was short of male labour, the female 
labour was absorbed. 
In 1961, only 28% of women aged 20-55 were in the labour force 
(Probert 1994: 162). During the 1970s and 80s, job creation 
overwhelmingly emanated from the community service sector, the 
finance, property and business services sector, and the wholesale and 
retail trade sector. The rapid increase of part-time employment 
(especially in the public sector) encouraged mothers with young 
children to enter the workforce, especially in the fast-growing white 
collar employment in education, science, health, culture, and social 
services. The rising employment opportunities brought women into 
the labour market. Middle-class, well educated women were the main 
beneficiaries of this 'post-industrial' transformation (Zagorski 1984; 
Booth and Rubenstein 1990; Ronalds 1990; Probert 1994). 
While women benefited from the expansion of the service sector 
in the 1970s and 80s, large numbers of women were employed part-
time. About 80% of part-time workers have been women since 1970 
(Foster and Stewart 1991; Encel and Campbell 1991). In the early 1980s, 
more than half of women part-time workers concentrated in services, 
sales and clerical occupations which were unskilled and semi-skilled. 
More than half of women worked part-time in recreation, personal 
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and other services, compared with 19% of men. Nearly a third of 
women part-time workers were in the category of 'professional, 
technical and related workers', compared with 7% of men in this 
group (ABS 1982). 
Concentration in lower white collar and service occupations and 
in part-time work has some negative implications for women. The 
'feminised' occupations are less unionised and less strongly limited to 
political organisations than the predominantly male jobs. Most of 
these 'new occupations' are also semi-skilled, and they seldom grant 
high status that distinguishes 'political springboard' occupations 
(especially law). It is difficult for women working in these occupations 
to develop their political knowledge and skills, and accumulate other 
political resources essential for political successful careers. It is the 
same for women in professional occupations because part-time 
workers can hardly keep continuous working careers which are vital to 
access to high positions in occupational hierarchy. 
The rapidly increasing labour force participation in the 1970s can 
be seen as an important factor in the political activation of Australian 
women. As women improved their working status, they organised 
lobby groups (eg. WEL), and tried to gain equal employment 
opportunities. Such developments also prompted women's entry into 
party politics. Occupational careers gave women experience in running 
organisations in the public sphere. The women's movement was both 
a cause and a symptom of a massive change in gender relations. This 
change took revolutionary proportions in the 1980s and 90s. 
Social-cultural Modernisation and the Women's Movement 
Economic modernisation has had a profound impact on social 
modernisation in Taiwan and Australia. This can been seen in 
demographic changes, urbanisation, changes in social behaviour, 
attitudes, and values, increasing education and social differentiation. 
With increasing standards of living and improved health care, for 
example, the average life expectancy is rapidly increasing (see Table' - 
2.1). Infant mortality declined from 24%0 in 1965 to 5%0 in 1993 in 
Taiwan, and from 19%0 in 1965 to 6%0 in 1993 in Australia (see Figure 
2.1). Women especially benefited from demographic changes. Fertility 
rates decreased from 4.8 in 1961-65 to 1.7 in 1992 in Taiwan, and from 
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3.3 in 1961-65 to 1.9 in 1992 in Australia (see Figure 2.2). The women's 
median age of first marriage grew from 22.3 in 1971-75 to 26.1 in 1993 in 
Taiwan, and from 21 in 1971-75 to 24.8 in 1993 in Australia (see Figure 
2.3). A relevant trend was the delay of child-bearing age. These changes 
in marriage and confinements, it has to be emphasised, were most 
strongly marked among educated women in both countries. 
Table 2.1 Life Expectancy at Birth in Australia and Taiwan, 1972-1992 
(Years) 
Year 
Australia Taiwan 
Male Female Male Female 
1972 68.6 75.4 67.6 72.3 
1982 71.3 78.2 69.9 74.9 
1992 74.5 80.4 71.8 77.2 
Source: Directorate-General of budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive 
Yuan, Statistical Yearbook of ROC 1994; Year Book Australia 1974, 
1992, 1995. 
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Figure 2.1 Infant Mortality Rate in Taiwan and Australia, 1965-1993 
Source: Directorate-General of budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive 
Yuan, Statistical Yearbook of ROC 1994; Australian Social Trends 1995; 
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Figure 2.2 Total Fertility Rate (per woman) in Taiwan and Australia 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive 
Yuan, Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of ROC, 1993; Year Book 
Australia 1965-95. 
Figure 2.3 Women's Median Age of First Marriage in Taiwan and 
Australia 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics,  Executive 
Yuan, Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of ROC 1993; Year Book 
Australia 1973-1995. 
In Taiwan, changes in social behaviours, attitudes, and values 
were affected by the implementation of universal education. 
'Education has risen rapidly over the last five decades in Taiwan, from 
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a time in the 1940s when many females didn't even make it to the 
sixth grade to today when twelve years of education is rapidly 
becoming the norm for everyone' (Parish and Willis 1993: 870). 
Compulsory education was extended from 6 to 9 years in 1968. Its 
impact on all aspects of society, in particular on women, was far-
reaching. This was the first time that all women had the opportunity 
of access to longer universal education. It was reflected in the 
increasing proportion of female students in three levels of education, 
and their share of the tertiary level, in particular, more than triple (see 
Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 Female Students as Proportion of Total Students in Three 
Levels of Education in Taiwan: 1950-1992 (%) 
Year Primary Secondary Tertiary 
1950-51 39 24 11 
1964 46 39 30 
1974 48 44 36 
1984 49 48 42 
1993 48 53 47 
Source: Ministry of Education 1993a: 33; Directorate-General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan 1994b: 74-83. 
Economic growth has facilitated women's access to education and 
to politics. Education is the main means of access to certain 'politically-
friendly' occupations, such as lawyer, teacher and journalist, which, in 
turn, are one of the most important springboards to political careers. 
Likewise, education is directly associated with political elevation in 
Taiwan because it grants social status. All these can be seen as the 
reflection of the high value which Confucianism places on high 
education. The differences in the full-time educational enrolment 
rates in Taiwan and Australia may reflect different social values of 
education (see Table 2.3). 
Some studies concluded that growing affluence contributed to 
The Taiwanese women's increasing access to education. Tsay's study 
(1985) compared average years of schooling for men and women from 
1951 to 1983. He found that the accumulation of family wealth was 
correlated with women's growing access to education. The traditional 
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preference of males over females became less emphasised as the 
economic constraints eased. Parish and Willis (1993) used retrospective 
data on the life cycle and family behaviour of The Taiwanese who 
came of age from the 1940s onward. They also found that educational 
attainment relied on family economic security. When the family was 
poor, children's access to education was significantly differentiated by 
gender. However, among the affluent families, the number of siblings, 
gender, and the birth order were all irrelevant to educational 
opportunity. It meant that women had the same educational 
opportunity as men in rich families. Moreover, this was not limited to 
a few elite families, but to 'about one-third of all families and even to 
some extent to the broader middle class' (1993: 887). 
Table 2.3 Full-time Educational Enrolment Rate by Age and Gender, 
Taiwan and Australia, 1992 (`)/0) 
Australia Taiwan 
Age Male Female Total Male Female Total 
6 98.2 99.0 98.7 97.1 97.0 97.0 
7 98.9 99.0 99.0 99.0 98.7 98.9 
8 99.3 99.8 99.5 96.6 96.8 96.7 
9 99.3 99.5 99.4 100 99.6 99.9 
10 99.6 99.6 99.6 98.4 98.4 98.4 
11 97.7 98.6 98.1 102* 102* 102* 
12 99.0 99.1 99.1 93.6 94.4 94.0 
13 98.1 98.8 98.4 96.5 98.4 97.4 
14 97.8 98.3 98.0 94.4 95.3 94.8 
15 92.7 93.9 93.4 77.3 80.5 78.9 
16 79.2 82.9 81.2 82.3 87.9 85.0 
17 58.2 62.4 60.5 72.9 81.8 77.2 
18 15.5 13.5 14.6 41.6 40.2 40.9 
19 3.1 2.7 2.9 37.5 34.8 36.2 
20 3.4 3.5 3.4 30.2 31.1 30.7 
Source: The Department of Employment, Education and Training 1994 
* It is a result of rounding. 
Access to higher education improved women's status and broke 
the myth that 'the virtue of a woman lies in her ignorance'. Moreover, 
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education encouraged women's occupational aspirations, increased 
confidence and stimulated their interest in seeking more participation 
in politics. 
Education has long been valued in Confucian culture as a major 
means of social mobility and source of respect. In Taiwan a good 
educational background is usually followed by higher social prestige, 
well-paid employment and high socio-economic status. Therefore, 
education aspirations have been reinforced by the growth of affluence. 
Modernisation has led to increases in women's education, 
employment and social status. However, the persistence of family-
centred orientations in Taiwan highlights the differences in social 
modernisation patterns between both countries. In Taiwan, 
modernisation has not undermined traditional norms to the same 
extent as in advanced Western societies. 
This was, at least partly, a matter of conscious and organised 
opposition to the erosion of cultural traditions. The Chinese Cultural 
Renaissance Movement was officially organised in 1967. It aimed at the 
revival of the traditional Confucian culture, in particular on filial 
piety, the mother's role, and the family ethic. Gold (1986: 30) noted that 
the KMT government 'primarily defined Taiwan's identity in security 
terms — Free China, but it also cultivated Taiwan as the last outpost of 
traditional Chinese culture.' The traditional Confucian culture was 
used as a means to strengthen the political legitimacy of the KMT 
government, to expunge the Japanese colonial culture, and to be a 
barrier against the impact of communist culture and ideology in the 
Chinese mainland. Women's familial roles were seen as an essential 
part of the defended cultural tradition. 
In spite of the formation and expansion of various non-familial 
organisations in Taiwan, the family continues to be a centre of 
authority, a main supplier of resources, and an information network 
in Taiwan. Most social interactions centre on the family. However, the 
family has two faces in modern Taiwan. One is characterised by 
adaptation to the new social environment. The other is more 
traditional — as a repository of values, norms, and traditional patterns 
of interaction (Thornton and Lin 1994). The former allows for 
women's participation in the economy and politics; the latter 
perpetuates traditionalism and conservatism. Ex-nuptial births, for 
69 
example, continue to be seen as immoral in Taiwan. In the last two 
decades, the number of the ex-nuptial births per thousand live births 
increased little in Taiwan from 1.7 in 1975 to 2.2 in 1992. By contrast, 
this increased in Australia from 10.2 in 1975 to 24 in 1992 in Australia 
(see Figure 2.4). Other indicators of familial stability, such as the 
divorce rates, the proportion of single parent families, and the 
proportion of young people living in de facto relationships also show 
more dramatic changes in Australia than in Taiwan (see Table 2.4 and 
2.5). 
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Figure 2.4 Numbers of Ex-nuptial Births as Proportion of per 
Thousand Live Births, Taiwan and Australia, 1975-1992 (°/0)• 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan, Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of ROC 1993; 
Australian Social Trends 1995; Births Australia 1978, 1983. 
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Table 2.4 Divorce Rate in Taiwan and Australia, 1966-1992 
(per 1,000 married population) 
Australia Taiwan 
1966 3.7 - 
1971 - 2.1 
1976 18.9 2.7 
1986 10.7 5.5 
1992 11.5 6.5 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan, Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of ROC, 
1993; Australian Yearbook 1967-1995. 
Table 2.5 Single Parent Families as Proportion of Total Families, 
Taiwan and Australia, 1986, 1992 (%) 
Australia Taiwan 
1986 7.9 2.9 
1992 13.0 3.4 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan, Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of ROC, 1993; 
Year Book Australia 1995. 
Social Modernisation and Women in Australia 
Changes in social behaviours, attitudes, and values in Australia were 
closely related to industrialisation, universal education, and to the 
mobilisation of the women's movement. Industrialisation 
transformed Australia gradually into an individualised class society. 
Class became the base for political organisation and 'communal 
action'. Relatively stable partisan identifications frustrated endeavours 
to mobilise political action around gender issues (Sawer and Simms 
1993). 
Like their Taiwanese counterparts, Australian women did not 
enjoy equal access to education until the social reforms and 
mobilisation of the women's movement in the 1970s. Women's 
education during the colonial period was very limited, and reflected 
nineteenth century concepts of femininity. Its aim was little more than 
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instilling middle-class courtesy and preparing women for marriage. 
Women's access to tertiary education was very limited. Although the 
University of Sydney was established in 1851 and Melbourne 
University in 1854, women were not admitted until 1881. Universal 
secondary education for women in Australia did not become a reality 
until the early 1960s. The expansion of tertiary education began in the 
early 1970s. However, women had lower enrolment rates than men in 
both levels of education till the late 1970s (Porter 1988). 
In the last decade, with changing social norms and concerted 
pressures from the women's movement, all states and the federal 
government have developed educational policies aiming at 
eliminating gender-related inequalities in education. At present, 
Australian women account for more than half of the higher education 
students, and their presence is increasing in various disciplines 
previously reserved for males (eg. law, medicine, engineering). 
In modern society, education plays a key role in political elite 
recruitment in the sense of selecting aspirants and granting them 
social status. In particular, educational credentials become the key 
characteristics of elite formation (Putnam 1976: 205). However, in spite 
of enormous educational advances, the presence of Australian women 
in politics has remained very low until the mid-1990s. One 
explanation for this 'lag' may be that education has not been directly 
linked in Australia with political status and resources. This issue will 
be discussed in Chapter Three. 
The Women's Rights Movement in Taiwan and Australia 
Many changes in social norms concerning education, employment, 
and marriage in Australia could be linked with the rise of the 'second 
wave' feminist movement. The goal of the movement was equality 
between sexes in employment opportunities, pay, work conditions, 
access to education and presence in politics. In other words, the 
women's movement aimed at creating a gender-balanced 
environment. 
The Australian women's movement was very different from that 
in Taiwan (Scutt 1988; Summers 1994b; Sawer 1994). As Watson (1990: 
3) pointed out, 
72 
Australia offers us one of the best opportunities to evaluate what 
these feminist interventions have meant for feminism and 
feminist thought. Since the mid 1970s, and the latter years of the 
reform-oriented and progressive Whitlam government, a small 
but significant number of feminists have held positions of 
(relative) power within federal and state governments and 
bureaucracies, influencing policy and funding women. 
Women's Electoral Lobby (WEL) illustrated the link between the 
women's movement and the state bureaucracy. It was a reformist 
organisation which worked within the existing system to improve the 
positions of Australian women. It relied on moderate tactics 
bargaining, negotiation, and pressure exerted mainly through the 
media and the parliamentary political system (Wills 1983). Most of the 
achievements were through prompting the initiatives of 
governments. 
The women's movement in Taiwan was underdeveloped before 
the lifting of martial law in 1987. It was closely linked with the political 
opposition movement and therefore subject to suppression by the 
KMT government. 'Neo-feminism', analogous to the first wave 
women's movement, was advocated in Taiwan by Lu Hsiu-lien who 
obtained her master degree in the US and came back to Taiwan in the 
early 1970s. The rise of 'neo-feminism' could be regarded as 'pioneer 
feminist activities in male chauvinist Taiwan' (Chiou 1986: 21), and 
also be seen as affected by the emergence of women intellectuals and 
the spread of Western culture. The movement was not widely 
supported, and the public ridiculed it as 'rich, young, married 
women's movement'. The political climate was crucial to the success 
of this movement. As the political opposition movement started to 
gain strength, the women's movement became increasingly visible. As 
Lu (1991: 339) noted, 
The women's liberation movement in Taiwan began in the early 
1970s under extremely adverse circumstances— politically, it was 
a martial law regime of authoritarian autocracy; culturally, it was 
a patriarchal society full of Confucian and Japanese 
androcentrism. However, the socio-economic structure was in 
the stage of shifting from agricultural to an industrial economy. 
Economic prosperity provided the young generation, both men 
and women, a considerably good environment for education and 
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for mobilisation. Tradition was facing severe challenge from 
rapid social development. 
Lu's (1990) appeal did not go beyond the Confucian great tradition — 
assigning high value to harmony between the family and the society. 
What she pursued was a reformist version of the civil rights 
movement with emphases on a balanced gender division of labour. 
While Lu absorbed the ideas of the women's movement in the US, she 
still adopted a more 'Chinese-style' method to introduce her ideas in 
Taiwan. Her famous slogan was 'to be human beings first, then to be 
men or women'. More importantly, women's familial roles were 
never devalued in her neo-feminist appeals. 
The women's movement in Taiwan was almost finished after Lu 
was jailed in 1979. However, a new women's group, the Awakening, 
was formed by a younger generation of women intellectuals in the 
early 1980s. It was led by a woman academic intellectual, Lee Yuan-
chen, who had worked with Lu. This new women's group took some 
of Lu's ideas, and it received a broadly sympathetic response from the 
public. It was successful in reviving the women's movement in 
Taiwan and still continues to be active in the 1990s (Ku 1989). 
In 1982, this new feminist group started to publish a magazine, 
Awakening, which aimed to 'awake women, support women, and 
build a harmonious society with gender equality' (Lee 1988). Further, 
the Awakening Foundation was established in 1987. Most of the 
members were women intellectuals, and their ideas were present in 
these annual goals of actions: 'Developing Women's Potential' in 
1983, 'Protection of Women' in 1984, and 'Dialogue between the Sexes' 
in 1986. The effort towards political democratisation in the 1980s, it 
must be stressed, was conducive to the emergence and growth of 
numerous women's groups. Compared with its Australian 
counterpart, the women's movement in Taiwan has never been 
incorporated into the state bureaucracy. Therefore, its influence on 
public policy is negligible. 
Improvements in women's status have been closely related to 
political modernisation in both countries. In Australia, these 
improvements were achieved mainly through government policies. 
Many policies, such as affirmative action, were responses to the 
demands of the women's movement. In Taiwan, the women's 
74 
movement was much less developed. Few women were concerned 
about women's disproportionate representation in politics. The quota 
system at different levels of elections since 1947 was used to defuse 
women's political demands. Women had not become vocal in politics 
until 1980. It was because of their special roles in the political 
opposition movement that women entered politics at the wave of 
democratisation. Political modernisation was, thus, the key factor in 
political status of women in Taiwan. 
Political Modernisation 
In the 1980 national election, many women entered politics for the first 
time. This election can be seen as a landmark in Taiwan's democratic 
transition. Gender equality, however, continued to be a minor issue 
compared with the threat from communist China. In Australia, by 
contrast, politics was stable, and gender issues could be systematically 
and successfully pushed into the political agenda by the women's 
movement. The issue of women's under-representation in politics 
gained a top priority in the 1980s. Many policy initiatives aimed at 
equalising opportunities could be linked with the initiatives of the 
reformist feminist movements. 
The Changing Political System in Taiwan 
The political system in Taiwan is based on the Three Principles of the 
People, which include nationalism, democracy, and social well-being, 
formulated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of 
China. It differentiates the 'political power' of the people from the 
'governing power' of the government. People exercise their political 
power by electing their representatives to the electoral bodies. Thus 
elected bodies, however, have a wide autonomy in formulating and 
pursuing policies. 
The government in Taiwan is divided into three levels: central, 
provincial/municipal, and county/city. The central government is 
made up of the Office of the President, the National Assembly, and 
five governing branches (called 'Yuan') which are the Executive Yuan, 
the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and 
the Control Yuan (details see Appendix A). 
Both the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan comprise 
the parliament. The National Assembly consists of delegates who are 
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elected from each county/city or area. The Legislative Yuan is the 
highest legislative branch of the state, composed of popularly elected 
representatives who serve for 3 years and are eligible for re-election. A 
single non-transferable vote, multimember system 7 is used for the 
election of parliamentarians in both the National Assembly and the 
Legislative Yuan. 
The first nationwide election of the Legislative Yuan was held in 
1948. Of the 760 members elected, 82 were women. General elections 
for the Legislative Yuan have been frozen since 1949 because of the 
communist rebellion. Supplementary elections have been regularly 
held since 1969 to replace those members who were unable to continue 
in their office. Additional seats have been added due to the rise in 
population since the mid 1970s. 
Following its retreat to Taiwan, the KMT government 
announced a state of national emergency and martial law was imposed 
on May 20, 1949. It restricted constitutional rights, including the right 
to form political parties. General elections to the national 
parliamentary bodies were suspended, and participation in mass 
activities, such as labour strikes, street demonstrations, and so on was 
banned. In September 1953, President Chiang Kai-shek recommended 
an extension of the terms of the first National Assembly delegates, 
elected in 1947, until the second National Assembly could be elected. In 
March 1954, the second session of the first National Assembly 
approved indefinite extension of the Temporary Provisions during the 
Period of Communist Rebellion. 
During the 1950s, the KMT built its cells at the grassroots level to 
work through patron-client networks allied with local factions which 
cemented control over local politics. In this way, the KMT penetrated 
the entire social fabric to secure compliance with party-state policies. 
With an internal party purge, the KMT extended its control over the 
polity, army, internal security apparatus, legal system, economy and 
society. With the establishment of a state corporatist structure, the 
KMT achieved full control over state-designated organisations, such as 
labour unions, business and professional associations, women's 
associations, and student bodies (Gold 1986, 1995; Tien 1989; Lu 1991b; 
Hu 1993; Chiou 1993b, 1995). 
7 Some electorates are single member because of their small population. 
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Besides the maintenance of tight political control, there were two 
major political goals pursued by the KMT in the 1950s. First, land 
reforms were initiated. Many previous land owners were transformed 
into entrepreneurs. One important political consequence of this was 
the elimination of the economic bases for local The Taiwanese political 
leaders. The threat of opposition was reduced, and the KMT could gain 
support among the rural people (Hsiao 1991; Jacobs 1993). Second, a 
popular election for a Hualien county council was held in 1950. This 
marked the beginning of the local self-government which gave The 
Taiwanese political leaders and citizens an opportunity to play more 
active role in politics. While these elections were local and limited, 
their impact was profound. As Chou et al. (1990: 125) indicated, there 
was lively grassroots local politics which served as a foundation for 
political careers. Local political leaders used these elections to regain 
the status lost in the land reform. Many of them were recruited into 
the central government later (Yang 1970; Jacobs 1980; Gold 1986). 
Political Modernisation and Women in Taiwan 
Although women were included in Taiwanese politics even before the 
democratic reforms (mainly in local politics, but also the national level 
due to the quota system) their political role was enhanced in the 
process of political modernisation. It is noteworthy that some women 
were active in the local elections already in the 1950s. The majority of 
them were characterised by their The Taiwanese origin, KMT 
affiliation, and high educational background. At that time, women 
who gained access to higher education, it has to be stressed, were 
usually from very rich families. Such families often enjoyed a good 
reputation in the local communities, and had a profound influence on 
local affairs. A large proportion of them were recruited into political 
elites in the supplementary general elections after 1969. 
Until the 1960s, those members of the National Assembly and the 
Legislative Yuan who were elected on the mainland in 1947 continued 
to serve their extended terms. No new members were selected. 
However, due to death, health problems, and advancing age, some of 
them were no longer 'active'. The size of the National Assembly 
declined from 2,916 in 1947 to 1,488 in 1966, and the Legislative Yuan 
from 760 in 1948 to 493 in 1967 (Copper 1981: 1031; Chou et al. 1990: 51). 
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These demographic trends prompted the KMT to call supplementary 
elections in 1969. 26 new members were elected, 15 to the National 
Assembly, and 11 to the Legislative Yuan in the 1969 election. Of 26 
new members, 3 were women. All these women were active in the 
KMT and the KMT-sponsored Women's Association, and 2 of them 
had served in local governments for more than 2 terms. 
Under the impact of diplomatic setbacks 8, the KNIT government 
started new reforms in the 1970s. 
It was only limited reform, but in stark contrast with his aging 
father, the young Chiang [Chiang Ching-kuo] did create a fresh 
political image and gave the distinct impression that he meant to 
democratize Taiwan, or at least soften the authoritarianism he 
inherited from his father. (Chiou 1993a: 19) 
A new generation called for social justice, political, legal and social 
reforms. Members of this generation who were born after World War 
II, experienced expansion of educational opportunity, as well as 
economic prosperity unprecedented in Taiwan, and many of them 
were educated in North America, Europe and Japan. They were excited 
by Western democracy, and were more inclined to take social and 
political risks than the previous generation. Dissatisfied with the 
KMT-monopolized policy-making procedure, they sought to exert 
more influence in the political arena. They campaigned for the seats in 
national supplementary elections, and adopted a mutual help 
strategy— pooled resources and formed a campaign organisation. In 
1978, they form a quasi-party organisation — 'Dangwai Campaign 
Assistance Corps' (Dangwai means outside the KMT). In August 1979 
the oppositional Melitao Magazine was published, and almost all 
important Dangwai figures were included in its editorial board. The 
main office of Melitao Magazine was set in Taipei, and various branch 
offices were set up in many cities and small towns (Domes 1981; Lu 
1985, 1992; Chiou 1986; Huang 1992). 
8 The People's Republic of China replaced the Republic of China on Taiwan in the 
United Nations in 1971. During the 1970s the KMT government was defeated by the 
CCP regime in many international bodies. For example, the ROC team withdrew from 
the Montreal Olympic Games to protest competing under the name of "Taiwan" in 1976. 
In 1979, the US. normalised its diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) led by the CCP regime, and derecognised ROC on Taiwan. 
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While Dan gwai members were active in local elections, the KMT 
did not severely suppress their activities. They again and again tested 
the limits of permissibility of the KMT government. The 'Chung-li 
Incident' in 1977 was a good example. It was a violent demonstration 
about alleged election meddling in Chung-li city. The conflict 
intensified in December 1979. Dangwai mobilised a number of 
demonstrations, and eventually provoked a violent clash between 
demonstrators and police. This was well-known as the 'Kaohsiung 
Incident' (or Meilitao Incident). Most leaders of the political opposition 
movement were jailed after this incident (Chiou 1986, 1991, 1993a). 
The political opposition movement nurtured some women 
political activists who were also well-educated, like those active in the 
1960s. Lu Hsiao-lien and Chen Chu, for example, were two central 
figures in the Kaihsiung Incident, and they devoted their life to 
participating in the opposition movement (Chiou 1993a: 21). Most 
opposition leaders succeeded in local and national elections in the 
1980s. The most salient figures in these elections were wives whose 
husbands were imprisoned after the Kaohsiung Incident. By 1985, of 10 
Dan gwai women who held electoral office ranging from local to 
national levels, 7 were wives of these 'political martyrs' (Lu 1990: 180). 
Thus while women politicians in Taiwan had emerged in the 
early 1960s, their presence in electoral politics was never as salient as 
after the 1980 elections. 'Dangwai members who had not been charged 
and the wives of jailed activists scored decisive electoral victories' 
(Gold 1991b: 58; Chiou 1993b). Some people held that the success of 
these Dangwai candidates, especially women, relied on the 'sympathy 
votes'. The loss of international identity and status was responsible for 
the setback suffered by the KMT. These failures also pushed the KMT 
to speed up political reforms improving the party's legitimacy. 
During the 1980s, the KMT speeded up its reforms, recruited 
more the Taiwanese into national politics (Winckler 1984; Tien 1992), 
and extended its tolerance of the opposition movement. As President 
Chiang Ching-kuo states, 'because the times have changed and the 
circumstances have changed, the government and the party also have 
to change.' These reforms were institutionalised by the end of the 
decade. With weakening restrictions on freedom of expression, 
elections, especially at the national level, started to heat up. Some 
79 
politically sensitive topics, such as the 'long-life' parliament, abolition 
of martial law, and the independence issue entered public debates (Lu 
1991a). 
The establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 
1986 was generally seen as the beginning of the democratic transition. 
It also symbolised the triumph of democratic evolution. Taiwanisation 
was one of the main goals of political reforms after the early 1970s. 
In oreder to deal with the new international realities and the 
growing power of the new Taiwanese commercial class, Chiang 
Ching Kuo began wresting power away from hard-liners of his 
father's generation and pushing for a series of 'reform and protect 
Taiwan' policies. He also sought to cultivate the semblance of a 
new , internal consensus (...) [and] appointed some Taiwanese to 
high party and government positions, thus starting the so-called 
Taiwanization process. (Chiou 1993a: 19) 
Since the power structure of the party-state was long monopolised by 
mainlander elites under the existing KMT, democratisation inevitably 
weakened the superiority of the mainlander political elites and 
encouraged the absorption of the Taiwanese into political elites (Tien 
1989; Chou 1991; Chiou 1993a; Tien and Chu 1994; Tien 1995). 
Under these circumstances, gender issues were less important 
than democratisation. Also sub-ethnic considerations were much 
more important than gender. Women's political opportunities were 
affected by these factors to some extent. This was especially evident in 
cases of the KMT women aspirants. For example, one of my 
interviewees (A) said, 'I sought the endorsement of the KMT to run 
for political office several times, but I was told that I was a mainlander 
and the preference was for the Taiwanese women.' Another B added, 
'my husband was as good as me (maybe better) to run for political 
office. However, I got the priority because of my Taiwanese origin.' 
Political reforms after 1987 included 
[a] mixture of presidential decrees (before the emergency regime 
was dismantled in 1993), KMT intra-party resolutions, legislative 
acts and constitutional revisions were aimed at weakening the 
regime's past authoritarian practices and liberalising Taiwan's 
political climate. (Tien 1995: 14-15) 
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The character of political campaigning also changed after 1986. The 
climate of politics was more liberal, and the access to mass media was 
fairer. Women candidates, in particular, stressed their gender more 
than their status as wives of 'political martyrs'. As one candidate (B) 
pointed out, 'I stood for KMT women in the 1986 national elections. 
The most important thing was not necessarily to be a wife of a political 
martyr. A good woman candidate could be from a 'normal family'. She 
was a good wife and a good mother, and her husband had a usual 
occupation and her children studied in schools.' 
Political reforms and indigenisation of political elites split the 
KMT. The New Party (NP) was formed by the second generation of 
mainlanders, the young elites of the KMT, in 1993. Ethnic cleavage and 
national identity made it different from the DPP. In the 1994 elections, 
of 51 seats in the Taipei City Council, the NP won 11 including 3 won 
by women. Most observers (such as Tien 1995: 32) claimed that its 
electoral strength was limited to the Taipei City where the majority of 
mainlanders resided. Yet, this myth was broken in the 1995 Legislative 
election. The NP successfully captured some seats outside the Taipei 
City. For example, a NP woman was the most successful candidate in 
Taichung city (located in the middle of Taiwan). 
The issues of independence and national identity are still the 
dominant issues in Taiwan's politics. The gender issues are increasing 
in salience, but they are likely to be overshadowed by the dominant 
issues in the foreseeable future. 
The Political System in Australia 
Political system in Australia is based in part on the Westminster 
model and in part on the US model of federalism. Parliament is the 
key element of the Westminster system. It is the outcome of 
representation of the citizens and is responsible to the citizens. The 
parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (the Federal 
parliament) was first elected in 1901 after a long history of reforms in 
the colony, including the granting of franchise to women in South 
Australia in 1894. It is a bicameral parliament, with the House of 
Representatives (lower house) and the Senate (upper house) elected in 
a different manner. 
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The electoral districts and the methods of counting the votes vary 
in both houses. For the House of Representatives, voters cast a 
preferential ballot in a single-member constituency; the majority 
formula is used to count the number of votes. For the Senate, voters 
cast a preferential ballot in a multi-member, state-wide constituency; 
the single transferable vote system is used. In 1924, the compulsory 
voting system was introduced in the Commonwealth. 
Party politics is the most salient feature of Australian politics. 
While the Australian party system is multi-party in form, essentially 
two-partism has developed, similar to the British pattern. The two 
major parties, the Australian Labour Party (ALP) and the Liberal Party 
of Australia (LP), have been competing for control of the legislature 
since early this century. The ALP is the oldest party in Australia, 
established in 1890, and has a strong masculine tradition at least partly 
reflecting its social base in the manual working class and the formal 
affiliation with trade unions. The affiliated blue-collar unions 
dominate collective membership and exercise extensive power within 
the ALP. The largest feminised unions, like the teachers' union, are 
not affiliated to the party (Sawer and Simms 1993: 178-79; Smith 1993). 
Unlike the ALP, the social base of the LP is less socially distinctive, and 
the power of business groups within the LP remains substantial. Since 
World War II, the LP has operated in coalition with the 
National/Country Party. The current changes of policy in favour of 
recruiting women to the ALP, and the the LP's strategies of boosting 
women representation are discussed in Chapters Three and Four. 
The 'third' parties, such as the Australian Democrats (ADs) and 
the Greens, are the products of the 1970s and 80s, and they increasingly 
play a significant role in providing recruitment avenues for women 
politicians. The participatory structure and orientation of the ADs has 
appealed to women. So did the party leadership. This became more 
evident when Janine Haines was elected as the party leader in 1986. 
However, these minor parties are fragile and their support varies 
regionally. They do not comprise a clearly defined interest and do not 
generate stable and deep loyalties. Therefore, they are more successful 
in the Senate, but find it difficult to win seats in the House of 
Representatives. Further discussion of the position of women within 
these parties is in Chapters Three and Four. 
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Political Modernisation and Women in Australia 
Unlike Taiwan, Australia has been a liberal democracy since 1901. 
While political modernisation in Australia led to the abolishment of 
the White Australia policy, the enfranchisement of Aboriginals, and 
multicultural policies, gender discrimination has survived well into 
the 1970s. Consequently, women's issues have played a significant part 
in contemporary Australian politics. 
Australian women were amongst the first to obtain political 
rights both to vote and to stand for the national parliament. A lot of 
Australia's egalitarian social legislation could be traced to the impact of 
women's suffrage (Sawer and Simms 1993: 1). These early 
achievements were underscored by persisting patriarchal attitudes and 
strong gender inequalities in education, employment and politics. 
It is a very Australian tradition that the state — a comprehensive 
manager of the colonial economy then, and an arbitrator of interests of 
different individuals, classes, and groups now— plays a central role in 
meeting the different demands from various social categories. This can 
be seen in the changes in women's political status, the rise of femocrats 
in the federal bureaucracy, and in the emergence of liberal feminist 
political organisations, including the Women's Electoral Lobby (WEL) 
(Encel et al. 1974; Ryan 1990; Sawer 1990; Millar 1993). This highlights a 
major difference in the role of the state in Australia and Taiwan. The 
state in Taiwan made little effort to improve women's political 
opportunities. By contrast, a powerful women's political organisation, 
such as WEL in Australia, could not have existed without state 
sponsorship of woman's causes. 
The early version of the Australian national identity was 
'constructed in terms of the white, masculine, outdoor person 
originating from the British Isles'. 'Mateship' derived from this 
intensely masculine working-class cultural environment (Castles et al 
1992: 8). Under such conditions, 
not only that women have been omitted from consideration, but 
that the qualities and attributes of Australian society identified as 
important have been ones which were germane to male interests 
and ambitions (Summers 1994a: 79). 
The first Australian women ran for parliament at the 1903 federal 
election. Three were candidates for the Senate, and one for the House 
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of Representatives. While the total number of women candidates who 
ran for the federal parliament was more than 31 during the period 
1903-40, no women succeeded until 1943. Women were largely 
excluded from the professions and the trade unions. Encel et al. (1974: 
251) held that the Second World War, the disintegration of the 
conservative coalition parties, and the mass entry of women into 
men's jobs during the war contributed to the presence of a great 
number of women candidates in the 1943 federal election. 
After the Second World War, more women competed for party 
endorsements. During the 1960s, women gradually gained a foothold 
in Australian politics. A Women's Bureau in the Department of 
Labour and National Service was set up in 1963. The ban on the 
employment of married women in the Commonwealth Public Service 
was lifted in 1966. In 1969 the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission made a decision that 'equal pay for equal 
work' would be incorporated in stages by 1972 (Encel et al. 1974). 
As in many other countries, the federal government and major 
political parties in Australia started to revise their policies in the 1960s. 
Since then, although only few women have been sent to the federal 
politics, politics has nevertheless ceased to be men's playground. The 
women's movement played a major role in this transformation. The 
creation of the WEL was the fruit of the women's movement. There 
was a constituency for change among women, but a vehicle •was 
needed to change the new consciousness rising from the women's 
movement into politically effective and systematic demands. The WEL 
was such a vehicle, and it played a major political role in bridging the 
movement and politics (Sawer 1990; Millar 1993: 74). 
The 1970s was a decade of political transition in Australia, and 
also a decade of women's unprecedented success in politics that 
brought changes of policies. 
These changes, which came about partly in response to the social 
attitudes of the period, were far-reaching, continuing on into the 
1980s and having direct bearing on the increase in the numbers of 
women who have entered the Parliament since that time. (Millar 
1993: 71) 
Following 23 years of the conservative government, the Whitlam 
Labour government, which was the first Commonwealth government 
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to break significantly a long-established system, came to power with an 
extensive reform program, such as the 1972 equal pay policies. They 
were re-launched by the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
(Campbell and Halligan 1992: 38). The child care issue was also pushed 
into the public agenda, and with the improvement of child care 
provision, more women entered the labour force. 
Perhaps the most dramatic change was that the elevation of 
women's issues to the ministerial level and the appearance of 
femocrats. Elizabeth Reid was appointed as adviser to the Prime 
Minister to organise affairs associated with women's welfare. This 
position finally became the embryo of the Office of the Status of 
Women. The appointment of Reid also meant that the federal 
government took its first step to give women's issues a high political 
and public profile. The first woman Minister with portfolio was 
Senator Margaret Guilfoyle, Minister for Social Security in the 1976 
Fraser government. However, women were poorly represented in the 
federal parliament. There were only two women Senators and no 
women members in the House of Representatives after the 1972 
election. After the double dissolution in 1974, Joan Child won a seat in 
the House of Representatives. She was the first woman to sit in that 
House since 1969. Likewise, the number of women Senators increased 
to four after this election. Child lost her seat in 1975. After that time 
there was no women in the Lower House until 1980 (Sawer 1990; 
Millar 1993; Sawer and Simms 1993). 
Reid's appointment proclaimed the commitment of the Whitlam 
government to the serious incorporation of women's issues into 
government decision-making processes. The number of femocrats 
increased in the decade following Reid's appointment. About 17 
women advisers quickly entered the bureaucracy in the 1980s and grew 
into the first femocrat lobby (Eisenstein 1990; Sawer 1990: 22; Ryan 
1990). This was to a large extent a result of affirmative action by 
government agencies. 
Affirmative action was 'a systematic means, determined by 
employers in consultation with employees and unions, of achieving 
equal employment opportunity for women' (Encel and Campbell 1991: 
173). It could be seen as a response to the women's movement, and as a 
further embodiment of the principle of state intervention in 
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improving women's access to the economy and politics. Some major 
political parties, such as the ALP, also implemented affirmative action 
to enhance women's chances in political competition. While it is too 
early to assess the results of these forms of affirmative action and 
related policy initiatives, one can conclude that gender issues have 
been integrated into mainstream political debates in Australia. 
Conclusions 
The classic view of modernisation has been shaped by such authors as 
Ward and Rustow (1967), Huntington (1966, 1968, 1971), Parsons et al. 
(1951) and Inkeles (1964). The Inkeles and Smith's study of 'modern 
man' [sic] states that 
With the possible exception of religion, no institution of society is 
more often depicted as either an obstacle to or a victim of 
modernisation than is the extended kinship structure (...) We had 
little reason to doubt that when urbanism increased the physical 
distance between kin, and industrial employment decreased their 
economic dependence, the strength of kinship ties as manifested 
in common residence, frequent visiting, and mutual help in 
work would decline (1974: 25-26). 
However, Inkeles and Smith also point to the possible strengthening 
of family ties in the process of modernisation (1974: 26) — a 
development which we have diagnosed in Taiwan. 
Modernisation in Taiwan has been 'uneven' with the economic 
institutions showing modern configurations while social and cultural 
patterns preserving many traditional elements. Growing affluence and 
demographic changes have improved women's access to education 
and paid employment. However, unlike Australia, the family has 
played a vital role in these processes of modern transformation in 
Taiwan. The family has been integrated into the overall economic 
development, and has helped in bridging the gap between the private 
and the public spheres. Therefore, although many social norms and 
expectations remain traditional and patriarchal, some of these 
traditional elements have been seized by women, and they help in 
women's political activation by opening the way for mobilisation of 
traditional family roles and networks in political contests. 
Australia experienced an 'even' pattern of modernisation during 
the last century. As in most advanced Western societies, women in 
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Australia have benefited from demographic changes, reproductive 
technology, access to education and paid employment. As in other 
Western societies, the family has been separated from the public 
sphere in the process of modernisation. Women gained social and 
political status in economic and political spheres. As Inkeles and 
Smith point out (1974: 26), 
[T]he liberating influence of the forces making for modernisation 
would act on men's attitudes, and incline them to accord to 
women status and rights more nearly equal to those enjoyed by 
men. 
The rise of the feminist movement and the emergence of femocrats 
helped in creating a gender-balanced environment and improving 
opportunities for women. Especially, the formation of the WEL helped 
in pushing women's issues into the political agenda. Gender issues 
gained a top priority in political modernisation in Australia. 
Unlike Australia, politics has been unstable in Taiwan since the 
end of the Second World War. The communist threat has resulted in 
the issues of national security dominating other political and social 
issues. During the US aid period, defending national culture was also 
interpreted as a call for the preservation of Confucian patriarchy 
against Western influences, especially the American one. Because of 
these factors, gender issues did not figure prominently in social change 
and political democratisation in Taiwan. 
As it is argued in the next chapter, the different modernisation 
paths in Taiwan and Australia have been reflected in different patterns 
of women's political recruitment. Uneven modernisation in Taiwan 
has generated relatively low political opportunities but relatively wide 
and diffused political resources. By contrast, modernisation in 
Australia has resulted in enhancing women's public roles. The 
emphasis on training, organisational membership and continuous 
working career for promotion in organisations, leads to equalisation of 
political opportunities. However, political resources are concentrated 
in highly masculine organisations, and Australian women find it 
difficult to access them in an equal fashion. This results in the 
'truncated' political careers of women, and gives rise to the notion of 
'glass ceilings'. 
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Finally it is worth highlighting here the different character of 
women's 'double burden' in both societies. This double burden of 
domestic responsibilities and working life is heavy in both societies, 
although social norms and gender roles in Australia are more modern 
and egalitarian. However, by and large, in Australia, women cannot 
utilise their familial roles in political competition. This is a matter of 
political culture as well as strong opposition from the feminist 
movement which is opposed to promoting the images of mothers and 
wives, In Taiwan, where social norms and expectations are more 
traditional and gender-specific, women are able — and encouraged — 
to transform their familial roles into an asset of their public life. The 
burden of women's domestic duties can be converted into social status 
that counts in political elevation. These themes are explored in more 
details in the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FAMILY, CULTURE 
AND 
WOMEN'S OPPORTUNITIES AND RESOURCES 
Different dynamics of social change in Australia and Taiwan create 
different social environments for political recruitment of women. 
Different social values, norms, evaluative criteria as well as different 
bases of the status claims in these two societies affect the distribution of 
women's political opportunities and resources. This chapter examines 
these structures of opportunities and resources in two sections. The 
first section examines how social dynamics affect women's political 
recruitment in general. The second analyses the impact of social 
dynamics of modernisation on the distribution of political 
opportunities and resources. 
Family, Culture and Women 
Liberal individualism and Confucian familism are the two major 
ideologies and social-cultural patterns affecting women's access to 
politics in Australia and Taiwan respectively. Their impact is mediated 
through cultural beliefs and practices of everyday life. For the purposes 
of presentation here, they can be contrasted along four analytic 
dimensions: the central social value, the main evaluative criterion, 
method in organisations, and the main bases of claim for social status. 
At the centre of the liberalism lies individualism as a central 
tenet of social philosophy and the main value standard shaping social 
life. In individualistic Western societies absorption of individuals into 
organisations occurs through apprenticeship with performance being 
the major criterion in judging individuals and accomplishment, in 
particular their political potential. Individual rights to fair competition 
are also the basic element of liberalism. (Table 3.1) 
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Table 3.1 Liberal Individualism and Confucian Familism 
 
Liberal 
Individualism  
individualism 
performance 
apprenticeship 
right 
 
Confucian 
Familism  
familism 
education 
credentialism 
duty 
the central social value 
the main evaluative criterion 
the main evaluative method 
the main bases of status claim 
 
The central idea of individualism is that all people are free and 
equal beings, liberated from ascribed statuses and hierarchical bonds of 
traditional society. It is the fundamental ideological tenet of Western 
modernity. With the development of the modern societies, the 
rationalisation of the state, and the extension of the capitalism, the 
individual becomes 'the ultimate source of value and meaning', and is 
treated as a main constitutive element: the sovereign source of the 
public life, the apt beneficiary of the public life, and the primary 
element of the social structure (Lodge 1987: 9). Individualism promotes 
autonomy and lack of self-control, and presents a package of ideas that 
place emphasis on rational calculation (Berger et al. 1974; Bell 1979; 
Bellah et al. 1988). Individuality encourages people to do their own 
thing. Men and women are no longer to be stereotyped by societal 
definitions. Each individual is encouraged to find and achieve his/her 
unique potential free from gender presumptions (Bern and Bern 1988). 
Familism lies at the core of Confucianism. It refers to the ideology 
that values strong cohesion in the family relationships. The members 
show their loyalty to and identification with the family unit, and 
expect substantial supports from it. The overriding concern is with the 
perpetuation and success of the family unit. Education is seen as the 
most effective means to enhance the status of the family and is the best 
way to increase the wellbeing of its members. The main basis of status 
claims is fulfilment of familial duties. The family, in turn, is 
responsible for its members' welfare, and the members are under 
obligation to support and honour their family rather than to claim 
individual rights. 
One of the most outstanding features of familism is 'the 
willingness to learn and sacrifice in order to accumulate wealth for 
future generations' (Vogel 1991: 37). The emphasis is therefore placed 
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on the subordination of the members to the development of the family 
group. The family applies pressure on its members to achieve 
professional and material success and its members expect, indeed often 
demand, financial and material support in return for their loyalty 
(Hodder 1992: 35). This is the way to encourage and promote 
individuals' social mobility, including success in politics. As Yang 
claims (1978: 72), the family '[gives] Chinese society its peculiar 
character and strength both as a basic component of society and as that 
which determined the quality and power of the social structure of 
which it was a part.' 
Individualism vs Familism 
Studies show that Australia is a highly individualistic society, and 
Australians are one of the most individualistic people in the world, 
only second to Americans (Hofstede 1980; Hofstede and Bond 1988; 
Benjamin 1988). Individualism permeates attitudes towards every 
aspect of life. Australians see individual liberty as the source of 
equality, and appraise individual decisions, initiative and 
achievements as leadership ideals (Galvin and West 1988: 105). 
The strong sense of individualism has created a social 
environment in which individuals are independent and rational. 
They are seen as the producers of their own needs and choices, and as 
the best judges of their own interests. Political representation is thus 
regarded as representation of individual interests (Lukes 1973: 79). 
Egalitarianism reflects this individualistic commitment, and it is 
expressed in the role of the state which is to ensure that all have a 'fair 
This ideological commitment affects gender inequality and 
women's presence in politics in many ways. First, individualism has 
punctured the ingrained prerogatives of males in organisations, in 
particular in political organisations. With the progressive 
modernisation of politics, women are treated as individuals and 
evaluated by their merit and achievement. Second, the ideology of 
individualism helps women free themselves from the confinement of 
the patriarchal family. Goode (1970) links individualism with the 
increasing activation of women in the labour market. Paid 
employment and economic independence, in turn, make it possible to 
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weaken the traditional — and subordinate — gender roles and the 
sexual division of labour. As Goode (1970: 56) writes: 
the gradual, logical, philosophical extension to women of 
originally Protestant notions about the rights and responsibilities 
of the individual undermined the traditional idea of 'women's 
proper place.' 
Familism has a strong root in Chinese history and social structure 
(Weber 1951; Levy 1952). It affects social change in contemporary 
Taiwan. The family may change in forms or functions, but scarcely in 
its overall importance and structure. Many traditional Chinese familial 
values and attitudes have been retained in contemporary Taiwanese 
society, and they are still extremely strong during the modernisation 
process (Freedman et al 1978; Thornton and Lin 1994). The key 
characteristics of the Chinese family include the follows: 
• The family network eradicates the spatial distance between rural 
and urban, domestic and foreign (Greenhalgh 1984: 529). The 
separate nuclear family still keeps interdependent relationships 
with their original extended families, though nuclear families 
are widespread and extended families fall into a decline. Social 
networks centred on the family are important in exerting 
political influence and in accumulating political resources in 
Taiwan. 
• The family is a crucial resource provider for its members. 
Married siblings not only maintain close economic and affective 
relations with each other and with their original family, even if 
they are scattered geographically, but also think of themselves as 
members of the family, even after the family has been divided. 
• The government is seen as the super-family. The qualities of 
righteousness, harmony and order are identified closely with 
familial relationships. Thus the whole society is framed by these 
relationships. The emphasis on belonging is very strong 
(Ketcham 1987, Redding 1990). 
These features highlight the role of the family in women's political 
recruitment. The wide familial networks can be mobilised in politics 
and the familial resources are available in elections. The infusion of 
morality of the family into the state can be particularly advantageous to 
women in political campaigns because the image of 'a good woman' 
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can be utilised effectively. The family is a vital unit of political 
ascendancy and survival in Taiwan (Winckler 1987: 176). 
However, many studies (eg. Diamond 1979; Greenhalgh 1985; 
Metraux 1991; Cheng and Hsiung 1992; Salaff 1992) also confirm that 
Taiwanese women suffer from patriarchal domination inherent in 
Confucian familism. Women sacrifice themselves for the family's 
happiness, suffer from the gender inequality, especially men's priority 
in getting education, and are financially exploited by their parents and 
husbands. The family becomes women's 'iron cage', and makes 
women's political success the outcome of family favours. 
Such views may exaggerate the inferior status of women in the 
modern Chinese family. They tend to overlook the interactive 
relationship between women and men in the family, and ignore the 
changing relationship between women and other family members. 
The improvement of women's social and economic status, and in 
particular their success in education and politics are to some extent at 
least, founded on familial relations. Women's access to higher 
education is the precondition of this success. In the past, women left 
school early and worked to support their brothers' education if the 
family was poor (Chiang and Ku 1985). Yet, as long as the family could 
afford educational expenses, women would get access to education. 
That is, men benefit from family affluence first, and women later. 
When the transformation of economy brings increasing family 
affluence, the gender gap in access to education is narrowing. Many 
women politicians who were born in the 1910s and 1920s, and elected 
in the late 1960s, held university degrees before entering parliament. 
Some of them were even educated overseas. All of them, needless to 
say, were from well off families. 
The reduction in family size, economic growth, and the relatively 
equal distribution of family income in modern Taiwan all have 
contributed to women's improved access to education, in particular to 
higher education. This is confirmed by a narrowing gender gap in 
education. The younger the age group, the smaller the differential 
between the sexes in education (see Table 3.2). Brothers and sons no 
longer monopolise the access to education at the expense of their 
sisters and daughters. In many cases, the family becomes women's 
'springboard' to politics, rather than their 'iron cage'. 
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Table 3.2 The Average Length of Education by Gender, 
Taiwan, 1993 (years) 
Age Group Male Female 
25-29 11.6 11.4 
30-34 11.2 10.6 
35-39 10.5 9.4 
40-44 9.6 8.2 
45-49 8.8 7.0 
50-54 7.5 5.2 
55-59 6.5 4.4 
60-64 6.8 4.0 
65+ 6.0 2.7 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan, ROC 1994b: 94. 
Many consequences of modernisation, including universal 
education, women's paid employment, the women's movement, and 
demographic change have helped in weakening traditional gender bias 
in the family. The declining fertility means that increasing number of 
couples have fewer than two childrenl. Fewer siblings and growing 
affluence help women to gain access to education. The wide family 
networks and the closer relationship between women and their natal 
families, provide an effective support system. Both are crucial to 
women's success in education and politics. 
Individualism and modernisation cut the links between the 
family and politics, promote the notion of autonomy, and are 
conducive to the functioning of the liberal democracy. The modern 
liberal democracy is characterised by the shift from a system based on 
the influence of kinship and connected with local communities to a 
system that encourages 'the monopolisation and regulation of 
'legitimate' coercive power by one universalist coercive institution' 
(Weber 1978: 337). Depersonalisation of administrative management 
1 The total fertility rate rapidly dropped decade by decade. It was 6.7 in the 1950s, 4.6 
in the 60s, 3.1 in the 70s, 2.0 in the 80s, and 1.7 in the early 90s. Average persons of per 
household reduced from 5.6 in 1964 to 3.8 in 1993. See Directorate-general of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, Executive yuan, ROC (1994), Social Indicators in Taiwan 
Area of the Republic of China 1993 and Greenhalgh, S. (1984), Networks and their 
Nodes: Urban Society on Taiwan, China Quarterly, 99: 529-52. 
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by bureaucracy and rationalisation of law complete the divorce of the 
private and the public spheres. Within bureaucratic organisations, 
individuals obey the law which is generally and clearly defined rather 
than the person who implements it. When confronting the law, 
individuals are legal equals. They need not establish a relation with a 
given person. An individual — a man or a woman — can 
autonomously decide about involvement in politics without relying 
on status or family connection. Access to the top depends on merit 
judged through performance in organisations. 
The modernisation of politics also poses obstacles for women, 
although these obstacles are less and less likely to be legal ones. The 
rationalisation of production and administration, and in the legal 
system in modern societies leads to the professionalisation of politics, 
that is, the rise of the professional politician who lives 'for' and 'off' 
politics (Weber 1948: 77-128). For him, politics is a vocation and a way 
of life. The professionalisation of politics shapes the path and the 
method of entrance into the political hierarchy which is an 
organisation, demanding 'training in the struggle for power, and in 
the methods of this struggle as developed by modern party policies' 
(Weber 1948: 90). Political elevation relies on appropriate political and 
occupational skills and experience at each level in the process of 
political 'climbing'. Every political advancement won by women, it 
must be stressed, is at the expense of male competitors. In order to be 
successful, women have to start early enough. Yet, as mentioned in 
Chapter One, this early start reflects the style of men rather than 
women. 
The split of the family and politics means that success in politics 
begins and ends 'with mobilisation of resources, achieving maximum 
impacts, calculating prudentially, articulating interest group claims, 
engaging in reward distribution functions' (Elshtain 1981: 246). It poses 
some problems for women entering political competition. 
Modernisation produces status disadvantage for women in 
organisations. If they are not equally resourced, women cannot 
compete with men on an equal footing. This resourcing includes access 
to these characteristics that are vital for recruitment and promotion in 
organisations: education, experience and administrative skills. For 
example, the modern bureaucratic organisations have established 
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conditions of recruitment, selection and promotion. Access to 
decision-making positions is determined by rules and conventions. A 
political aspirant is set for a career within the hierarchical order of 
bureaucracy. Thus, the disadvantage women face in political 
competition is an outcome of the combination of institutional changes 
and societal location. 
These problems present differently in Taiwan because of the 
stronger fusion between the family and politics. An individual's 
position in organisations is closely linked with the honour of his/her 
family. Social mobility of individuals is an honourable symbol of the 
family's status. Individuals can extract resources from the family 
networks to compete in organisations. In this context, a woman is not 
only an individual, but also a member of a family group, with her own 
supportive networks. She participates in politics by mobilising family 
resources. Paradoxically, this may help in reducing gender bias in 
organisations in the sense of reducing gender disparity in resourcing. 
In Australia, the individual's prestige and rewards are attached to 
their achievements in organisations, and are dependent principally on 
the labour market position rather than the position in the family. 
Women's familial roles thus, are ignored in the public sphere, 
including politics. The family performs biological functions such as 
reproduction, some social reproductive ones, such as child-rearing, 
caring, and some psychological functions. As Susan Bastick, the NSW 
Secretary of the Australian Family Association, asks: 
Do we recognise unpaid work as work which has a parity of 
value— and equal dignity with paid work— or have we still got 
some sort of the hierarchy of work which places unpaid work as 
lesser work that has to be fitted around the demands of 'real' paid 
work? Do we still think of paid workers as greater contributors to 
our society than unpaid workers and think of needing to 
minimise unpaid work so that we can all spend more time 
participating in real paid work? (quoted from House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs 1992: 40-41) 
The devaluation of the familial roles derives from the formally 'non-
productive' status of the family. One can argue that public recognition 
of unpaid domestic work would not alter the devaluation of familial 
roles. The family has been losing its economic functions since the 
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separation of the family and the workplace, and this trend has been 
inherent in modernisation. Under the climate of 'modern economy', 
production and paid work become the major measures of contribution 
by individuals to society and the major sources of social status. As one 
Australian woman points out, 
I was recently quoted $600 per week to get a live in nanny. It 
seems ludicrous that my work in the home has no worth, but it 
costs $600 to replace it. (Ibid pp. 40-41) 
The value and the importance of familial roles and home duties are 
publicly recognised in Taiwan. Confucian tradition connects the 
private and the public spheres with a step by step logic relation: one 
should cultivate the moral principles necessary for organising one's 
own life, then managing one's family, then governing one's country, 
and then maintaining peace in the world. In this order, familial roles 
are highly valued by society and successful performance in familial 
roles is as important as organisational achievement. In this respect, the 
contrast between Australia and Taiwan is quite striking. Taiwanese 
women can use their familial roles and familial achievements as 
political resources. This means not only mobilising family resources of 
money, support and influence, but also using family roles of mothers 
and wives as bases for status claims. While using the social prestige 
gained in the family, women can mobilise other resources available 
from family networks. 
It may also be argued that the Australian family is a less 
autonomous social unit than the family in Taiwan, because it relies 
heavily on the state. This is particularly evident in the nature and 
scope of welfare provisions. Women may get some welfare provision 
from the state, and the state takes some domestic responsibilities, such 
as child care. When modern state transforms its role from a night 
watchman into an interventionist welfare state, the traditional 
boundary between the private and the public spheres is blurred. One 
symptom of this blurring is evident in state interventions becoming 
essential for women who want to conquer traditional obstacles to social 
and economic equality (Nevitte and Gibbins 1990: 75). Women become 
dependent on the resources and welfare provision of the state in their 
occupational political careers. 
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By contrast, the typical Chinese family in Taiwan is relatively 
autonomous. Because the family forms a complex network, some 
positions are interchangeable. For example, women's domestic 
responsibilities may be absorbed by her family networks (rather than 
the state) if her other duties— eg. public functions— are regarded as 
important for family welfare. Such 'familial welfare provisions' are 
crucial to aspiring women politicians in electoral campaigns. 
These differences between Australia and Taiwan in the centrality 
and autonomy of the family are reflected in political recruitment. 
Individualism makes it easy to release women from traditional 
restrictions and creates more equal opportunities for Australian 
women. However, this equalisation does not extent to political 
resourcing and it creates an environment of 'dependency' whereby 
access to political resources is increasingly controlled by bureaucratic 
political organisations. In Confucian Taiwan, familism hinders 
women's political opportunities, but paradoxically, it may help women 
in mobilising a broad range of gender-specific political resources which 
are relatively independent of the political organisations and the state. 
Apprenticeship and Performance vs. Educational Credentialism 
The single most significant feature of political elite recruitment is a 
high level of formal education (Putnam 1976: 27). While Australian 
elite studies (Higley et al. 1979; Rydon 1986) stress this feature, there is 
also a historical legacy of anti-intellectualism. This legacy derives 'at 
least in part from an ethical and intellectual scepticism that is anti-
utopian' (Pusey 1993: 32). The very expression of anti-intellectual 
legacy is the emphasis of the political apprenticeship as the most 
legitimate mode of political recruitment. 
High education does not lead to fast elevation in Australian 
politics. Ministerial positions, for example, are usually gained after 
lengthy political apprenticeship that starts outside parliament and 
leads through backbench positions. Before becoming a backbencher, a 
political aspirant typically serves in his/her political party in election 
campaigns. He/she may be as a party official for a period, or contest an 
unwinnable or marginal seat to build his/her reputation for hard work 
and reliability (Aitkin, Jinks, and Warhurst 1989: 109). This is the time 
to demonstrate the 'political potential'. The aspirants' performance 
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during the apprenticeship determines their elevation in the party and 
parliamentary hierarchies. Australian women politicians frequently 
point to this 'long climb' feature of political careers. 
I was far too low on my party's ticket to be elected then, but a few 
months after I had served my apprenticeship as a Legislative 
Council candidate, I sought and won preselection as a candidate 
on the Liberal Movement's Senate ticket for the 1975 double 
dissolution. (Haines 1992: 139) 
The timing of my entry into Parliament in 1970 was preceded for 
me by three years service as State President of the Women's 
Section of the Liberal Party of Victoria (...) My real political entry 
started at the time that I accepted that responsibility within the 
Party and used that opportunity to be part of the Party structure in 
the national and State spheres(...) I think it was probably as good 
an apprenticeship as you could have. (Guilfoyle 1995: 21) 
Needless to say, such a long-climb career can disadvantage women 
who temporarily opt out to have children or to perform family duties. 
In politics, like in any other bureaucratised institution, continuity and 
full-time involvement tend to be essential for success. 'Political 
apprenticeship' seems to be 'designed' for men's life style rather than 
women's. Women's success in politics depends on time they spend in 
their party/union work, and on positions they achieve in their 
parties/unions. Women's efforts are evaluated by their length of 
service and organisational performance. It is forgotten that women 
still have to cope with more domestic chores than men. Women's 
duties, such as caring for the family and child-bearing, make it difficult 
to have a continuous and full-time political apprenticeship and career. 
This affects the evaluation of women's political performance and 
hinders their promotion in political organisations. 
The political arena is less bureaucratised and more moralised in 
Confucian Taiwan. According to Confucian teaching, good 
government relies on good persons who should be selected on the 
basis of their 'good character' (see Bahm 1992: 91). Politicians are 
expected to be 'wise' and serve as moral models for the people. 'The 
rule of virtue can be compared to the Polar Star which commands the 
homage of the multitude of stars without leaving its place' (Confucius, 
translated by Lau 1979: 63). As one of my respondents (D) said, 'the 
personal image and morality, free of visible shortcomings and sexual 
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scandals, as well as 'clean' family background, are critical to my 
nomination.' Morality and 'good character' are seen as reflected 
mainly in caring for one's family. As the Analects put it, albeit in 
somewhat sexist terms, 'Simply by being a good son and friendly to his 
brothers a man can exert an influence upon government. In so doing a 
man is, in fact, taking part in government' (Confucius, translated by 
Lau 1979: 66). One may argue that this principle has been effectively 
extended to women, especially with the end of Imperial China and the 
modernisation of Taiwanese politics. Women have an increasing say 
in politics, and the teachings of 'imperial Confucianism' have been re-
interpreted in the context of modern Chinese society. 'A good son' can 
be viewed as 'a good child', and 'his brothers' as 'his/her siblings'. 
Confucianism links politics, morality and education with the 
family. Education becomes the best propellant of upward social 
mobility, the main status basis, a key family asset and a key criterion of 
access to politics in Taiwan (Yang 1978). It is seen as both an individual 
and a family accomplishment. Without providing education to its 
members, the family never obtains the opportunities to improve its 
social status. 
The Confucian legacy has also some equalitarian elements. It 
stresses that education should be universal and available to all people, 
not just the upper strata. According to the Confucian ideology, all 
people should be able to enter politics via education. This makes class 
division blurred. According to Gold (1991a: 8), 
Taiwan's proletarians in large part do not see themselves as 
lifetime industrial workers, but as petty capitalists accumulating 
capital, knowhow and contacts as part of a (usually family-based) 
strategy for upward mobility. This inhibits their formation of a 
sense of themselves as a class. 
Although this egalitarianism had not been explicitly extended to 
gender, it nevertheless had crucial impact on women's access to 
politics in the process of modernisation. To some extent, 
modernisation contributes to women's access to education which is a 
vital political asset in Taiwan. Taiwanese women are in a good 
position to mobilise the argument about fairness and claim political 
position on the basis of familial roles, and 'good character'. They can 
use 'morality' and education as the key political credentials. Both are 
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nowadays as easily accessible for women as they are for men. Women 
can transfer their educational attainment into political capital. Thus, 
for example, two of my respondents reported that they emphasised 
their 'PhD' in political campaigns. High education helped them in the 
pre-selection within political parties and served the similar function as 
political apprenticeship in Australia. It implied intellectual shells, gave 
high prestige and indicated high political potential. 
The point can be summarised as follows: it is easier for women 
today to gain university degrees than it is to negotiate bureaucratic 
'long climb' apprenticeships. Those recruitment systems which rely on 
educational achievements and prestige are more open for women 
competitors than those which make a long organisational 
apprenticeship, the key condition of political elevation. Similarly, the 
emphasis on 'morality' and 'good character' (often identified in terms 
of successful performance of familial — rather than organisational — 
roles, minimises some important gender disadvantages suffered by 
women in political competition. 
It is not necessary for Taiwanese women politicians to complete 
long organisational apprenticeships before obtaining political 
elevation. By contrast, Australian women rely heavily on such 
apprenticeships or on the affirmative action-type fast-trading. They 
cannot use other credentials, such as education, to signal their 
achievements and capacity and cannot employ their familial roles as 
assets in political claims. Ironically, Australian women are better 
educated now, but their education is unlikely to be shifted from an 
individual asset to a political capital. They still have to pass the 
'training period' — and this remains a significant source of 
disadvantage. 
Rights vs. Duties 
These differences in political credentials and modes of political 
recruitment in both countries reflect the cultural differences discussed 
above. In Australia, the opportunities and access to politics are widely 
open for women. Women's rights to compete for political posts are 
protected by the concepts of individualism and egalitarianism, and are 
formally supported by the state. As Hancock (1961: 55, quoted from 
Head 1989: 287) points out, 'To the Australian, the State means 
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collective power at the service of individualistic 'rights'. Therefore 
he[/she] sees no opposition between hisPher] individualism and 
his[ her] reliance upon Government.' 
The ideology and the practices in Taiwanese society are quite 
different. Duties still outweigh rights, either the family duties to the 
state, and/or the individual to the family. The family relies on duties 
and obligations being respected, especially between generations. 
Women's duties to the family constitute a heavy and uneven burden, 
at the first glance. Taiwanese women, however, are able to transform 
these duties and burdens into social values and political assets by 
mobilising support from the family and revoking familial roles (Lee 
1990). This was stressed by two of my respondents: 
During the political campaign, first of all, I emphasise that I do 
not have to worry about domestic responsibilities, because my 
mother-in-law looks after my family. My husband has a stable 
good job, and my children are in school. Second, I talk about my 
political ideas (E) 
For me the family is a springboard rather than a barrier. I chose to 
look after my family first, and pursue my career second. (I) 
Further, the family may encourage women to run for political office, 
because successful politicians can benefit their families (Fang 1982). 
Women candidates and their families built a reciprocal relationship. 
Women politicians extend and consolidate the political influence of 
families and boost their social status. The family has the obligation to 
support them in political campaigns, both materially and non-
materially. Domestic responsibilities are automatically shared within 
the family and financial and overall support are widely available. 
An important qualification must be added here. Males are still 
regarded as the best political candidates, and the most effective carriers 
of familial responsibilities. However, this gender preference has been 
weakening with the demographic change, increasing education of 
women, and the increasing importance of female-linked family 
networks (see pp. 97-8). Many families face the situation that they do 
not have male scions available for political sponsorship, that their 
male scions are not good enough to compete for political office, or that 
their male scions are not ready to run for political office. Instead, they 
have a growing pool of highly educated, able and ambitious, daughters 
102 
and daughters-in-law. This 'supply' increases with the increasing 
education profiles and accompanies an increasing demand for women 
politicians. 
The source of this demand, it must be stressed, is located both in 
the traditional notion of balance — Confucian beliefs in women's 
familial virtues balancing those of males — as well as in the distinctly 
modern orientation towards gender egalitarianism that spreads in the 
younger generation. 
Women's Opportunities and Resources 
The key principle of democracy is that any eligible person can become a 
candidate in an election. However, those who become members of 
parliament are very few, and they are disproportionately extracted 
from the higher strata of society. For example, federal parliamentarians 
in Australia are overwhelmingly middle class, male, Australia born, 
and more likely to hold a university degree than voters. A similar 
disproportion can be found in Taiwan and indeed in most advanced 
societies (Higley 1979; Pakulski 1982; Peng 1986; Verba et al. 1987; 
McAllister 1992; Lovell et al. 1995). 
While some of these disproportions, especially those due to class 
differences, have been widely studied and well understood, gender 
inequality in political recruitment is more puzzling. It is argued here 
different patterns of women's under-representation in political elites 
reflect different combinations of political opportunities and resources. 
These two concepts are used here in a way analogous to social 
movement theories of 'opportunity structure and resource 
mobilisation (eg. Tarrow 1994; McCarthy and Zald 1977). The former 
identifies facilitative conditions that increase the likelihood of 
movement mobilisation. The latter focuses on those characteristics of 
social actors that increase their power capacities. Here we use the 
opportunity and resource concepts in the context of an elite 
recruitment model developed by Putnam (1976). In this context, 
political opportunities refer to the overall position of women in 
society or, more specifically, women's access to the aspects of social 
status which are relevant for political recruitment. In other words, 
political opportunities concern women's access to the pools of eligibles. 
Political resources are political career propellants. They include those 
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characteristics that help political aspirants in competing effectively for 
top political offices and in prompting their elevation to elite positions. 
Gender political opportunities form a structure in the sense of 
being inter-related and relatively stable. They are reflected in the 
overall position of women in the social structure and, indirectly, elite 
recruitment. Barriers encountered by women seeking access to politics 
reflect their broader societal location in the status-granting systems, 
including, above all, the economic, educational, and institutional 
systems. More specifically, political opportunities of women are 
comprised of their participation in the labour market, their position in 
the social-cultural sphere (norms and gender roles), their access to 
higher education, their presence in political organisations, and 
women's citizen rights movement. 
Political resources are career propellants. They empower political 
aspirants in political competition. They include financial support, 
political influence, loyalty and support, campaign staff, and media 
exposure. Differential access to political resources helps explain 
women's success and failure in political contests for the top positions 
of power. Australian women have higher political opportunities than 
their Taiwanese counterparts, but their access to political resources — 
which happen to be heavily concentrated in political organisations — 
seems to be more limited than in Taiwan. 
Political Opportunities 
Indicators of political opportunities of women in political 
organisations include a proportion of women as total party/trade 
union membership, as well as their share in decision-making 
positions, such as presidents of party branches, members of executive 
committees, and so on. We will examine these indicators in Australia 
and Taiwan. 
Women's availability for political elites is also linked with their 
access to gainful employment. This is important because such 
employment carries status and forms springboard for political careers. 
Like male politicians, most women politicians are recruited from the 
top of the occupational hierarchy and from professional positions, 
especially 'political springboard' professional occupations, such as law, 
teaching and journalism. Thus women's presence in managerial, 
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administrative and professional positions, and especially their 
presence in 'political springboard' professional occupations, are 
viewed as key indicators of their political opportunities. 
The constraints of social cultural norms and gender roles are seen 
as one of the main factors determining the availability of women 
politicians (eg. Lee 1976; Bers 1978; Phillips 1980; Wolchik 1981; 
Lovenduski 1986). Norms making women primary carers for pre-
school children and domestic chores are a part of broader social 
cultural norms and social arrangements of gender roles. They are 
reflected not only in labour force participation rates, but also in gender 
division of domestic labour and the images of women's familial roles. 
The most typical occupational backgrounds of politicians are 
lawyers, teachers, administrators, managers, and other professions. 
Most have higher education degrees. People with these attributes are 
seen as most appropriate by both elite selectors and mass electors. It is 
particularly true for women. Their positions in political organisations, 
their share in some 'politically advantageous' occupations, and their 
portion in higher education are important indicators to measure their 
political opportunities. The social-cultural mechanism — the social 
expectation on gender roles and the sexual division of labour within 
the family and society — is another key factor in helping their access to 
political opportunities. This factor is specially significant for women 
when politics is traditionally seen as 'men's playground'. 
1. Political Organisations: 
Women in Political Parties and Trade Unions 
'Australian politics is the politics of parties, not of class' (Aitkin 1977: 
142). Most political elite members are affiliated with political parties or 
supported by trade unions and pressure groups. Political organisations 
are the key sponsors of political careers, and therefore women's 
presence in their ranks is an important indicator of women's political 
opportunities, especially in Australia. Political parties are also the 
main players and sponsors in Taiwan politics. The KMT effectively 
controls politics and trade unions. However, in both countries the 
party's control over political recruitment is far from complete and may 
well be weakening as indicated by the growing number of successful 
independents. 
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There are four major national political parties in Australia: the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP), the Liberal Party of Australia (LP), the 
National Party of Australia (NP), and the Australian Democrats (ADs). 
The Greens are also important in the Senate. The majority of 
candidates for the federal parliament are endorsed by these parties. 
Parties groom and select politicians, and control the key political 
resources, including electoral funds, political exposure and networks of 
influence. 
The proportion of women among the party rank-and-file are not 
available. There are, nevertheless, some secondary data which can be 
used to estimate to what extent women have access to parties and are 
involved in party politics. These data show that women's access to 
parties at the local level is, generally, low. The rank-and-file members 
are predominantly male. This is less the case with political parties in 
Australia than it is in Taiwan, and less the case now than 20-30 years 
ago. 
During the past three decades women's representation has , 
increased to about half of the Australian Liberal Party. The ALP seems 
to be more 'a man's party'. Only 25% of its membership were women 
in 1978, and 30% in 1981. After an intense recruitment drive and 
affirmative action campaigning, women's membership increased to a 
high of 46% in Victoria and a low of 32% in Queensland in 1986 
(Simms 1981; Sawer and Simms 1993). Taking major parties in Victoria 
as examples, White (1981: 34-35) pointed out that women were 
increasingly active at the membership level in all parties. They 
comprised more than half of membership in the ADs; about 50% in 
the LP; about one third in the ALP and the NP in the late 1970s. The 
NP remains most masculine in its membership. 
Historically, the major non-Labour parties have attracted the 
greatest number of women (Irving 1974/75). The success of the LP in 
coopting the Australian Women's National League (AWNL) in 1945, 
the largest women's non-Labour organisation, can be seen as an 
example. In South Australia, for instance, urban branches of the LP 
have normally included more women than men members (Western 
1983: 188). The lower number of women members in the ALP may 
have been caused by its close relationship with 'masculine' trade 
unions. Since 1986 the 60:40 rule has been used in selecting 
106 
representatives to all ALP state conferences: 60% of representatives 
from affiliated unions and 40% from local branches. As Susan Ryan 
has said (cited from Sawer and Simms 1993: 179): 
one of the major obstacles to gaining women's support for the 
Labor Party has been its traditional structure: machines, steering 
committees, complicated trade union connections. These 
antiquated, unrepresentative, male-dominated hierarchies with 
their mysterious and indirect ways of getting the numbers for pre-
selections and the election of Party officers deter many women 
who are otherwise attracted to Labor policies. The absence of such 
structures is part of the explanation for the participation of 
women in large numbers in newly formed parties, such as the 
Australia Party and the Australian Democrats. 
The latest data (see Table 3.3) show that in most states and territories 
women's membership in major parties is increasing. In the ALP 
women comprise now 41% of members. 
Table 3.3 Female Membership in Major Political Parties, Australia (/o) 
South 
Australia 
(1990-91) 
Northern 
Territory 
(1992) 
Victoria 
(1990) 
Tasmania 
(1992) 
Queensland 
(1991) 
New 
South 
Wales 
(1991) 
LP ALP CLP ALP ADs ALP ALP ALP ALP 
44 	38 37 	45 52 	40 c.50 36 34 
Source: Asia Pacific Women's Studies journal No. 2, 1992; Sawer and 
Simms 1993: 179. 
Women's membership in trade unions was traditionally low. 
Australian unions were resistant to women, and treated them as 
subordinate to men. Until the 1970s, it was accepted that women 
received about two thirds of the male wage. Also women paid lower 
membership dues than men (White 1984; Wieneke 1992). Encel et al. 
(1974: 276-7) found that in 14 federal and state unions with a total 
membership of 260,000, only 110,000 were women in 1968. The increase 
of women membership in trade unions was one of major changes 
during the past two decades. White (1984) observed that the portion of 
female membership increased from 36% in 1970 to 48% in 1980. Griffin 
and Benson (1989) found that from 1970 to 1986 the number of women 
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unionists rose by 88%, compared with 21% rise for men. This 
amounted to the increase of 871,600 union members during this 
period, 57% of whom were women. 
The latest data (ABS 1995c: 132) reveal that women account for 
40% of all union members around Australia. It is noteworthy that 
among permanent women employees, women managers and 
administrators, and women professionals there is higher proportion of 
union membership than among men in these occupations (25.8% to 
19.3% and 52.1% to 36.5%, respectively) (ABS 1995c: 107). Australian 
women's participation in trade unions is thus increasing, similarly to 
their participation in political parties. 
In Taiwan the KMT was the major party from 1949 to 1987. While 
there were other two political parties, the Young China Party 
established in 1923, and the China Democratic Socialist Party, 
established in 1932, both were relatively weak, received subsidies from 
the KNIT, and indeed played the token role. The DPP became a major 
party in 1986, though it was not technically legal until 1987. 
The total membership of the KMT increased from 1,934,011 in 
1980 to 2,620,179 in 1994. However, even at the rank-and-file level, 
women's participation was low. They comprised only one fifth of total 
members in 1980 and one-quarter in 1994 (see Table 3.4). The DPP's 
membership has been relatively small; it increased from 1,285 in 1986 
to 24,546 in 1991 (Huang 1992: 53). Although the data on gender 
comparison are not available, it is believed that the percentage of 
women members is well below that in Australia. 
Women's access to decision-making positions within political 
organisations is a better indicator of opportunities than membership. 
The majority of political elites are normally recruited from active and 
senior members in these organisations. Our data show that the 
increase in women's membership in political organisations has not 
translated into their elevation to senior decision-making positions. 
Their overall presence in political parties is much higher than their 
representation in the executive bodies and the national parliament. 
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Table 3.4 Membership in the KMT by Gender 
Year Male (h)) Female (%) 
1980 80 20 
1981 80 20 
1982 79 21 
1983 79 21 
1984 78 22 
1985 77 23 
1986 77 23 
1987 77 23 
1988 76 24 
1989 75 25 
1990 75 25 
1991 75 25 
1992 75 25 
1993 75 25 
1994  74 26 
Source: ICMT documents. 
Personal communication with the KMT staff 
This is true for both Australia and Taiwan. However, Australian 
women have better representation in heading party decision-making 
positions than their counterparts in Taiwan. During the last two 
decades, the ALP and the LP have promoted more and more women 
into various decision-making positions. This can be seen in the 
increasing portion of women delegates to national conferences, and the 
growing number of women heads of branches/divisions at the 
state/territory and national levels. Thus while in 1979 only two out of 
49 delegates to the National Conference of the ALP were women, 
approximately 11% of all State Conference delegates were women. 
Women's under-representation in the ALP decision-making 
positions might be caused by their low representation in the trade 
unions. A study of Annual Conference of the ALP in NSW, for 
example, showed that only 10-15% of 825 delegates were women. Of all 
delegates, trade unionists held 60%, but women account for one-third 
branch delegates. Among the branch delegates, 8 positions were 
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reserved for members elected by the NSW Labour Women's 
Committee (Simms 1981a: 87). In 1994, 8 out of 32 national and 
state/territory presidents among four major political parties were 
women (ABS 1995c: 129). 
Table 3.5 Women Office Holders within the ALP 
State Executives (1992) 
State Women Total % of Women 
ACT 1 4 25 
New South Wales 1 7 14 
Northern Territory 1 3 33 
Queensland 7 20 35 
South Australia 1 4 25 
Tasmania 2 5 40 
Victoria 2 4 50 
Western Australia 1 5 20 
Source: Adapted from Women in Politics and Public Life, 
Asia Pacific Women's Studies Journal No. 2, 1992. 
Women benefited from the affirmative action within the ALP. 
The proportions of women office holders within the ALP state 
branches have been increasing since 1990 (see Table 3.5). In Victoria, for 
example, one third of all positions in policy committees are 
automatically filled by women. Typically, women's representation is 
higher than this minimum ratio. Two-thirds of all elected positions 
are currently occupied by women at the branch level, and half of all 
Branch Secretaries are women. Women's presence in the National 
Conference is important, because the ALP demands that its 
parliamentary representatives are also its delegates (Jaensch 1991: 136). 
At the National Conference in 1991, women made up 32 of the 101 
individuals with voting rights (delegates, proxy delegates and party 
leaders). At the same time, women occupied 6 of the 32 places on the 
National Executive of the party (Commonwealth of Australia 1992). 
While the quota, goal or any type of affirmative action is still a 
bete noire to the Liberals (Simms 1994a), women's representation 
within the party decision-making positions is not lower than that in 
the ALP. In the 1970s, only the Victorian division of the LP had a 
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constitutional requirement that a half of its executive members must 
be women. This was the result of the incorporation of the AWNL into 
its Victorian division. Liberal women were guaranteed equal 
representation in the Administrative Committee, the Policy Assembly, 
preselection conventions and electorate committees in Victoria. Also 
state offices of metropolitan and rural vice-presidents holders included 
equal numbers of men and women. 
In other states Liberal women were not so lucky as their sisters in 
Victoria. They constituted 33% of members of the State Council in 
South Australia, and held 20-33% of elected positions in the Party 
Executive in the CLP in the Northern Territory. At the Federal level, 
the LP has an eleven member Federal Women's Committee, 82% of 
which were women. Women filled 4 of the 32 positions on the Federal 
Executive in the 1970s and 80s (Encel et al. 1974; Commonwealth of 
Australia 1992; Sawer and Simms 1993). 
The NP in NSW also adopted some strategies to increase 
women's representation in decision-making positions. During its 1976 
Annual General Conference it was resolved that the existing 14 
electorate councils, each of which had two representatives on the 
central council, should all include at least one woman representative. 
At the party's 1977 Annual General Conference women comprised 40% 
of delegates (White 1981). The NP elected its first woman federal 
president, Shirley McKerrow in 1981. She held the position until 1987. 
The ADs are seen as the most women-friendly of Australian 
political parties. They use the rank-and-file ballot to elect party leaders 
and party position holders (Sawer and Simms 1993). In Victoria, 
women constitute half of the state executive (White 1981). Recently 
three of the ADs leaders are women; they are Janine Haines (1986-90), 
Janet Powell (1990-91) and Cheryl Kernot (1993-). The ex-leader, 
Senator Janet Powell, claims (Powell 1990: 53): 
Old boys' networks, built up over generations, can be almost 
unassailable. Simply because the Democrats did not exist before 
1977, we carry none of that 'baggage'. I have to be frank and admit 
that there were, at one point, a few men who had brought some 
of that baggage' with them and who thought they could impose 
the 'old' ways on our party. If there are any of them left in our 
party— and some chose to leave with great sound and fury— they 
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have to be faded quietly into the background and have no impact 
on our day-to-day operation. 
There is little available data on women's presence in decision-making 
positions in trade unions. The Australian Council of Trade Unions 
(ACTU) does not gather this kind of data, but has estimated that about 
10% of decision-making positions are held by women. The Council 
promises to implement affirmative action and makes 3 seats reserved 
for women on its 38 member Council. At present women comprise 
11% of senior position holders in South Australia, and 23% in Victoria. 
Also the Victorian Trades Hall Council adopts affirmative action to 
create 3 extra positions reserved for women, raising women's 
representation on the executive from 14% to 25% (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1992). 
Women's representation in decision-making positions of trade 
unions has been improving in recent years. Jennie George has been 
elected as the first woman president. Women comprise one quarter of 
the ACTU executive and two thirds of the council in 1995. Of all 
affiliated unions, 16% of the national or general presidents and 
secretaries are women. Women in professional unions are also more 
likely to hold leadership positions. However, there are no women 
executives in unions of tradespersons and labourers and related 
workers (ABS 1995c: 132). 
In the Report of Human Rights Indicators 1993 of Taiwan Area, 
two items of women's rights were directly related to women's 
representation in political parties. One was that 'There is no 
discrimination against women when political parties nominate 
candidates.' The score of this item was 1.89 2 . The other was that 
'Women enjoy the equal opportunities in participating in political 
activities and heading decision-making positions within political 
parties.' The score on this item was 1.94. These low scores reflected 
women's low representation in important positions both within the 
KMT and the DPP. 
This at least partly reflects the organisational structure and the 
process of decision-making in the KMT, both of which are highly 
centralised. However, at the grassroots level, the gender balance is 
2 The score is from 1 to 5. 1 means the worst, and 5 the best. 
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better. Party members are organised in cells of about 3 to 29 members. It 
has district, county/city, provincial/special municipal congresses and 
committees, and finally the National Congress and the Central 
Committee (CC) 3 . Major vocational groups, such as journalists, 
farmers, seamen, and overseas Chinese communities, various labour 
groups, and women have their own branches. 
In accordance with the conclusion of the 7th second Central 
Committee Conference of the KMT on 7 October, 1953, the Women's 
Department was established in order to incorporate women into the 
political process and to promote women's welfare policies. The 
structure of the Women's Department was hierarchical ranging from 
the centre (the state), province, hsien (county) to town. Membership 
was widespread throughout Taiwan. The organisational activities of 
the Department included ideological persuasion and community 
services. The Department was also linked with various women's 
groups. Its work was useful for the KMT mobilising voters' support. 
For example, in the 1986 General Election, all of the KMT women 
candidates were elected (Chou and Chiang 1989). 
The Women's Department was linked with the other six 
Departments in the KMT. For decades the heads of Department held 
seats in the National Assembly. Apart from carrying out the Party's 
policies, it also delivered services, such as protecting step-daughters, 
assisting prostitutes, advocating family issues, improving the standard 
of living in rural areas, contacting women's groups domestic and 
overseas, and assuring the employment right of married women 
(Chien 1988: 21-22). However, its ideals reflected conservative and 
patriarchal vision and failed to encourage more women into politics. 
The Central Standing Committee (CSC) that represents the CC 
when it is out of session is the most influential organ within the KMT. 
Members of the CSC meet once a week to deliberate and approve 
important policies for the government, and to nominate people for 
important government and party positions. The Secretary-General is 
3 The National Congress convenes every four years or more. It amends the constitution 
or charter of the party, decides on the platform and other important resolutions, elect 
the members of the Central Committee and the party chairman as well as approve 
members of the Central Advisory Council nominated by the chairman. During recess, 
the supreme party organ is the Central Committee which holds a plenary session every 
year. 
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also a powerful position within the party4 . There are 7 Departments, 4 
Commissions, 2 parliamentary Coordination, and 1 training 
institution at the national leve15 . All are heavily male dominated. 
The proportion of women in the top decision-making bodies at 
the national level has been very low. Within 7 Departments and 4 
Commissions, only the Women's Department has always been headed 
by women. No woman has ever been appointed as the Secretary-
General, and the first woman deputy Secretary-General was selected 
only in the early 1990s. Among members of the CC, women's 
representation has never exceeded 9%. The CSC has had no woman 
member until 1988 (see Table 3.5). At the grassroots level, the Directors 
of each county/ city and provincial/ special municipal branch have 
been powerful positions. Yet, none of these positions has ever been 
held by women. 
The organisational structure of the DPP closely resembles that of 
the KMT. The DPP's annual National Congress elects the chairman 
and 31 members of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) who, in 
turn, elect the 11 members of the Central Standing Committee (CSC). 
The chairman appoints the Secretary-General and two deputy 
Secretaries-General. There are 4 Departments, 7 Committees, 1 Centre, 
and the Secretariat at the national leve1 6 . Among them, only the 
Financial Affairs Committee, Women and Development Committee, 
Secretariat, and the Department of Foreign Affairs have been headed by 
women in 1994. Compared with the KMT, the DPP has better gender 
representation within the CEC and the CSC (see Table 3.6). This may be 
seen as a result of women's early involvement in political opposition 
movement in the mid 1970s and 1980s. All women members of the 
CEC and the CSC are either central figures in the opposition 
4 The day-to-day affairs of the party are managed by the Central Committee headed 
by a Secretary-General and three deputy Secretaries-General. 
5 7 Departments include: Organisational Affairs, Mainland Affairs, Overseas Affairs, 
Cultural Affairs, Youth Activities, Social Affairs, and Women's Activities. 4 
Commissions include: Finance, Party History, Evaluation and Discipline, and Policy 
Coordination. The training institution is The Sun Yat-sen Institution on Policy Research 
and Development. 
6 4 Departments are: Organisation, Culture and Information, Foreign Affairs, and 
Social Movement. 7 Committees are: Financial Affairs, Policy Coordination, Party 
Negotiation, Election Management, Indigenous Affairs, DPP Development, and Women 
and Development. The Centre is the Policy Research Centre. 
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movement or members of political families which have played an 
important role in local politics and the opposition movement. 
Table 3.6 Women's Representation within the KMT's Central 
Committee and the Central Standing Committee (persons) 
Year 
the Central Committee 
the Central Standing 
Committee 
Member 
Alternate 
member Member* 
Total Women Total Women Total Women 
1957 50 1 25 1 15 0 
1963 74 2 35 2 15 
1969 99 5 51 2 21 0 
1976 130 6 65 3 22 0 
1981 150 7 75 3 27 , 0 
1988 180 9 90 5 31 1 
1993 210 19 105 8 31 2 
Source: 1CMT document. Personal communication with ICMT staff. 
Note: * All members were appointed by the chairman. In 1993, 15 were 
appointed by the chairman, and 16 were elected by the members 
of the CC. 
Table 3.7 Women's Representation within the DPP's Executive 
Committee and the Central Standing Committee (persons) 
Year 
Members of the Central 
Executive Committee 
Members of the Central 
Standing Committee 
Total Women Total Women 
1986 31 4 11 0 
1987 31 6 11 2 
1988 31 3 11 2 
1989 31 3 11 1 
1991 31 4 11 1 
Source: Huang 1992. 
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2. The Occupational Pools: 
Women in 'Political Springboard' Occupations 
Most politicians start their careers as teachers, lawyers, administrators, 
managers, and other professions. These occupations form the major 
eligible pools in recruitment to political elites. The higher the 
percentage of women in these occupations, the more likely is the 
presence of women among the top politicians. 
During the last two decades, the common trend between 
Australia and Taiwan has been the increase in the proportion of 
women in these political springboard occupations (see Table 3.7). 
However, Australian women have shared higher proportion of 
administrators, managers and professions than their counterparts in 
Taiwan. Since 1988, the proportion of women in administrative 
executive and managerial positions in Australia has dramatically 
increased, but has dropped in professional positions 7 . In Taiwan, the 
administrator and manager category includes politicians. This means 
that when excluding women politicians from this category, the 
proportion of women administrators and managers will be lower than 
that in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8 Women as Proportion of Total Administrators/ 
Administrative Executives, Managers, and Professionals (°/0) 
Administrative Executive 
& Managerial Professionals 
Year Australia Taiwan Australia Taiwan 
1972 13 - 42 - 
1978 12 12 45 41 
1983 14 11 46 45 
1988 240 15 40# 47 
1993 24** 12 43* 47 
Source: the Office of the Women 1994; ABS 1979, 1984, 1989, 1995; Directorate- 
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan 1994c. 
Note: it The Australian Standard Classification of Occupations was 
adopted for use in the Labour Force Survey from August 1986. 
Occupation estimates prior to this date were based on the 
Classification and Classified List of Occupations. 
* data for 1994. 
7 This may due, at least partly, to the new method of classification. 
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While a large number of political leaders are recruited from 
professions, some professions are particularly compatible with politics. 
Studies of elites (eg. Encel 1970; Currell 1974; Putnam 1976; Pakulski 
1982; Rydon 1986; Darcy et al. 1994) point out that teachers, lawyers, 
public relation workers, journalists and medical doctors, develop 
specific skills that are vital to successful politicians. These professions 
train in symbol manipulation and provide job insurance against 
possible defeat in elections. By contrast, some occupations like farmer 
and manual workers, are less likely to enter politics due to low 
symbolic skills and job security (Randall 1987; Putnam 1976). 
Among these professions, law is the biggest supplier of political 
elites in many countries like Australia, UK, and USA. Weber (1948: 85, 
93-94) gives the explanation for this preference for lawyers in political 
elites. The lawyer is economically 'dispensable', familiar with the law 
which is the traditional means of statesmanship, and able to 'plead 
effectively the cause of interested clients.' Other characteristics of 
lawyers include skills in public debate and contacts with people and • 
community. 
Some scholars (eg. Kirkpatrick 1974; Randall 1987; Darcy et al. 
1994) argue that women's under-representation in political elites is due 
to their under-representation in law. This argument needs to be 
revised in the light of the recent data on feminisation of law which. is 
seldom reflected in feminisation of politics. 
Women are often over-represented among teachers. Large 
numbers of women political elites in Australia and Taiwan come from 
this occupational category (see Chapter Four). Thus, women's 
proportion in professional occupations cannot fully explain limited 
women's political opportunities. The social-cultural norms and the 
constraints of gender roles are also important obstacles in women's 
political careers. 
3. The Social-Cultural Norms and Gender Roles 
Gender role constraints are regarded as one of the greatest barriers for 
women pursuing political careers. The labour market participation rate 
of married women, gender roles, and the domestic division of labour 
can be used as indicators of political opportunities. This assumes that 
women's domestic roles are conventionally seen as the barrier to their 
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social roles, including paid employment and political activities. Female 
labour force participation rate is usually seen as an important indicator 
of the changing sexual division of labour and gender discrimination. It 
is also a good indicator of the political acceptance and activation of 
women. It is believed that the higher is the female participation rate, 
especially among married women, the more accessible the political 
positions for women aspirants. 
The married women's labour force participation rate in Australia 
increased from 41% in 1979 to 53% in 1993. Women's labour force 
participation rate in Taiwan also grew from 32% in 1979 to 44% in 1993, 
but this growth was from a much lower basis than in Australia, thus 
indicating lower political opportunities for women in Taiwan (see 
Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1 Female Labour Force Participation Rate by Marital Status 
Source: Year Book Australia 1979-1994; Directorate-General of Budget, 
Account and Statistics, and Council For Economic Planning 
and Development, Executive Yuan 1994 
Female average weekly earnings as a proportion of male earnings, 
also increased in Australia to 84% in 1993. This compared with the 
Taiwanese proportion of 66% (ABS 1995c: 100; Directorate-General of 
Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan and Council for 
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Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan 1994: 33). In 
this respect, Taiwanese society illustrates a persisting wide gender gap 
found in all East Asian societies. 
It is also noteworthy that the participation rate among unmarried 
Taiwanese females has dropped since 1979. This trend reflects a high 
proportion of young women continuing their education and thus 
delaying their paid employment (details will be discussed later). 
Cheng and Liao's study (1985) of gender roles in Taiwan found 
that 'traditional familial roles' have still been identified as preferable 
by employed women8, in spite of many modern values permeating 
Taiwanese society. 'Motherhood/wifehood' and 'traditional 
femininity' have been the cores of women's role identification in 
Taiwan. The study indicates that: 
• 61% of women politicians agree that women's self-image is 
with subordinate and docile. In order to gain voters' support, 
women politicians think that it is inappropriate to be presented 
as anti-traditional or 'quasi-men'. 
• Two thirds of respondents agree with the statement that 
'Women manage households, and men are breadwinners. It is 
women's natural vocation to look after husbands and 
children.' 
• 76% of respondents agree with the statement that 'To be 
standard modern female, a woman should be a good wife and 
good mother. To be a good wife and good mother is not out-of-
date.' 
• 93% of respondents agree, and 56% of them strongly agree with 
the statement that 'A modern woman should give the priority 
to her family.' 
• More importantly, 79% of women politicians agree with the 
statement: 'A woman politician can use her femininity and her 
role as mother in political appeals' 61% of all women 
respondents agree with this statement. This seems to be 
8 They used questionnaire and interview methods to survey 540 women in various 
occupations. The respondents included 92 nursing professionals, 89 school teachers, 29 
women legislators at all levels, 45 civil servants, 58 white-collar and blue-collar 
workers, 43 women managers, 18 civilian organisation workers, 81 women scholars, 57 
social workers, and 5 professionals (physicians, writers, journalists, etc.). 
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consistent with the results above, and implies that the familial 
•roles can be used in political appeals. 
• 94% of respondents agree that 'A modern woman should not 
behave like a man and become 'the second class man'. She can 
exert her own capacity to be 'the first class woman', and 
contributes her skills and knowledge to our society.' This 
statement is seen as a combination of modernity and tradition. 
The fact that high proportion of women agree with it may 
mean that social prestige is not derived from paid employment. 
Less respondents (34%) agree with the statement that 'Paid 
employment promotes modern women's dignity and rights.' 
Lu's studies (1980, 1982) also found that Taiwanese women give 
priority to their familial roles rather than professional career roles, 
although the latter is also seen as important. Most women tend to 
combine their 'traditional' familial roles with 'modern' working roles, 
and even those with higher education are likely to give the same 
weight to both family and career roles rather than choose one over the 
other. However, the emphasis on familial roles has different 
consequences to women's political opportunities in Taiwan. One is 
that the successful familial roles are recognised by voters and party 
selectors, thus becoming a useful political resource. The other is that 
the combination of familial duties and political activities is difficult 
because intensive political activities and harmonious family life are 
usually seen as mutually exclusive, thus limiting women's political 
careers. One of my respondents, for example, reported: 
My husband supports political opposition movement as much as 
I do. He also shares with me housework and child care, but 
strongly opposes my involvement in politics, because he thinks 
this will affect our family life. For example, when I became the 
director of the Department of Women Development, the DPP, he 
felt uneasy. He agrees, but hopes that I better serve one term only. 
(J) 
Domestic labour is unevenly divided between sexes in both countries. 
However, husbands of working wives start to share more housework 
in Australia, though their contribution is less than their wives (Bryson 
1983). Recent Australian studies (Bittman and Lovejoy 1993; Baxter 
1993) suggest that urban and dual earner couples share egalitarian 
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attitudes to domestic division of labour. They also show that men are 
more involved in child care, cooking, and laundrying (Office of the 
Status of the Women 1991b). Goodnow and Bowes (1994), for example, 
argue that the gender division of tasks is no longer separating men's 
and women's work within households. The house work 
in practice moved away from the conventional distinctions 
between 'men's work' and 'women's work', not by role-reversals 
but by simply blurring the usual gender lines, dividing work on 
the basis of fairness, practically, or likes and dislikes rather than 
on the basis of one person being male and the other female (1994: 
1). 
The domestic division of labour in Taiwan is more strictly demarcated 
by the gender line. It is not surprising to find this arrangement within 
a Confucian society. Women in such societies have traditionally been 
responsible for the majority of domestic tasks. The results of the 
Women's Life Survey conducted by the Taiwan Provincial 
Government confirm this gender division (Department of Social 
Affairs 1992). Half of women respondents believe that husbands 
should help housework, but still one-third maintains that husbands' 
help should be limited to some areas only. 36% of women respondents 
say that 'housework is exhausting', but also agree that 'it does not 
matter because this is my job.' This may be the main reason for the 
belief that politics affects the family life. Such belief restricts political 
opportunities of Taiwanese women. 
4. Access to Higher Education 
Higher education seems to become a prerequisite for successful 
political career in Australia and Taiwan. Both the basic political 
recruitment and elite selection occur increasingly from the pools of 
highly educated eligibles (Putnam 1976; Pakulski 1982). Women's 
access to higher education is therefore a good indicator of political 
opportunities. 
There has been the same trend in Australia and Taiwan of 
increasing access by women to higher education. This trend is 
particularly salient in Australia where the proportion of women in 
higher education starts to exceed the proportion of men (see Table 3.9). 
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Table 3.9 Women as Proportion of Higher Education Students (`)/0) 
Year Australia Taiwan 
1964 24 28 
1974 42* 36 
1984 47 43 
1991 53 46 
Source: Year Book Australia 1965, 1974, 1991, 1992; Directorate-General 
of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC 1994a. 
Note: * including students in colleges of advanced education and universities. 
Australian women seem to have benefited from the educational 
reforms and the active feminist movement by dramatically rising their 
educational profiles during the period of 1964-1974. By contrast, 
Taiwanese women experienced an educational reverse in the early 
1970s. There seemed to be a concern that the proportion of female 
students may exceed that of male students in senior colleges and 
universities in 1971. Some politicians proposed to set the 'male quota' 
in the annual joint university entrance examination (Lu 1990; Lee 
1988). While this proposal was rejected, it nevertheless revealed a 
deep-rooted traditionalism. With the improvement of family 
economic resources, women gained a broad access to higher education 
although their proportion was still lower than men's in 1991. 
5. Citizen Rights and the Quota Systems 
To vote and to stand for the parliament are seen as an important 
part of political participation and citizen rights in modern societies. 
Australian women gained these citizen rights at the beginning of this 
century and Taiwanese women after the Second World War. These 
extensions of citizen rights have assured legally equality between sexes 
in both societies. In an attempt to translate legal equality into social 
equality, the (in-)formal quota systems have been introduced in 
Australia and Taiwan. The quota system in Australia has been 
introduced recently within the ALP, and has been an informal 
arrangement. By contrast, the reserved-seat system in Taiwan was 
established in the Constitution initiated in 1947 when the KMT regime 
controlled the Chinese mainland. It was a very helpful initiative to 
create women's political opportunities in patriarchal Chinese society at 
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that time. After four decades, the system is seen as inimical to 
women's political opportunities. This is discussed in more details in 
Chapter Four. 
Political Resources 
Political resources can derive from political organisations, local 
communities, and the family. In Australia, the main resourcing bodies 
are political organisations, especially political parties and trade unions. 
Local communities are unlikely to produce and deliver sufficient 
political resources. As far as the family is concerned, its impact on 
political careers seems to be limited 9 , although it still plays an 
important role in providing early exposure, valuable contacts and 
doubtless, financial resources. Some family members may exert their 
influence within organisations to help their children. Nevertheless, 
this practice is rare and regarded as corrupt. 
In Taiwan, local communities are powerful and they can 
effectively support candidates in elections at all levels. Sometimes the 
extent of their support can decisively affect the results of elections. This 
power, in turn, often reflects family power. Family can be seen as basic 
cell of local community. Most of the local factions within local 
communities are based on family ties. It is therefore particularly 
important for an aspirant candidate to secure family support. Under 
such arrangements, the importance of gender is often reduced. Because 
the KMT deliberately establishes local political factions in local 
community as its electoral foundation, the distribution of political 
resources, such as political influence, loyalty and financial support, is 
in the hands of leaders of local community. For example, one of my 
respondents reported, 
If you campaign within Taipei City, the importance of the 
family/local community connections is less. However, outside 
Taipei City, you will not succeed in elections without these 
connections. (C) 
Therefore, the family/local community system of distribution of 
political resources is much less gender biased than the organisational 
9  It was estimated that 1 of every 8 political elite members in mid-1970s owed part of 
their success to their political family background. See Higley et al. 1979: 74-107. 
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system of distribution in Taiwan. It is discussed in the section of the 
local communities as political resource controllers. 
1. Resources in Political Organisations 
Political organisations, in particular political parties, lies at the centre 
of the Australian politics. Political parties are also the most evident 
and visible actors in the Australian political system. One common 
feature of Australian major parties is their active role in selecting and 
grooming political leaders. Party members and activists serve an 
important function in election campaigns. They hand out leaflets or 
pamphlets or to do fund-raising (Jaensch 1991). In theory, resources 
such as political expertise, money and campaign staff, are to be 
distributed in a gender-neutral way. However, as is argued below, this 
is not necessary the case in practice. 
Australian candidates for federal parliament elections could 
receive public financial support for their campaign, so long as they gain 
at least 4% of first preference votes. The funding is directly paid to the 
parties (except for the Independents) in Australia, and to each 
candidate in Taiwan. However, this financial support is relatively 
small, and it is paid after elections. For example, funding for per first 
preference vote for a member of House of Representatives in Australia 
is $1, and for a Senator 50 centsw (Office of the Status of Women 1995: 
46). Candidates who cannot find other sponsors or financial sources 
have little chance of winning in elections. 
Political organisations in Taiwan also control important 
resources, especially the financial resources and media exposure. For 
example, the KMT is the richest political party in the non-communist 
world. It has money invested in more than 100 companies ranging 
from nearly bankrupt firms to enormously profitable financial 
industries. These businesses supply more than US$450 million which 
the KMT has recently spent (1994). 
With these huge businesses as its backbone, the party budget for 
the 1994 Provincial election was reported at NT$7 billion (A$350 
million). The real spending could go higher (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, August 11, 1994). Apart from its affluence, the KMT could also 
10 As long as candidates can get at least 4% of first preference votes (regardless of 
whether or not they are elected), they can receive public funding for their campaigns 
for federal, NSW and ACT government elections. 
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successfully mobilise various voter groups in elections. This will be 
discussed in Chapter Four. 
With the exception of the Dan gwai women, the overwhelming 
majority of women politicians in Taiwan were affiliated with the 
KMT. For most of these KMT women candidates, the party 
nomination was the equivalent to success in elections. For example, all 
women candidates that KMT nominated in the 1986 national election 
won their seats (Chou and Chiang 1989: 82). This reflected the fact that 
the KMT still played a hegemonic role in Taiwanese politics until the 
mid 1980s. However, its monopoly over the whole society was being 
undermined. 
The organisational systems of distribution of political resources 
are controlled by the party campaign staff, the majority of whom are 
male. Some women politicians report that male members of the 
campaign staff consciously or unconsciously ignore the media 
exposure of women candidates. They think that this may be an 
institutional (the reserved-seat system) bias since women, candidates 
are often seen as competing with each other rather than with male 
candidates. This reduces women's share of overall political resources, 
especially media exposure and financial support. By and large, the 
organisational resources are unlikely to exceed family/community 
resources (see further comments on p. 131 and pp.133-134). 
2. Local Communities as Political Resource Controllers 
'The ideal of local democracy and the existence of strong and active 
local government itself were never significant in Australia' (Simms 
1989: 9). Lack of active local politics, and the dominance of centralised 
mass political parties in national politics, both diminish the role of 
local communities in recruiting and resourcing aspiring political elites 
in Australia. 
Unlike their Australian counterparts, the political parties in 
Taiwan have strong grassroots in local communities. The KMT has 
built complicated local patron-client networks. Within each 
county/city, the KMT supports and maintains at least two competing 
local factions contending for political offices in semi-official 
organisations, such as Farmers' Associations or Irrigation Associations. 
The KMT permits these local factions to compete for 'a share of the 
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region-based economic rents in the non-tradeable goods sector to be 
distributed by the party-directed local spoils system' (Hu 1993: 138). In 
this way, the KMT may utilise and manipulate the elections through 
its local factional clientele. 
The existence of political factions in local communities is evident 
in most electorates (except for Taipei City and Nantou County). Both 
the KMT and the DPP are influential, and have their own wings in 
local factions. These factions are integrated by familial, school-
friendship, geographical, and interest bonds. They supply political 
resources and define dominant economic interests. The factional 
conflicts often surface during local political elections (Chi 1985: 102; 
Chen 1990: 421; Liang 1993: 11; Bosco 1994). According to Liang (1993), 
very high proportion of Provincial Assemblywomen, both the KMT 
and the DPP women, relied on the support of local factions. Recently, 
the percentage is estimated to range from 69% to 90%. 
Local communities also include two other types of organisations: 
Tung Hsung Huei and schooling associations. While they are 
organised more loosely than local party factions, both are important 
'vote stocks' for most candidates. Many interviewees mention seeking 
support from these associations during political campaigns. 
Tung Hsung Huei is formed by those who came from the same 
province, city, county, and so on. Such voluntary associations are often 
established in urban areas, such as Taipei City, Kaohsiung City, and 
highly urbanised towns of Taipei county, due to the presence there of a 
large rural population. Schooling associations are alumni associations. 
Their functions in elections include mobilising votes for candidates, 
donating money, and exerting influence through members' personal 
connections. 
These local community-based organisations are by and large 
gender-neutral. The gender-neutral character, it must be stressed, 
derives mainly from the predominant emphasis on community 
interests. Women's political opportunities are low in local 
community, particularly in rural areas and in some traditional 
associations (such as Tung Hsung Huei), because these organisations 
tend to be patriarchal and masculine. However, when women are 
selected as candidates, they represented the interests of these 
organisations, thus being less affected by gender-biased distribution of 
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political resources. The local community-based organisations are often 
key resource-sources for successful women politicians. Factors, such as 
family connections, shared birth place, and studying location, are used 
by women to generate political resources. 
3. Political Resources and Family Networks 
Some studies (Currell 1974; Randall 1987; Chou et al. 1990; Haines 1992; 
Darcy et al. 1994) suggest that the earlier familial political socialisation 
a candidate experiences (eg., being from supportive or politicised 
families), the more likely is his/her political success. This is true for 
Australian men and women. For example, Senator Janine Haines, the 
former leader of the ADs, wrote (1992: 110), 'A non-traditional 
upbringing was also to have a strong impact on my development.' The 
similar experience was reported by such political 'scions' as Kim 
Beasley and Simon Crean. 
The structure of the family is also important. Geographical 
distances have weakened the kinship networks in Australia. The 
family developed into a nuclear form without the assistance from 
extended kinship networks. It was further weakened due to the 
processes of secularisation and urbanisation. 'Australian families 
developed in a more insular, nuclear form from the outset' (Graetz 
and McAllister 1994: 23). Such weak kinship ties limit the resourcing 
capabilities. They also increase domestic pressures thus posing serious 
dilemmas for aspiring women politicians. Sandra Non, Member of the 
NSW Legislative Assembly, expressed well this dilemma (1993: 26): 
Politics is not an easy game (...) it is very hard for a woman to be 
in politics and still manage a family. You have crises of 
conscience and guilt pangs that I am sure the men don't have 
because they have that wife role at home for them. 
Unlike in Australia, the extended families have not only survived in 
the process of economic modernisation, but are also still prevalent in 
contemporary Taiwan. The economic modernisation and the increase 
in the importance of nuclear bonds do not break the broader kinship 
ties. The Women's Marriage, Fertility and Employment Survey reports 
that 69% of married women aged 15-49 lives with parents during the 
first five years after their marriage. The proportion of young couples 
living with parents is especially high: 96% of those aged 15-19, 83% of 
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those aged 20-24, and 73% of those aged 25-29 (Department of Social 
Affairs 1990). These living arrangements may make it easier to cope 
with domestic chores and facilitate involvement in politics. One of my 
interviewees reports: 
I have lived with my parents-in-law since I got married. I have 
been always busy, and have no time to look after the children and 
to deal with the domestic responsibilities. However, it does not 
matter. My mother and mother-in-law look after the children 
and perform domestic responsibilities for me. Everything goes 
well. (A) 
The family plays another key role in women's political recruitment, as 
well. Without the family networks, women would not have access to 
rich political resources. In particular, 'having an elite family 
background, women and men are surprisingly equal in the possession 
of political resources' (Chou et al. 1990: 190). 
Family networks themselves form the basic supportive electorate. 
'The family is a rich resource of votes in that it is a very large network. 
Many Taiwanese candidates hold such a large 'vote stock". It is not 
limited to candidates of Taiwanese origin. Chung Ching Huei is a kind 
of family-based organisation similar to a clan association. Those who 
have the same family name or whose family names are different but 
have a common ancient ancestor, form their own Chung Ching Huei. 
Many of my interviewees mentioned their connections with these 
organisations. 
The family can be used as a tool to 'hunt' votes. For example, my 
family name is Chu, and I will contact the Chu Chung Ching 
Huei to seek for support. Chu, Chaung and Yuan have the same 
ancestor, so I also seek their support. (E) 
A family can also exert its influence through its members. Connections 
built by family members can be transformed into the candidate's 
resources during political campaigns. Two of my interviewees reported 
such experiences. Candidate E shows how the spouse effectively 
establishes grassroots networks, and Mrs. F illustrates how the 
daughter successfully succeeds her father by taking over his political 
resources: 
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Life of a Legislator is very busy. I have not enough time to attend 
many grassroots activities. However, my husband has been doing 
this for me. The electorate treats him as my best representative. 
He has been involved in many different kinds of voluntary 
organisations, such as the Lions Club, trade unions, and he 
attends weddings and funerals on many occasions. All these are 
very important activities, helpful in accumulating political 
resources. They strengthen personal networks and voluntary 
organisations' support which are essential in political campaigns. 
(E) 
During the period of campaign, I found that the electorate had 
sweet memories of her father, although he had died two years 
ago. As we visited the electorate, everyone said 'I would give her 
a vote!' The only reason was that she was the daughter of this 
influential man. Think about it: she was only 24 then and knew 
little about politics. If she had not inherited her father's political 
resources, she would have not been nominated and elected. Her 
mother was one of the main contributors, who was active during 
the campaign and effectively exerted influence through the 
personal networks. (Mrs. F) 
It should be restated that the family constitutes the basic unit of a local 
community. Essentially, the establishment of family networks implies 
the mobilisation of local communities. The complicated/ family 
networks can spread across large distances and form a 'political net'. 
Sometimes, they may transcend political parties, especially if their 
interests are not in conflict (eg. the candidates of two local factions are 
registered in different districts). 
The distribution of political resources in Australia can be seen as 
'concentrated'. In fact, one may argue that such concentration goes 
hand in hand with the modern bureaucracy and rationalisation. The 
distribution of political resources is ordered by rules and 
administrative regulations in political organisations. Calculable rules 
are of paramount importance in modern bureaucracy (Weber 1948). 
Political organisations have to deliver effectively and gender-neutrally 
their resources to the candidates. However, these organisations are 
mainly male-dominated. The mostly male officials in these 
organisations know the availability of, and decide the distribution of, 
resources. It is predictable that unwinnable and marginal seats will 
receive relatively less resources. Not surprisingly, the majority of 
candidates in those seats are women. 
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By contrast, political resources in Taiwan are 'diffused' or 
'spread'. Those resources which are derived from local community 
and family networks are at least as important in propelling political 
careers as those derived from political organisations. 'Gender-
neutrality' is the most salient feature of resources from local 
community and, to a lesser extent, from family networks. A gender 
bias/preference in selecting candidates in local community and the 
family typically reflects disadvantages women suffer in political 
opportunities rather than access to resources. As long as women are 
selected, they are able to command wide resources. Some of these 
resources, we argue in the conclusions, are gender-specific in the sense 
of being available to women rather than to men. For example, both 
Yeh Chu-lan (the DPP candidate) and Hung Dong-kwei (the KMT 
candidate), the most famous women Legislative candidates in Taipei 
City, emphasised their familial roles in the 1989 national election (Lee 
1991: 139). 
Organisationally concentrated distribution and diffused 
distribution of political resources are ideal types. No political systems 
in any existing society has a completely concentrated or completely 
diffused distribution of political resources. Thus even in the 
Australian political system, which approximates the concentrated type, 
some political resources are available from families, communities and 
non-political organisations (eg. the green movement). Similarly, in the 
Taiwanese system, which approximates the diffused type, many 
political resources, as stressed above, are under organisational control, 
especially by the KMT. 
It is worth highlighting further the differences between the 
concentrated and diffused resources. One is the gender composition of 
managers of political resources. Men have always dominated the 
concentrated organisational resources. This is in part the historical 
legacy of gender bias in political organisations traditionally seen as 
'men's playground'. It is not necessary the case with diffused resources. 
They are likely to be more equally distributed with less gender-
restricted resource managers. For example, Yu-Chen Yueh-ying, former 
Provincial Assemblywoman, Legislator, and the first woman 
magistrate in Taiwan, is the head of the 'Black' (the strongest local 
political faction in Kaohsiung county). The former head of the Black 
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was her father-in-law. He selected her replacing his son-in-law in local 
elections because of her performance and the family inheritance. The 
Black is equal to the Yu family in Kaohsiung county. Women 
candidates from this family can be resourced from the networks of the 
Black, thus succeeding in elections. Essentially Yu-Chen's political 
success has been built on her family networks. As well, her daughter 
has won political office because of her support. Under this 
arrangement, women's political resources are more 'evenly'. spread. 
Therefore, the diffused type is likely to be more advantageous for 
women politicians. 
Conclusions 
Different dynamics of social change in Australia and Taiwan result in 
different configurations of women's political opportunities and 
resources. Australian women have higher political opportunities than 
their Taiwanese counterparts. They enjoy a better location in 
occupational structure, better access to and representation in political 
organisations (both in membership and decision-making positions). 
They have higher labour force participation rates, narrower gender gap 
in domestic labour, and better representation in higher education. In 
general, their access to societal statuses that 'count' in politics and that 
form the springboards for political careers has been rapidly improving. 
Consequently, they are increasingly present in the political 'pools of 
eligibles' for political careers. However, Australian women rely 
heavily on resources controlled by political organisations which are 
male-dominated. This is reflected in the low success rates in political 
competition for highest offices and in truncated political careers. The 
political 'glass ceilings' reflect narrow resourcing. 
Compared with their Australian counterparts, Taiwanese 
women's political opportunities are low because of traditionalism and 
patriarchal elements in Confucianism. Yet, women's access to political 
resources, especially gender-specific resources, is relatively wide. Many 
of these gender-specific resources, it must be stressed, are derived from 
and dependent upon traditional Confucian values and norms. 
Aspiring women politicians in Taiwan can use the family and its 
networks, and local community as their supplementary political 
resources to compensate for the unequal share of resources from 
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political organisations. Moreover, women's familial roles — those of 
good mothers and good wives — can be utilised in political campaigns. 
While not all women choose to mobilise these gender-specific 
resources in political campaigns, they can and do use them. This 
accessibility of gender-specific resources reduces the gender gap and 
results in the similar proportion of women politicians in Australia and 
Taiwan. By contrast, like in other Western societies, the feminist 
movement devalues women's familial roles, and these gender-specific 
resources may be destroyed in Australia in spite of the latter's 
traditionalism. The next chapter is an analysis of the accumulation and 
mobilisation of these gender-specific resources in women's political 
careers. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
AND 
WOMEN'S POLITICAL CAREER STRUCTURE 
The institutional framework in which selection of politicians occurs is 
a central feature of the opportunity structure. The political careers of 
women MPs are the key to understanding of their political recruitment 
patterns and in turn, to the overall nature and structure of political 
resources available to women. As indicated in the previous chapters, 
the balance of political opportunities and resources is considered as a 
central feature of political selection system that shapes the patterns of 
political careers and gender composition of elites in Australia and 
Taiwan. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
discusses the core elements of the selection system, namely the 
electoral system and political institutions in Australia and Taiwan. 
The second section identifies and compares political careers of women 
MPs in both countries. The third section analyses the overall patterns 
of political recruitment of women MPs. The empirical sections are 
based on published biographical materials and interviews with women 
politicians. 
Electoral System and Political Institutions 
The structural features of political selection system in Australia and 
Taiwan are summarised in Table 4.1. Five differences between the two 
systems are highlighted here: in the electoral system, in the process of 
pre-selection, in the overall position and mobilising capacity of 
political organisations, in voters' attitudes, and in the role of 
traditional social networks. Each of these aspects, it is argued here, 
affects the distribution of opportunities and resources, and 
consequently the political recruitment of women. 
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Table 4.1 Structural Features of Electoral Politics 
in Australia and Taiwan 
Structural Features Australia Taiwan 
Legal age to vote 18 20 
Legal age to stand 
for parliament 
18 23 
Electoral System 
• Upper House: Multi- 
member PR 
Lower House: Single 
Member 
(Affirmative Action, 
ALP 35% winnable 
seats by 2002) 
• Single transferable 
vote in the Upper; 
majority formula in 
the Lower 
• Multi-member PR + 
Reserved-seat System 
(Guarantees a 
minimum portion of 
women in 
parliament, since 
1947) 
• Single 
non-transferable 
vote 
• Plurality formula 
Pre-selection decentralised centralised 
The Influence of 
Political 
Organisations 
1. Political Parties 
2. Union 
autonomy 
Weak 
Strong 
Strong 
Weak 
Voters' Attitudes Political Party Oriented Individual Candidate 
Oriented 
The Impact of 
Traditional Local 
Social Networks 
on Electoral 
Politics 
Weak Strong 
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Legal Age to Vote and to Stand in Parliament 
In Australia the minimal legal age to vote and to stand for parliament 
is the same (18), and it is lower than those in Taiwan (20/23). However, 
in Australia, no one has been elected at 18. In Taiwan though, some 
women, including national and local elections have been elected at 23. 
This early elevation, it is argued, can be attributed to their access to rich 
political resources available outside the political organisations. 
The Electoral System 
In Australia, the multi-member party list PR system is used for the 
Senate, and the single member system in the House of 
Representatives. In Taiwan, both the National Assembly and the 
Legislative Yuan adapts multi-member PR system. Also the reserved-
seat system has been institutionalised since 1947 to guarantee a 
minimum of 10% of total seats for women. 
The general principles of the reserved-seat system were not listed 
in the Constitution until the amendment in 1992. Before that, the exact 
number of reserved seats and the regulation for selecting Women to fill 
the seats were set by the Public Officials Election and Recall Law. In fact, 
before election of the second term of the parliament in 1991 and 1992, 
the reserved-seats system worked differently for elections of the 
Assemblywomen and the women Legislators. 
The reserved-seats in the National Assembly are filled by 
members of the Women's Organisation which is one of many 
organised constituencies, including minority ethnic and occupational 
groups. However, since the supplementary election in 1969, under the 
Temporary Provisions, the Women's Associationl (Fu Nu Huei ) is 
the only legally qualified constituency for the election of candidates to 
fill these reserved seats 2 . The members of the Women's Association 
'Taiwan Provincial Women's Association (Fu Nu Huei) was established in 1946. Its 
membership includes all county and municipal women's association in Taiwan Province. 
Its basic units are village and town associations. As Taipei and Kaohsiung became 
special Municipal cities in 1968 and 1979, respectively, the Taipei and the Kaohsiung 
Municipal Women's Associations became two independent associations. 
2 There are also some other women's organisations. Before the lifting of the martial 
law, large scale women's organisations were very close to the KNIT and small scale 
women's groups seemed relatively more autonomous. These included Chinese Women's 
Anti-Aggression League, established in 1950 by Madame Chiang kai-shek; Taipei 
International Women's Club, established in 1951 by women of the Chinese and foreign 
communities; Taipei Zonta Club, established in 1964 and later its branches established 
in many counties; and Business and Professional Women's Club Taipei established in 
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can choose to register as voters of general constituencies or the 
Women's Organisation constituency in the elections for the National 
Assembly. This latter constituency is controlled by the KMT. All 
Assemblywomen representing it are members of the KMT. The 
reserved-seats for women Legislators are distributed in every general 
constituency according to the size of the population (for details see 
Appendix A). Generally, there is one seat reserved for women in each 
general constituency3 . 
In 1992 the Constitution was amended, and the constituencies 
were changed. All members of the National Assembly and the 
Legislative Yuan are now elected from four constituencies: two Special 
Municipalities and counties 4 , lowland and highland Aboriginal 
groups, Chinese citizens residing abroad, and from the nationwide 
constituency which adopts party list PR to determine the party 
balance5 . 
Due to Taiwan adopting single non-transferable vote with the 
plurality formula, women may be elected by less votes than men, as 
there are reserved seats for women candidates in each constituency. 
Table 4.2 shows some examples. Let us assume that there are 8 
candidates, and 5 should be elected in a particular constituency. 
According to the principle of the reserved-seat system, one seat is 
reserved for a woman candidate. Of all 8 candidates, candidates B, D, IF, 
G, and H are elected, according the plurality formula. Because there is a 
woman (F) elected already, there is no need for the reserved seat 
1973. After the lifting of the martial law, numerious women's groups and foundations 
were established in the late 1980s. 
3 These reserved seats are only applied to the popular election of the directly elected 
Legislative members from Taiwan Province, Taipei City and Kaohsiung City, two 
special municipalities of provincial status. There are no reserved seats for women in 
the constituencies of Occupational and Aboriginal groups, and Chinese residing 
overseas. 
4 The seats in this constituency are called regional seats because each Special 
Municipality and county is divided into many sub-constituencies according to the size of 
its population. 
5 Any political party has to collect at least 5% of the votes cast in the regional 
electional elections to get a share of the seats of the nationalwide constituency for 
party list PR. Votes won by Independent candidates or party-affiliated aspirants 
whose participation is not approved by their parties are not to be taken into account in 
the distribution of these seats. When distributing elected candidates from the party 
list, women candidates should get priority if the numbers of the elected women are less 
than their quota. This means women candidates may be elected even if their positions 
are behind men's. 
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arrangement. In Example II, candidates B, D, E, G, and H are elected. 
Therefore, the reserved seat arrangement works: candidate E will not 
be elected, and candidate F is elected. 
Table 4.2 Women Candidates and the Reserved-seat System (Examples) 
Candidates Example I Example II 
A 2568 2568 
B 3580* 3580* 
C (female) 1684 1984 
D 4866* 4866* 
E 2907 3407 
F (female) 4862* 2162* 
G 3896* 3896* 
H 5211* 5211* 
However, from 1969 to 1992 very few women relied on this 
system to win their parliamentary seats in Taiwan. Of all _101 women 
politicians, only 7 of them — 1 woman Legislator and 6 
Assemblywomen — relied on the reserved seats to win in general 
elections. Three women (1 from the DPP and 2 from the KMT) out of 
these 6 Assemblywomen were elected from the nationwide 
constituency. This meant that they were placed at the bottom of their 
party lists. 
The reserved-seat system boosts women representation. 
However, it hinders women's nominations in pre-selection, because 
political parties are inclined to nominate no more than the quota of 
women to fill the reserved seats. For example, in the 1989 Legislative 
election, there was a woman 6 who sought the KMT's nomination as a 
candidate for the Legislative Yuan. Due to the high popularity of the 
other woman, the KMT was reluctant to nominate her, and persuaded 
her to contest a seat in the Taipei City Council instead. 
In Australia, the introduction of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 
and the Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity for 
Women) Act 1986 were important steps in boosting women's political 
prospects. They helped in co-opting more women into the pools of 
6 She was elected to the Taipei City Council at 24, following in her father's footsteps. 
She served in Taipei City Council from 1981 to 1991, and became a Legislator in 1992. 
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eligible political candidates. While the more radical Carlton Proposal 7 
was not accepted, throughout the 1970s and 1980s all the major 
political parties adopted some forms of affirmative action to encourage 
women's candidacy and boost women's political recruitment. 
The ALP set some specific targets on its 1981-1991 Affirmative 
Action plan. It included a target of one-third party positions to be held 
by women. In 1993 the Victorian Branch of the ALP reached a decision 
to employ new pre-selection rules that guaranteed women 35% of 
winnable seats by the year 2003. During its national conference in 1994, 
the ALP leadership made a historical decision to introduce a quota of 
35% women in winnable parliamentary seats by the year 2002. 
The LP founded a national Liberal Women's Candidates Forum 
in 1993 to attract women aspirants for parliament. In addition to that, 
there was an active feminist network (Millar 1993: 88), and some 
affirmative strategies are also developed within the party. They focus 
on the provision of training, support and education to aspiring 
women politicians. Recently some special training courses were 
introduced to help women succeed in nominations. This included 
courses on personal representation, policy, handling the media, party 
organisation, the selection process and the resolution of problems 
faced by women in parliament (The Parliament of the Commonwealth 
of Australia 1994: 20-21). 
A comparison of the Taiwanese reserved-seat system and the 
affirmative action in Australia shows how liberalism and 
Confucianism work in a different way. In Australia there is a strong 
individualistic emphasis on apprenticeship and training. The ALP 
promotes women within party executive positions by providing 
encouragement and training programs for women, so they can be 
selected on individual merit. Women's right to access is defined in 
terms of citizenship rights. In Taiwan, the reserved-seats system 
reflects the traditional notions of gender balance and rectification of 
names8 . The emphasis is placed on parties' moral duty and obligation 
7 In 1993, Liberal MP the Hon. Jim Canton suggested that the Commonwealth of 
Australia's Electoral Act should be altered to allow voters to elect equal numbers of 
women and men to both Houses. For detail, see Carlton, J. (1994) Women in Parliament, 
Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, 76: 13-16. 
8 In Book XIII, Tsze-lu, Confucian Analects, one of students asked Confucius, "The ruler 
of Wei has been waiting for you, in order with you to administer the government. What 
will you consider the first thing to be done?" Confucius replied, "What is necessary is 
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to find 'appropriate' woman candidates for reserved seats. Morality, 
prestige, educational attainment, and local contacts (patronage) are 
considered as important factors. These are reflected in support for 
women candidates coming from the local factions or communities. 
Normally two women candidates — one from the party in power and 
one from the opposition — compete for each of the reserved seats. 
The Processes of Pre-selection 
Preselection is an important gatekeeping process, the first important 
gate on the way to parliament. Political parties in Australia recruit 
most of their successful parliamentarians from the party organisation, 
trade unions or the staff of leaders of a party. Coming from a political 
family is also an important asset, as well as holding a degree or being a 
member of a profession, especially in the fields of the law, medicine, 
accountancy or teaching. 
The mechanisms of pre-selection in Australia is an internal party 
affair, and is seen a game played in a 'secret garden' (Gallagher and 
Marsh 1988; Jaensch 1994). As Simms (1994b: 241) says: 
[T]he processes themselves are part of the 'private' face of 
political parties as opposed to their more 'public' role of running 
election campaigns and nominating candidates for public office 
(...) The selection process itself is mostly conducted behind closed 
doors. 
However, some aspects of party pre-selection are better known. 
Generally speaking, in Australia pre-selection for party candidates is 
highly decentralised (Gallagher 1988: 257). Each state and territory party 
organisation selects its candidates for federal elections; central (federal) 
selection is relatively rare. By contrast, in Taiwan the selection is 
relatively highly centralised, especially within the KMT. The Central 
Standing Committee of the KMT is the last and the most powerful 
selector. 
to rectify names. (...) If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the 
truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot 
be carried on to success." Here to rectify names means to rectify the names of all things. 
That is, when each person in his/her relations is what the name of his/her relation 
would require. In traditional Chinese society, women should not participate in politics. 
The reserved-seat system, to some extent, can be seen to justify women's "name" in the 
relations of political participation between men and women. 
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In Australia, the formal pre-selection is typically made by a 
committee of local party activists. The ADs, a minor party however, 
selects candidates through a plebiscite of all its members rather than a 
small group of pre-selectors (Jaensch 1995: 80), and this method may 
result in a selection of younger women candidates, such as Sowada, at 
a tender age of 21. The ALP has moved away from the rank-and-file 
ballot (except in NSW and the ACT), and towards a more centralised 
control at the level of the state branch or division. By this method, the 
ALP selectors hope to have a better chance of selecting good candidates. 
The system of factions makes it a bit more complicated (Simms 1994b). 
There is little doubt that within the ALP the factions plays a crucial 
role in pre-selection. Factional leaders recruit parliamentary candidates 
in an attempt to change the factional equilibrium of power in their 
favour. Sometimes, women candidates may become victims of 
factional struggles. For example, Senator Jean Melzer entered the 
federal parliament in 1974, but in 1979 she was dropped to the third 
place on the ALP list as a result of factional deals (Millar 1993: 85). It 
must be stressed, though, that factions are entrenched in the local 
levels of the ALP. 
• 	Compared with the ALP, there has been less factional recruitment 
within the LP and the NP. However, since the late 1980s, there has 
been growing factionalism also within the conservative camp (Smith 
1993: 139). This factionalism may start affecting seriously the selection 
process. Also the pre-selection within the LP is different from that 
within the ALP. Liberals tend to adopt a mixture of local 
representation (branch delegates) and central representation (members 
of the executive of the state council) representation. However, in 
Victoria, Queensland, and Tasmania the LP uses the local branch-based 
selection system (Simms 1994b). 
Holding internal party positions in the major parties is another 
important asset in pre-selection. Committee members, officials, 
leaders, conference delegates, presidents of local branches are always 
preferred candidates. A relatively large proportion of Australian 
women MPs have held such positions in their parties before they were 
selected as candidates. This channel of recruitment can be seen as more 
institutionalised and safer for the party. Women may benefit from it 
because during the long period of organisational activism they are able 
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to accumulate resources for further stages of career and contest. For 
example, Kathy Martin Sullivan had 13 years experience in party 
branches working and almost 10 years experience as a federal Senator. 
When contesting the Lower House seat, she received strong support 
from the party on meritocratic grounds. She stressed this proudly 
(1993: 10): 
Until the 1990 election, no woman member of the House of 
Representatives was given a 'safe seat'. All women, except me, 
won their seat from an opposing party. My seat of Moncrieff was 
considered on paper to be National Party, and the pundits all 
wrote off my chances of winning in 1984. Therefore, whilst it was 
a safe non-Labor seat, it was not a Liberal seat for the taking. 
Before the process of democratisation in Taiwan started in the mid 
1980s, the KMT dominated the selection of candidates. Most of those 
who campaigned for elections without the KMT endorsement and 
sponsorship relied on their family networks, and this was especially 
evident in the careers of women MPs. Most women politicians who 
ran without the KMT endorsement, entered politics either as wives of 
political activists or as political activists themselves (Domes 1981). For 
example, 12 out of 35 women Legislators between 1969 and 1992 who 
were not members of the KMT followed the family career. These 12 
women Legislators could be divided into two groups. Ten represented 
a family-sponsored career type. Four of them came from political 
families. One of them came from a wealthy and well-known family 
and she was elected to the local government at 23. Another one of 
them came from a pristige family. The remaining four represented 
what is normally called 'fight for husband' career type. Their husbands 
had been in political opposition movement since the 1970s and all 
were sent into prison after the Kaohsiung Incident. Only 2 women 
Legislators were political activists on their own right, without a family 
background of influence, prestige and political activism. 
The DPP emerged as a legal opposition party in the 1989 election. 
Officially, the principle of selection is merit and chances of success; 
gender is a lesser consideration. Some men are reluctant to compete 
for the seats in the National Assembly, because the Assembly is 
regarded as less powerful. It is not the main arena of politics, and 
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cannot help in accumulating political capital. Therefore women have 
more chances to be nominated as candidates to the Assembly. 
In the 1992 Legislative election, the DPP adopted a meritocratic 
and open rank-and-file selection to determine the candidate order on 
the party list for the nationwide constituency. One woman won a 
quarter of all votes, and she was subsequently granted the top place on 
the list. 
The KMT selection process is shrouded in secrecy. However, it is 
clear that the party's CSC is the ultimate gatekeeper. During the 1989 
election the CSC for the first time allowed for an open pre-selection 
among rank-and-file members (Ling and Myers 1990). One woman 
Legislator mentioned that she won the rank-and-file pre-selection 
within the KMT, but it did not assure her nomination. The final 
decision was made by the CSC elites. Another Assemblywoman talked 
about her experience in pre-selection. She said that at the beginning all 
aspirants were invited to make a public speech to the party officials. 
Then the officials investigated their backgrounds. They concluded that • 
the woman candidate had a good chance to win the election because of 
her PhD (she was then lecturing in universities), her good family 
background, and her appealing personality. Thus while she had never 
had any experience in party activism or electoral contest, she was, 
nevertheless, selected. The director of Taipei City Branch told the CSC 
that as long as she was formally nominated he could guarantee her 
success. She was nominated, and subsequently did win the election. 
Another woman Legislator depended entirely on her family 
network to win the pre-selection within the KMT. Her performance in 
rank-and-file pre-selection was not good, but she was nominated with 
the strong support from a large and rich family business group 9 . One 
DPP Assemblywoman concluded that the common feature of the KMT 
and DPP selection was that neither of them considered the gender 
balance as an important factor in the process of nomination. In the 
DPP, and like in the KMT, women were sometimes used as 
chesspawns. 
9 One of her sons married the daughter of the president of a large rich family business 
group, and the other son married the daughter of an active woman politican who is the 
head of the Black, discussed in Chapter Three. 
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In both countries most political gatekeepers are males, and they 
set male criteria of selection. Women candidates face problems in 
meeting these criteria. According to Simms (1994b), the Candidates 
Studies (1987 and 1990) and the State Secretaries Studies (1988) indicate 
that most selectors judge 'a good candidate' using the criteria that are 
usually associated with males: a continuous occupational career, 
political and media exposure, being a good 'family man', strong 
community ties, local government service experience, as well as 
business and/or trade union links. These criteria reflect what are 
considered to be the key political resources. Clearly, Australian women 
candidates have less access to these resources than their male 
counterparts. 
Women candidates in Taiwan are in a relatively better position 
because they can utilise some gender-specific resources. Thus being a 
good 'family woman' is an important asset, as is a successful 
'wifehood' or 'motherhood'. Naturally, successful occupational 
careers, political activism and political exposure are also important 
assets. Access to these resources is often mediated by family networks. 
Australian women candidates enjoy greater and more equal 
opportunities than their counterparts in Taiwan, where no women 
candidates hold the position of president in any county/ city or 
provincial/ special municipal branch of the KMT. Yet, their limited 
access to resources eliminates them from the top political echelons and 
results in an under-representation in political elites. 
The Influence of Political Organisations 
Since 1924, in Australia, it has been compulsory to register in an 
electorate and vote in an federal election. The compulsory system 
reduces the need of the parties to worry about their 'loyal' supporters. 
However, it also means that it is difficult for political parties to 
manipulate voters. They have to fight for the swinging — often 
unwilling — voters. 
As Andrew Robb, the Federal Director of the LP, points out (1995: 
422) personal contact, direct mail, advertising and earned media are all 
used in the LP campaigns. The LP also mobilises its party members and 
supporters to deliver the party message to the target voter categories. 
The ALP seems to be more powerful in using organisational links 
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because of its formal affiliation with trade unions. As Robb mentions, 
in the 1993 election the unions contributed very much to the success of 
the political campaign because they were well-entrenched, well-
resourced, had well-developed abilities for political campaign, and 
were united in their support for the ALP. 
In Taiwan, the organisational landscape is very different, 
reflecting the past authoritarian polity. Until recently, the KMT almost 
completely controlled all organisations, including the unions, and had 
strong links with local factions. In the past, the KMT could deliver a 
certain size of vote to each of its endorsed candidates due to its control 
over various voter groups, such as veterans, military dependents, 
public servants, and so on. These votes were called 'iron votes'. Their 
number was estimated at about one million. The common feature of 
these one million voters was that they were residentially concentrated 
and showed strong loyalty to the KMT. Nowadays these 'iron votes' 
are less numerous, but they still have a powerful effect in elections. 
(Lu 1991b; Nathan 1993). 
Voters' Attitudes and the Impact of Traditional Social 
Network on Electoral Politics 
Perhaps the most striking difference in voters' attitudes between 
Australia and Taiwan is their orientation to, and identification with, 
political parties or candidates. Party orientation and identification ate 
much stronger in Australia. Candidate orientation and identification 
are much stronger in Taiwan. Aitkin (1977) argues that the strong party 
identification enhances the stability of the party system, and sets 
Australia apart from other liberal democracies. Evidence confirms that 
the strength of party identification in Australia is much higher than 
other countries (Bean 1988: 45-49; Graetz and McAllister 1988: 268). The 
family and the traditional social networks are relatively less important 
in electoral politics, except when they operate via political parties. 
In Taiwan, the candidates themselves are the focus in the 
electoral contests. The personal image of the candidate and his/her 
personal connections become the key to winning an election (Lu 
1991b). In Hu's studylo (1986) of voters' orientations in Taipei City. The 
10This study was based on the 1980 national election. Researcherers interviewed 954 
Taipei citizens in Februray 1981. Among the 954 sample, 754 voted, 183 did not vote, 
and 17 were invalid. Interviewees could make multiple choices among all voters' 
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candidate orientation emerges as the most important one (59%). It can 
be found that even in Taipei City the traditional networks play an 
important role, and traditional expectations are evident. For example, 
39% of the voters who were candidate-oriented tended to stress 
candidate's achievement, 25% of them stress morality, and 20% stress 
education. Traditional relationships also account for 20% of choices. 
'In fact, elections in all counties and cities (except Taipei City) are 
'traditional wars'. This means that candidates heavily rely on 
traditional social and kinship ties to win elections', one of my 
interviewees reports. This contrasts with the Australian situation 
where elections are party contests. 
One may explain the strong party identification and orientation 
in Australia by evolving tradition, compulsory voting and frequency 
of elections (see Jaensch 1991; Lovell et al. 1995). These accounts seem 
to emphasise the institutional impact rather than the social dynamics 
within society. In our view, the difference between Australian and 
Taiwanese voters' identification can be attributed to the patterns of 
modernisation in each society. In Australia, organisations have been 
dominant mobilisers in public life, and have played the key role in 
political modernisation. Political parties grew into dominant 
mediators and articulators of voters. Some even see them as 
generators of the major political changes. In Taiwan, voters' 
orientation reflects the traditional Confucian teaching: the well-
educated should govern and form the moral model of the populace. In 
that sense, broad political participation— the key consequence of the 
political modernisation— has always been traditionally regulated. The 
family plays a fundamental role in this regulation and in shaping 
voters' preferences. Under these circumstances, the aspiring women 
MPs in Taiwan have to seek the support in these traditional structures. 
Political Career 
The overall social and economic positions of Australian and 
Taiwanese women have been improved in the process of 
modernisation. This is reflected in women's political careers. As 
argued earlier, they appear to be more accessible to women in both 
orientations, including candidate orientation (59%), political issue orientation (39%), 
political party orientation (21%), personal relationship orientation (17%), social 
relationship orientation (10%) and other personal factors (10%). 
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countries, but pattern of accessibility is quite different. A 'political 
career' refers to the steps and stages in political elevation to national 
parliament. These steps may have a direct (e.g. as a political party 
worker) or an indirect (e.g. as a member of a voluntary organisation) 
link with political organisations. 
The backgrounds of MPs are useful indicators of the type of 
political careers pursued. By analysing the family, educational and 
organisational backgrounds of successful women politicians, we can 
assess how political careers start and progress. The age of first political 
engagement and electoral success, for example, indicates how long it 
takes to progress from a political activist to a MP. The relevant 
personal backgrounds include education, political party affiliation, 
political family background, occupations before entering parliament 
and the age of the first successful election. 
This analysis includes 153 women, from 1970 to 1993 in Australia 
(52) and from 1969 to 1992 in Taiwan (101). In Australia, our sample 
includes 34 women Senators and 19 women members of House of 
Representatives (MHRs). (The total is 52 because one woman served in 
both Houses.) Likewise, in the Taiwanese sample, there are 70 women 
in the National Assembly and 35 women Legislators in the Legislative 
Yuan. The total is 101 because four women have served in the 
National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. 
Political Family Background 
The family is a crucial place of socialisation. Family involvement 
in politics may be conducive to people developing political interest 
and knowledge. Political family background provides not only political 
socialisation, but also the personal networks, associations and 
influence which help to pursue a political career. Three out of the 
seventeen members of the 1993 Keating cabinet, for example, had 
political family backgrounds (Lovell et al. 1995). 
There is much higher portion of women MPs with political 
family background in Taiwan than that in Australia (see Table 4.3). 
This difference highlights again the fact that while the family plays 
minimal role in Australian politics, it is a key to political career in 
Taiwan. It must be stressed that while we classify less than half of 
Taiwanese women MPs as representing political family background, 
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the influence of the family on politics is much wider. As mentioned in 
Chapter Three, the KMT builds intensive patron-client networks in 
local communities to assure its control over local politics. These 
networks are interwoven with family networks, especially with 
networks of political families. In addition, the influence of the family 
can reach local communities and some traditional associations. 
Table 4.3 Women MPs with Political Family Background 
Australia Taiwan 
Total 
No 	`)/0 
Senate 
No % 
House of 
Representatives 
No 	% 
Total 
No % 
National 
Assembly 
No 	% 
Legislative 
Yuan 
No 	% 
7 	13  6 	18 1 	5 23 	23 9 	13 14 	40 
There is little doubt that the contest for MHRs is much harder 
than that for Senate seats. One important reason is the institutional 
factor. The PR system used in the Senate is conducive to increasing 
number of women senators. Single member districts as in the House of 
Representatives affects women receiving party endorsement for safe 
seats. Two woman MPs had resigned from the Senate to contest the 
election of MHR. One without political family background succeeded; 
the one who failed was from a political family (Haines 1992). 
In Taiwan, the contests in Legislative elections are very 
competitive compared to the National Assembly election. Women 
Legislators with political family background are more successful in 
these competitive elections than others. Their success, it is argued, can 
be attributed to strong political and financial support they get from the 
family. 
Education 
Education is seen as one of the most important credentials for 
women MPs. Many studies (e.g. Duverger 1955; Putnam 1976; Verba et 
al. 1978; Randall 1987; Darcy et al. 1994) link the role of education with 
women's increasing political participation. Education is seen as the 
most decisive influence on women's political activism because it is 
related to women's employment, especially political springboard 
occupations. 
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Higher education is particularly important in Taiwan. As 
mentioned earlier, it has traditionally been seen as the key political 
credential and the major enhancement of family prestige. It is 
therefore hardly surprising to find that women MPs in Taiwan are 
better educated than their counterparts in Australia (see Table 4.4). The 
contrast is especially represented in the share of women MPs with 
higher degree in both countries. They account for 11% of all women 
MPs in Australia, but 19% in Taiwan. In Australia there are almost 
one-quarter women MPs with secondary education, but less than one 
fifth in Taiwan. 
Table 4.4 Education Attainment of Women MPs 
Australia Taiwan 
Education 
Senate 
No 	`)/0 
House of 
Representatives 
No 	`)/0 
National 
Assembly 
No 	% 
Legislative 
Yuan 
No 	`)/0 
PhD 1 3 - - 4 7 2 6 
Master 5 15 - - 7 9 7 20 
Bachelor 17 50 12 63 32 46 18 51 
College 1 3 3 16 15 21 2 6 
Senior 
High 
School 
1 3 - - 12 17 6 17 
N/A 9* 26 4* 21 - - - - 
Total 34 100 19 100 70 100 35 100 
Note: *9  Senators and 4 MHRs do not hold any degree. 
In Taiwan women Legislators are better educated than 
Assemblywomen. One-quarter of women Legislators hold higher 
degree, compared with 16% of Assemblywomen. This reflects some 
political realities in Taiwan. The National Assembly is not the main 
political arena, and most politically ambitious and better qualified 
women may not be interested in contesting its seats. Most of women 
who served in the National Assembly came from the special 
constituency, the Women's Organisation, which was tightly controlled 
by the KMT. With affiliation to the KMT and serving as branch 
presidents of the Women's Association, women could easily win the 
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seats. Since the 1980s, the Legislative Yuan has no longer been the 
'rubber stamp', and more and more ambitious politicians aimed at 
contesting the Legislative seats. Therefore, the Legislative Yuan could 
recruit better qualified women. 
By contrast with MHRs, the proportion of women Legislators 
with degree is much higher, and the share of those with secondary 
education is lesser. This reflects different main evaluative criterion 
and method in both societies. In Australia, the emphasis of political 
elevation is placed on performance and apprenticeship. However, in 
Taiwan, education and credentialism play a key role in determining 
political success. 
One may argue that the difference in educational backgrounds 
between Australian and Taiwanese women MPs reflects the different 
value attached to education in politics. While education is an 
important credential for politicians in Australia, its importance is 
lesser than in Taiwan when the Confucian tradition enhances the 
value of educational credentials. Some women MPs in Taiwan who 
are lack party experience and organisational training can be nominated 
and win elections if they have high education and family backing. The 
educational attainment and family support are the key to their success 
because they are consistent with the Confucian teaching that the well-
educated should govern, and that the family is the centre of loyalties. 
Occupations before Entering Parliament 
The importance of specific skills as credentials for political recruitment 
is reflected in over-representation of certain occupations in political 
elites. The legal profession, for example, is conducive to developing 
some skills and techniques, including interaction with people, the 
skills and techniques of speech and the written word, and the 
formulation and exchange of ideas, which are of special value in a 
political career. Flexible working hours and insurance against possible 
electoral defeat also make some occupations especially compatible with 
a political career. 
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Table 4.5 Occupation before Entering Parliament (person) _ 
Occupation 
Australia Taiwan 
Senate House of 
Representatives 
National 
Assembly 
Legislative 
Yuan 
school teacher 12 8 20 9 
school executive position - - 2 2 
school/college principal - - 4 1 
lecturer/ associate 
professor/ professor 
3 1 9 3 
pharmaceutist/nurse 2 1 2 1 
medical doctor 1 - 2 2 
judge/lawyer 3 4 2 
manager/ company 
director 
5 4 5 4 
general manager - - 4 1 
journalist/editor 1 1 3 5 
accountant 1 - - 3 
family/ own business 2 1 6 1 
civil/public servant 2 2 3 2 
political researcher** 1 5 - - 
TV/ radio worker - - 3 - 
assistant of MP*** 1 1 2 - 
member of local council - - - 2 
consultant 2 4 1 
political party worker 3 3 5 - 
lobbyist 1 - - - 
others 6 1 2 3 
N/A 2 1 10 3 
Total  32 18 60 32 
Note: * including clerk, university non-academic staff, real estate agent, librarian, 
social worker, public relations officer, advertising, retailer, and sales. 
**including research assistant. 
***including assistant for provincial/state MPs. 
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Women MPs in Australia and Taiwan had engaged in a wide 
range of occupations (see Table 4.5). In both countries, most of women 
MPs were school teachers before entering parliament. More women 
MPs in Taiwan than those in Australia have been professionals such 
as medical doctors, judges as well as lawyers, and university academic 
staff. This is consistent with the differentials in educational attainment 
between both countries. 
A higher proportion of Australian women MPs have worked in 
politics-related occupations, such as political party worker, lobbyist, 
political researcher, and so on. Political careers in Australia show clear 
dependence on the early organisational exposure. This is in line with 
the importance of political apprenticeship in Australian politics. 
Political Party Affiliation 
Political parties are the main players of modern politics. They are an 
integral part of the processes of representative democracy. Their impact 
on politics is paramount. Political parties dominate the electoral 
process and organise the government through recruiting . candidates 
and nominating party members for elections. That is, political party 
affiliation can be seen as access to political opportunities, and then 
utilisation of political resources controlled by them. 
Women MPs' political party affiliation is shown in Table 4.6. 96% 
of Australian women MPs and 92% of Taiwanese women MPs 
affiliated with political parties. Those women MPs affiliated with 
major parties account for the majority of them, 79% in Australia and 
91% in Taiwan. However, the share of Independents in Australia is 
slightly lower than those in Taiwan. 
In Australia, most women MPs are affiliated with major parties, 
the ALP and the LP. The minor parties, especially the ADs and the 
Greens, are also able to elevate women into parliament. As Kathy 
Martin Sullivan, former Senator and now MHR, says (1994: 10), 
The apparent increase in the Senate since [1983] has been virtually 
all due to the increasing representation of the Australian 
Democrats and the independent senators (Nuclear Disarmament 
or Greens), most of whom are women (...) If it were not for the 
Democrats and the Greens, the proportion of women in the 
Senate would actually have declined. 
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Table 4.6 Women MPs' Political Party Affiliation, 1969 -93 (person) 
Australia Taiwan 
Political 
Parties 
Senate House of 
Representatives 
Political 
Parties 
National 
Assembly 
Legislative 
Yuan 
ALP 9 14 KMT 51 21 
LP 13 5 DPP 14*** 10*** 
NCP 1 - NP - 2 
ADs 7 - Independent 3 
WAG 3 - N/A 2 1 
NDP 2 - - - - 
Ind. for 
NDP 
2 - - - - 
Total 37* 19 Total 70 36** 
Note: *2  women changed their affiliation from NDP to Independent for NDP, 
and 1 woman changed her affiliation from NDP to Independent for 
NDP to WAG. 
** 1 woman changed her affiliation from the KMT to the NP. 
' including those who were identified as members of Dan gwei before the 
DPP became a legal political party. 
The ADs and the Greens have been more energetically wooing 
women's vote and have been recruiting more women than major 
parties (Sawer and Simms 1993: Table 3.1). The ADs, in particually, 
have selected a relatively high proportion of women candidates since 
its formation in 1977. This is partly because the ADs has been a 
relatively new party attempting to carve up its support base, and partly 
because it has lacked the entrenched vested interests and hierarchies of 
major parties. Therefore, the ADs women do not 'have to get into an 
existing system dominated by men. [They have] the opportunity to 
start things on an equal basis. That [makes] things easier' (quoted in 
Sawer and Simms 1993: 56). However, women candidates from these 
minor parties have not yet won any seat in the House of 
Representatives. 
The inflow of women into Australian parliament occurs mainly 
via the Senate. Due to the proportional party list electoral system, 
women have been relatively successful in the Senate contests (Simms 
152 
1989: 11). Women politicians in the House of Representatives have 
been usually recruited via the marginal seats. This reflects the 
viriarchal nature of selection in the major parties, and it means that 
women representation in the Lower House increases after 'wide 
margin' elections, when a large number of seats change hands (like in 
the 1996 federal election). This also means that women hold the most 
marginal seats, most vulnerable to swings in party preferences. 
While major parties have become more conscious of the electoral 
value of women candidates in order to woo women voters, women 
have still suffered from male-dominated party pre-selection processes 
and the internal party factions (Reynolds 1991; Smith 1993; Sawer and 
Simms 1993; Simms 1981a, 1989, 1994a). One Labour woman says, 'Men 
do keep women out because the structures work that way. Women are 
still in secondary positions in the ALP' (cited from Sawer and Simms 
1993: 58). Tokenism to factions determines the ALP's selection of 
parliamentary candidates. Although the LP has a significant 
proportion of women active at the branch level and has recognised the 
importance of working and career women after its defeat in the 1983 
federal election, until recently the LP has not shown 'a greater 
willingness either to preselect women for winnable seats or advancing 
them through the party's organisation and hierarchy' (Reynolds 1991: 
206). 
Like in Australia, most women MPs in Taiwan are affiliated with 
the two major parties. Yet, women Independents are noteworthy and 
very important. Unlike in Australia, family connection among them 
are very strong. Three out of five Independents in Taiwan belong to 
the same family: mother and two daughters. The mother served as 
Legislator from 1972 to 1980, the younger daughter served as Legislator 
from 1989 to 1992, and the elder daughter served as Assemblywoman 
from 1986 to 1992. All of them are medical doctors, and the mother is 
the first female medical doctor with doctorate of medicine obtained in 
Taiwan. They enjoy very high social prestige and are very popular in 
their electorate. This can also be seen in the fact that they have been 
serving in the same local government, in the position of City Mayor, 
from the 1950s to the present. Even if the KMT mobilised the 'iron 
votes' and nominated a male, such a candidate could not defeat them. 
It is especially noteworthy that in their district only one candidate can 
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be elected due to the small population. Another Independent was 
elected as Assemblywoman in 1986 from the electorate of the Labour 
Group. In this district three out of eight candidates were elected, and 
this Assemblywoman received the highest number of votes (including 
male votes). 
Age at Election 
Politics is described as 'very much a middle-aged occupation' (Mellors 
1978: 27). This has different implications for male and female 
politicians. For the former, this means that men spend a few years in 
serving their apprenticeship in political organisations; for the latter, 
this not only means apprenticeship, but also reflects women's life 
cycle. Middle aged women are free from child-bearing and their 
children have grown up. Therefore, they are more likely to be 
involved in political contests. 
Table 4.7 Age at Which Women Parliamentarians Were First Elected 
(persons) 
Australia Taiwan 
Age Senate House of 
Representatives 
National 
Assembly 
Legislative 
Yuan 
20-24 0 0 1 0 
25-29 0 0 7 0 
30-34 6 1 3 3 
35-39 4 2 11 8 
40-44 9 6 13 11 
45-49 6 5 13 5 
50-54 4 3 10 4 
55-59 1 1 6 2 
60-64 1 0 4 2 
65+ 0 0 2 0 
N/A 3 1 0 0 
Mean 43.2 44.9 44.7 42.7 
Total 34 19 70 35 
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Consistent with most previous studies, the average age of women 
MPs first entering in parliament is in their early 40s in both Australia 
and Taiwan. However, there are some differences between both 
countries (see Table 4.7). The Senators are almost 2 years younger than 
MHRs, 43.2 and 44.9, respectively. In Taiwan Legislators are 2 years 
younger than Assemblywomen. In Australia, this may imply that the 
Senate contests are relatively easier than the House of Representatives. 
In Taiwan, this reflects the fact that more young ambitious women 
would rather compete Legislative seats because the Legislative Yuan is 
the main political arena. 
Women MPs entering parliament before their 40 are seen as early 
starters and those entering the parliament in their 50s are seen as late 
starters. The proportion of early starters in Taiwan (33%) is higher than 
that in Australia (25%). The most outstanding feature of women MPs 
between Australia and Taiwan is that no women MPs enter 
parliament before their 30 in Australia, but there are 8 out of 101 enter 
parliament in their 20s in Taiwan. 
More early starters among Taiwanese women MPs cannot be seen 
as the result of different electoral system. We suggest that this reflects 
the difference in the nature and distribution of political resources. 
Family-controlled resources are very important in Taiwan, and they 
are accessible to younger candidates. Such candidates may be less 
politically skilled, have less party experiences, and less organisational 
exposure. The family electoral and financial support is a likely reason 
for their success in elections. During the 1992 election, for example, it 
has been reported that a young woman MP got huge financial support 
from her family, about NT$20,000,000 (A$1,000,000). She won the 
election and became Assemblywoman. Of total 32 early starters in 
Taiwan, about one thid of them have political family background. 
Political Career Patterns 
The family is an important medum affecting women's political success 
in Taiwan. Thus, it is expected that Taiwanese women politicians will 
have typically family-sponsored careers. By contrast, political 
organisations play a key role in recruiting women politicians in 
Australia. Therefore our recruitment model suggests that, typically, 
Australian women politicians should represent organisational activist 
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careers. These models are tested by examining women politicians' 
politically active age, local government service experience, political 
party and trade union experience, and their involvement in other 
organisations. These form the bars for our general typology of political 
career which, in turn, serves as the tool in comparative analysis. 
Politically Active Age 
It is hard to find at what age women MPs became politically active. The 
data do not clearly show this. However, some other information, such 
as becoming presidents or executive officers in political party branches, 
involvement in political opposition movement or running an 
electoral political office in local government, may indirectly reveal the 
time of political activation. Unfortunately, not all of women MPs held 
such political party or government positions, and some records of 
Taiwanese women MPs do not clearly show when they served in local 
government. Therefore, the age of activation can be identified for only 
18 out of 34 women Senators, 10 out of 19 women MHRs, 18 out of 70 
Assemblywomen, and 19 out of 35 women Legislators (see table 4.8). 
The mean age at which women MPs became politically active is 
higher in Australia than that in Taiwan. This means that women MPs 
in Australia have a longer experience of organisational activism. Most 
of them have served on various important positions in their parties 
before entering politics full-time (see Table 4.8). By contrast, women 
MPs in Taiwan start running for electoral political office relatively 
early. Most of them have local government service experience rather 
than experience in political party activism (see Table 4.9). In local 
government, organisational apprenticeship is less important. 
More importantly, in Australia it takes women Senators 8 years, 
women MHRs 10 years, whilst in Taiwan it takes Assemblywomen 14 
years, and women Legislators 12 years to first win national parliament 
elections. Australian women MPs show a long apprenticeship in 
political parties, and it is particularly true for women MHRs. Usually, 
they move from rank-and-file to top positions such as president, 
delegate, member of committees. As a woman Senator who has been 
elected at 30 and is the youngest woman MP in Australia says: 
I joined the Democrats at 20 (...) I was Branch President, [and] held 
virtually every position in every committee over the last ten 
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years or so, I thought about the positions that would elevate me 
to some prominence within the Party and therefore bring me to 
the attention of the Members, which included positions on 
National Executive, Party Campaign Director for 1988 and 1990 
Federal Elections and 1988 State Election, and a whole range of 
things that firstly would give me the experience within the Party 
to perform some new and more important role (...) it was a fairly 
deliberate effort on my part to adopt a fairly strategic approach in 
deciding how my goal would best be achieved. [Sowada 1993: 32- 
33] 
Table 4.8 Age at Which Women MPs Began Politically Active (persons) _ 
Australia Taiwan 
Age Senate House of 
Representatives 
National 
Assembly 
Legislative 
Yuan 
under 20 - 1 1 - 
20-24 1 - 3 4 
25-29 4 1 1 2 
30-34 3 3 9 
35-39 4 2 1 5 
40-44 4 1 3 2 
45-49 2 2 - - 
50-54 1 - - - 
mean 36.5 35 32 32.8 
Total* 19 10 18 19 
Note: *Refers to the number of the women MPs whose data are available. 
Taiwanese women MPs rely mainly on family sponsorship. In the 
local elections the family is the most active agency. Its influence, 
networks and links with local factions are relatively easy to mobilise, 
and women can utilise these networks as easily as men. During the 
service period in local government, women can run political office 
and look after their families because of the less work in local 
administration and close geographical distances. 
Australian women MPs are older and more experienced in 
organisational politics. Compared with Taiwanese women, Australian 
women usually enjoy more equal educational and occupational 
chances, domestic division of labour, and they more actively 
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participate in organisations, especially political parties. Thus their 
opportunities are higher, but they suffer from restricted access to 
resources, such as political clout, media exposure and money. Their 
ability to run for top political offices may be not proven until they 
have 'enough' party working experiences. 
In Taiwan, women frequently are asked to perform their family 
roles even when involved in politics full-time. However, these tasks 
are regraded as politically important and relevant for their career. They 
can use it as a political asset. Women's ability to run political office is 
not narrowly defined by party experience. One of my respondents 
reports, 
My case demonstrates that women candidates are not necessary to 
be associated with political martyrdom. I have three children who 
are doing well in school. My husband has a good job. I am 
lecturing in university. I can say that my family is a perfect 
family. This fact makes me popular in my electorate. 
Local Government Experience 
More than one-third women MPs in Taiwan have had local 
government experience (see Table 4.9). More than one quarter 
Assemblywomen and near half of women Legislators had served in 
local governments before entering parliament. If those two women 
Legislators' experiences in the National Assembly are included, then 
18 out of 35 (51%) of all women Legislators in Taiwan have experiences 
of running a local political office before entering the Legislative Yuan. 
The portion of Assemblywomen with experiences of running political 
office is 31%. 
By contrast, few Australian women MPs have experience in local 
government service. There has been a reduction in the shifts from 
state parliaments, and a growing proportion of women members win 
their seats without previous electoral experience (Rydon 1986: 47). It 
looks like local government is not an important channel for MPs to 
reach the federal elite position in Australia. 
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Table 4.9 Women MPs with Experience of Local Government Services 
Australia Taiwan 
Senate 
No 	% 
House of 
Representatives 
No 	°A) 
National 
Assembly 
No 	% 
Legislative Yuan 
No 	% 
2 	6 3 16 20 	29 16 	46 
- 	- 4* 	21 22** 	31 18** 	51 
Note: *1 woman MHR had served in the Senate before entering the House of 
Representatives. 
** 2 Assemblywomen had served as Legislators before entering the 
National Assembly. 2 women Legislators had served as Assemblywomen 
before entering the Legislative Yuan. 
This difference reflects the composition of political resources. In 
Taiwan, local communities and the family-centred networks are 
crucial resource suppliers. In order to run for local political office, one 
has to build solid political connections which are helpful in contesting 
first the local and then the national seats. In Australia, political parties 
themselves are the main resource providers. They effectively deliver 
political resources and place their members in federal parliament. 
Therefore, activism in political parties, rather than in local politics, is 
more advantageous to those who try to reach the positions of the 
political elite. 
Political Party Experiences 
As expected, Australian women MPs are much more active in political 
parties than their counterparts in Taiwan. In Australia, 24 out of 34 
women Senators had held significant positions in political parties, as 
had women MHRs (13 out of 19). In Taiwan, only 27 out of 70 
Assemblywomen and 4 out of 35 women Legislators had held party 
positions. Equally important, Australian women MPs overwhelmingly 
had held top positions in local or state branches of political parties. 
Taiwanese women MPs, by contrast, had only served in lower 
positions, such as members of party branch committees". It is 
11 Members of committees, at either local or provincial level, are not a powerful 
position in the KMT. The chairperson at local or provincial branches has much more 
power. 
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noteworthy that 15 Taiwanese women MPs entered the top positions 
in parties after their election. Two women Legislators, for example, 
were granted directorships in the KMT's Sun Yat-sen Institution on 
Policy Research and Development. Both held PhDs and got the 
positions after winning the election. It is clear that political parties are 
less central arenas of political ascent in Taiwan than in Australia. 
Table 4.10 Political Party Experience of Women MPs 
Australia 
Political Party Experiences Senate House of 
Representatives 
Secretary/ Treasurer 4 5 
Vice-President, local branches 1 2 
President, local branches 2 3 
Vice-President, state branch 5 1 
President, state branch 5 1 
Vice-/Deputy President, federal 2 
President, federal 1 - 
Convenor/ Policy co-ordinator 4 - 
Delegate to state conference/council 4 2 
Delegate to national conference/council 4 3 
Executive, state 2 
Executive Member of committees 1 - 
Member/ Delegate, state council/ executive 9 1 
Member of committees 8 4 
Officer/Secretary/ (Vice-) President 
of electorate council 
7 3 
Member/ Chairperson of women's council 2 3 
Spokesperson 1 - 
Campaign manager/ chairman/ staff/ 
assistant 
4 1 
Total* 24 13 
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Table 4.10 (Continued) 
Taiwan 
Political Party Experiences National 
Assembly 
Legislative 
Yuan 
The Sun Yat-sen Institution on Policy 
Research and Development 
11 4 
Member of Central Committee, national 2** 13** 
Member of Central Standing Committee, 
national 
1** 1** 
Women's Department, local 1 1 
Women's Department, provincial 1 1 
Women's Department, national 2 - 
Member of committee, local branches 10 - 
Member of committee, provincial branches 4 - 
Executive officer, local branches 2 1 
Executive officer, provincial branches - 1 
Executive officer, national 1 - 
Delegate to the provincial conference 1 - 
Delegate to the national conference - 12** 
Total* 27 18 
Note: * Number of persons out of all women MPs who had political party 
working experiences. However, the records of those who were first 
elected in 1993 are not available in Australia; and the records of some of 
those who were first elected in 1991 are unclear in Taiwan. 
** The positions were gained after successful election. 
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Trade Unions 
Few women MPs in both countries were active in unions. Four 
Australian women MPs (two Senators and two MHRs) were Liaison 
Officers of a trade union, President of a Chamber of Commerce and 
members of other unions, member of Miscellaneous Workers Union, 
and organiser of Hospital Employees Unions. In Taiwan, five women 
MPs (one Legislator and four Assemblywomen) were active in unions: 
one was board director of the Telecommunications Union; one was 
board director of the News Agency Union; one was chairperson of the 
Post Union; and two were General Managers of the Farmers' 
Association. While most of these nine women MPs were union 
activists, two Taiwanese women MPs who were General Managers of 
the Farmers' Association may have obtained their positions via family 
networks, because the position was sponsored by local factions 12 . All 
five Taiwanese women MPs also held university degrees and 
diplomas. Education was important in getting to the top positions in 
Taiwanese unions. 
The relation between political parties and unions was reflected in 
women MPs' careers. In Australia, the ALP has always maintained 
very close relation with trade unions, and 3 of 4 women MPs from 
trade unions were members of the ALP. In Taiwan, the KMT tightly 
controlled unions until the late 1980s. Four of 5 women MPs with a 
union background were also members of the KMT. 
Involvement in Other Organisations 
Women MPs have been involved in two other types of organisations: 
women's, and voluntary (see Table 4.11 and 4.12). The women's rights 
organisation (WEL) seems to be most successful in sending their 
members into parliament in Australia. Only two women MPs in 
Taiwan came from such women's groups, and both were members of 
the DPP who entered in the Legislative Yuan in 1992. One was an 
advocate of neo-feminism in the early 1970s, and the other was her 
successor in the 1980s. Most women MPs in Taiwan participated in the 
kind of women's organisations which were very close to the KMT. 
12 The General Manager of the Farmers' Association is a very powerful position in 
local community. Usually the person who heads this position is supported by local 
factions. See Bosco, J. (1992) Taiwan Factions: Guanxi, Patronage, and the State in 
Local Politics, Ethnology, 31(2): 157-83. 
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Table 4.11 Involvement of Women MPs in Women's Organisations 
Women Organisations 
Australia Taiwan 
Senate House of 
Representatives 
National 
Assembly 
Legislative 
Yuan 
Women's Electoral 
Lobby (WEL) 
3 1 - - 
Feminist Groups - - 1 1 
The Zonta Club - - 1 2 
Women's Associations - - 21 6 
Chinese Women's 
Anti-Aggression 
League 
- - 11 5 
Total 3 1 23 12 
Note: The total is less than the sum of each column because one woman was 
involved in more than one organisation. 
Voluntary organisations are an important channel of access to 
elite positions, especially in Taiwan. The involvement of women MPs 
in voluntary organisations in Australia is lower than in Taiwan (27% 
vs 37%). The character of these voluntary organisations are different in 
both countries. In Australia, women MPs participate mainly in social 
issue or charity oriented organisations. In Taiwan, they are likely to be 
involved in social or personal relationship organisations, such as 
alumni associations, clan associations, and Tung Hsung Huei. 
Through these organisations people build their personal and social 
networks, and this is very important in mobilising support in 
elections. This may also reflect the fact that women MPs in Taiwan are 
more grassroots oriented than their Australian counterparts, and that 
voluntary organisations in Taiwan are more important as controllers 
and providers of political resources. 
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Table 4.12 Involvement of Women MPs in Voluntary Organisations 
Organisations 
Australia Taiwan 
Senate House of 
Representatives 
National 
Assembly 
Legislative 
Yuan 
State College Staff/ 
School/ University 
Association/ Council 
2 1 - 2 
Consumer Association - 2 - - 
Sport Associations 1 - 
Legal Aid Commission - 1 - - 
Red Cross 1 - 1 - 
the Girls Guides' 
Association 
2 - - - 
YWCA 2 - - - 
National Trust 2 - - - 
Family Planning 
Association 
1 - - 
Professional 
Associations 
2 - 3 1 
Foundations - - 3 
Lions Club - 1 1 
Alumni/ Clan 
Associations; 
Tung Shung Hui 
- 8 7 
Others 9 - 16 4 
Total 11 3 21 16 
Note: The number of total is less than the sum of each column because one 
woman may be involved in more than one organisation. 
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The Patterns of Political Recruitment and Career Types 
Political parties in Australia have recently started to emphasise gender 
balance within higher party positions and to place more stress on 
training programs and affirmative action for women. In Taiwan, by 
contrast, gender balance within parties is not a big issue. Due to the 
reserved-seat system, parties are likely to ignore gender issue, and do 
not give women appropriate political training, let alone affirmative 
advantage. This difference makes the aspiring women politicians in 
Australia keen party players, and pushes aspiring women politicians in 
Taiwan into local and familial politics. 
This is clearly reflected in our data. There is a high proportion of 
Australian women MPs with party experience. By contrast, few women 
MPs in Taiwan have held important party positions before their 
political elevation. This is also reflected in the differences in the 
organisational exposure. In Australia, there is a high proportion of 
women MPs with party decision-making experience. Training 
programs designed by parties and unions for women are popular and 
help women in pre-selection. In Taiwan, party experience is rare and it 
does not involve holding decision-making positions. Also, the 
proportion of women MPs with union affiliation and experience is 
higher in Australia than in Taiwan. This availability of the union 
channel increases women's opportunities in Australia. 
Taiwanese women MPs, by contrast, seem to have access to more 
diffused political resources. They can mobilise their family roles (as 
mothers, wives, and so on) in political campaigns. They can also utilise 
traditional social and family networks which are very helpful in 
political campaigns in Taiwan. The family networks are mobilised 
mainly during political campaigns and pre-selection contest. This is 
reflected in the high proportion of women MPs in Taiwan who gain 
local government experience. 
Thus, Australian and Taiwanese women MPs may be seen as 
representing two general configurations and types of political 
recruitment. In Australia, most women MPs climb to elite positions 
through long apprenticeship in political organisations, especially 
political parties. In Taiwan, most women MPs represent sponsored 
careers; they are clients of different patrons, including influential 
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political families. These different patterns of political recruitment and 
ascent are summarised in Table 4.13: 
Table 4.13 Political Careers of Women MPs 
Australia Taiwan 	I 
Patterns No Patterns No 
1. Organisational Activist 
Career 
42 1. Sponsored Career 95 
(1) Political Party/Union 
Career 
38 (1) Indirect Family/Party- 
sponsored Career 61 
(2) Grassroots Organisational 
Activist Career 
2 (2) Direct Family-sponsored 
Career 21 
2. Political Family Career 2 • Grassroots Political 
Family Career 
8 
• Political Martyrdom 
Family Career 
7 
3. Self Made Career 5 • Allied with the 
Ruling 
Party Political Family 
Career 
5 
N/A 5 (3) Entrenched 
Institutional 
Career 
13 
- - 2. Self Made Career 6 
- (1) Independent Political 
Activist Career 
3 
, 	- - (2) Political Opposition 
Movement Activist 
Career 
3 
Total 52 Total 101 
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Political Careers in Australia 
This pattern, by far the most dominant among Australian MPs, is 
presented by 42 women. Their career include a prolonged political 
party or union experience and affiliation. Most of them are early 
starters, have been school teachers or professionals, and hold 
university degree. They comprise of three sub-patterns: political 
organisation apprentice, grass-root apprentice, and political family 
apprentice. 
Thirty eight women MPs can be grouped as political party/union 
career. Their elevation to political elites depends mainly on their 
organisational positions. They have held some powerful positions, 
such as branch presidents, members of executive committees, 
conference delegates, within political parties and unions before 
election to parliament. 
Two women MPs are classified as grassroots organisational 
careerists. They have served in local government and have less 
political party experiences than the party apprentices. For most party 
selectors, local government service may be significant, but most 
women MPs do not meet this criterion. Paradoxically, the proportion 
of women parliamentarians in state and local governments is much 
higher than on the federal level, but most women MPs have not 
shifted between these two levels. One possible reason may be that on 
the federal level the party training is more important than on the state 
level. Five women MPs have local government service experiences: 
three have held top positions in parties; two have not held any 
significant positions in parties. Among the latter two, one had served 
in local government for 20 years and the other had been a civil servant 
for 20 years and had 2 year experience in local government. 
Two women MPs represent family-sponsored political career". 
However, it must be stressed again that the impact of political families 
in Australia is limited. Families may give encouragement, skills and 
contacts with political parties but they cannot guarantee political 
elevation. Close family members can provide substantial advantages 
in the form of contacts with strategic positions in party bureaucracies, 
13 While seven women MPs have a political family background, 5 of them are deeply 
involved in political party work and 2 of them do not have any clear party work 
records. 
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but these advantages are mediated by parties rather than coming 
directly from the family itself. This is reflected in the fact that the 
political elevation to elite positions of the family politicians has also 
involved long apprenticeship in political parties. 
Few Australian women MPs represent a self made career. All of 
them are professionals and all held 'political' occupations, such as 
political research officer, lawyer, and lobbyist. They are relatively better 
educated than those representing an organisational activist career. 
They seem to be more active in seeking resources outside political 
parties, and their party involvement is lower and party experience is 
more limited. 
Another five women MPs cannot be assigned to any one of these 
political career types because their career records are too vague or brief 
to identify clearly their career paths. 
Political Careers in Taiwan 
Women MPs in Taiwan are mostly the sponsored career type. This 
type includes 95 women MPs. It is composed of three sub-patterns: 
indirect party/family-sponsored career, direct family-sponsored career, 
and entrenched institutional career. Party-sponsored career comprises 
two thirds of 95 women MPs. The educational backgrounds of these 
women ranges from PhD to senior high graduates. Few have served in 
local government. Most of them are affiliated with major parties, 
especially the KMT, and have been sponsored and supported not only 
by parties but also by local factions. The family is a basic and influencial 
element in this sponsored relation. As mentioned in Chapter three, 
political parties, especially the KMT, consolidate their electoral 
foundation through the family within local communities and factions. 
Both educational background and local faction influence networks are 
their main resources. Those women MPs who hold higher degree but 
lack local faction support are strongly sponsored by their parties. Those 
whose educational background are low typically have endorsement of 
local factions and/or are nominated and supported by parties. 
A large proportion of family-sponsored women MPs also have 
local government service experience. MPs with family-sponsored 
careers come from three different types of families: grassroots political 
families, political martyrdom families, and political families allied 
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with the ruling party. Grassroots political family refers to a family in 
which politics is the main 'business'. Most aspirant members are 
encouraged to seek political office to maintain their 'family business'. 
These families are typically of Taiwanese origin 14, and usually have 
strong ties with local factions. Some of the women MPs in this type are 
heads of local factions or wives/relatives of heads. Eight women MPs 
come from this background: three are mother, daughter, and mother's 
sister-in-law; two are sisters; one is married to an electoral political 
officer; one has parents running an electoral political office; and one 
has an uncle who is running an electoral political office. 
Political martyrdom families are those families whose members 
actively participated in political opposition movement and were sent 
to prison during the 1970s. The women politicians in this type have 
been involved in politics early and have followed their husbands' 
footsteps to build local networks. They had not run for political office 
until their husbands' imprisonment. All of them are also members of 
the DPP, and all have higher education. It is noteworthy that some of 
them described themselves as full-time housewives. They rely on 
networks and 'traditional' affective orientation of voters. 
Many political families are allied with the ruling party. Their 
members (mainly father, father-in-law, or husband) have held 
powerful positions within the KMT or in government. They enjoy 
advantages in pre-selection, and can win elections due to the party 
factional distribution of 'iron votes'. It is not surprising that half of 
women in this type have local government experience. Compared 
with those from grassroots political families, these women MPs rely 
more strongly on the ruling party to win their seats. Once the ruling 
party loses its power, or their family members lose powerful status in 
the party or government, their political careers are in crisis. 
Thirteen women MPs represent the entrenched institutional 
career type. All of them were recruited by the institutional mechanism. 
They were elected in the district of the Women's Group. All of them 
served prior to election in various positions of the Women's 
Association, and most of them held positions of the heads of it in their 
14 Their ancestors migrated to Taiwan before the establishment of the Republic of 
China. Generally, these families have been settled in Taiwan for several generations. 
In this sense, these families can be called "of Taiwanese origin". Those families settled 
in Taiwan after the 1940s are usually seen as mainlander origin. 
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own city/county. Since the 1991 National Assembly election, this 
pattern of political career has no longer been accessible, because of the 
amendment to the constitution. 
Like their counterparts in Australia, those Taiwanese women 
who represent the self made career are few. Compared with sponsored 
careerists, they are more politically active and relatively less reliant on 
party or family sponsors. They are propelled by their own political 
interests and capacities, while their family or personal networks 
remain helpful. Among the six women MPs who belong to this type, 
there are two distinct sub-types: independent political activists and 
political opposition movement activists. 
Each of the three independent political activists has very 
distinctive character. The only common feature is that they have not 
been affiliated with any political party during their political life. One 
was medical doctor with doctorate of medicine, who was a member of 
the KMT and later of the Social Democratic Party for a very short 
period. She has been politically active since the 1950s and run electoral 
political office on various levels. The second had a higher education 
background and has been active in the labour union. Still another 
without university degree was a school teacher and manager. 
Three self-made women MPs rose through the political 
opposition movement and now are members of the DPP. One of them 
combined the feminist movement with the political opposition 
movement, and the other two devoted themselves to establish an 
opposition political party. All had been sent to prison after the 
Kaohsiung Incident. Clearly it was much harder for them to run for 
political office because they had to break both the 'political taboo' and 
the gender stereotypes. 
Conclusions 
Our results indicate that the different patterns of women MPs careers 
are affected by the different composition of political opportunities and 
resources in Australia and Taiwan. The higher opportunities of 
Australian women MPs are reflected both in societal location 
(occupation, education, and so on) and in their active participation in 
political organisations. There is less discrimination against women 
within the Australian society and political system. Taiwanese women 
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MPs, by contrast, suffer from patriarchal and viriarchal disadvantages, 
but have access to wider political resources, including some gender-
specific ones, which they can derive from their extensive social and 
family networks. 
It is noteworthy that opportunities and resources do not develop 
in isolation. As opportunities for women improve, organisations are 
forced to distribute more equally the political resources under their 
control. This becomes an election issue. In Australia, it is apparent that 
major political parties try to woo women voters and promise to 
nominate more women candidates. Once a woman is nominated, 
however, they often 'stall' because of poor resourcing. In order to 
promote them, the political parties need to give them either 
preferential treatment or more access to resources to increase their 
chances of political success. If women's opportunities increase without 
improvement in access to resources, women are likely to monopolise 
lower ranks of political posts and mainly contest unwinnable seats. 
The arrangement of opportunities and resources affect career 
paths leading to political elites. High political opportunities provide 
Australian women's access to political organisations and, increasingly, 
to powerful positions within these organisations. This, in turn, affects 
the access to, and the accumulation of, political resources which are 
located mainly in bureaucratic organisational positions. These 
resources, in turn, propel women to elite positions. Therefore, the 
dominant career path of Australian women MPs is organisation-based. 
By contrast, Taiwanese women have low political opportunities. They 
have less party experience and less media exposure, and seldom hold 
powerful positions in political organisations. Their political success 
emanate mainly from mobilisation of wide political resources, 
especially from family networks. 
Thus Australia and Taiwan women show different patterns of 
political recruitment. In Australia, as Rydon (1986: 120-21) notes, party 
and family affiliations usually seem to counter each other; family 
connections within a party do not guarantee loyalty and may be 
regarded as corrupt. Furthermore, family ties are relatively 
unimportant, and family careers are rare. The significance and the 
advantage of political family background may be restricted to the 
process of socialisation and early exposure. 
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In Taiwan, party and family affiliations strengthen each other, 
and family roles can be used in electoral politics. Not only voters but 
also party selectors look for family men and family women. For 
Taiwanese women this is especially advantageous because men cannot 
compete with them for the merit and distinction of 'good mother and 
good wife'. Women, in fact, monopolise the claims to familial virtues, 
since they, more than the men-providers, are seen as the sustainers of 
familial bonds. 
In the next concluding chapter, we will re-examine our four 
propostions proposed in Chapter One, and discuss theoretical 
implications for modernisation theory, gender inequality and elite 
recruitment in the light of these findings. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS 
Women in Political Elites 
Following the rise of women's movements, the gender composition of 
elected representatives has become an important political issue. 
Neither the processes of economic modernisation, nor representative 
democracy, as feminist critics point out, have prevented the biased 
gender composition of political elites. Three aspects of this biased 
composition are highlighted here. First, though it is universal, under-
representation tends to be greatest in less developed and in unevenly 
modernised societies with strongly traditional cultures. Second, the 
pattern of under-representation conforms to the "law of growing 
disproportion": the higher we go in the political hierarchy, the smaller 
proportion of women we find. Third, the patterns of gender inequality 
have been changing in the process of modernisation. However, this 
change is slow and uneven, and it reflects the specific paths of 
modernisation followed by different societies. While patriarchal 
domination typical of traditional societies is waning everywhere, 
various viriarchal forms of inequality and organisational exclusion 
persist even in advanced modern societies, such as Australian and 
Taiwanese society. In order to explore this pattern of inequality — and 
resolve the puzzle of the similar level of gender under-representation 
in such dissimilar societies as Australia and Taiwan — we have 
conceptualised gender inequalities in terms of political opportunities 
and resources, and have located them within a framework of a 
sophisticated version of modernisation theory on one hand, and the 
elite recruitment model, on the other. 
The impact of modernisation on gender inequalities, it is argued, 
needs to be re-examined in the light of the findings on women's 
representation in, and access to, political elites in both countries. The 
main weakness of the simple version of modernisation theory is that 
it ignores variations in modernisation paths, and that it places a 
disproportionate emphasis on equalisation of women's political 
opportunities, while ignoring inequality in access to political resources. 
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A more sophisticated version, embraced here, forms a useful 
explanatory framework for the analysis of gender inequalities in 
political recruitment in both evenly and unevenly modernising 
societies. 
The elite recruitment model proposed here is based on the 
classical work of Mosca (1939) and Michels (1962), and has been 
elaborated by Putnam (1976) and Pakulski (1982). It stresses the 
importance of social, structural and organisational factors, and points 
to elites' control of recruitment through the system of selection and 
gates leading to pools of eligible candidates from which elite selection 
is made. This model is linked with the key concepts of political 
opportunities and resources, while the former reflect the access to the 
selective pools, the ultimate elevation to elite position is seen as 
propelled by political resources. In other words, political opportunities 
can be seen as collective mechanisms facilitating women's access to the 
pools of eligibles. By contrast, political resources can be regarded as 
personal characteristics and capital, which empower women in 
political contests. 
Women's access to political elites results from the overall 
structure of political opportunities and resources. Political 
opportunities are reflected not only in the women's overall societal 
location, such as occupation, education and social norms, but also in 
the institutional arrangement, political selection systems for instance. 
Political resources are reflected in women's access to specific political 
assets concentrated in different locations, including political 
organisations, local communities and family networks. 
The arrangement of political opportunities and resources is 
shaped by the social and cultural dynamics within societies, and 
reflects the overall paths of modernisation. The social dynamics in 
Australia have led to a typical "package-like", even modernisation. By 
contrast, Confucian familism has affected social dynamics in Taiwan, 
resulting in tradition and modernity being juxtaposed in a pattern of 
uneven modernisation. 
It is stressed here that the combination of women's political 
opportunities and resources in the two societies is quite different. 
Liberal individualism in Australia places emphasis on a person's 
rights, performance and organisational apprenticeship, and has 
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prompted a rapid equalisation of political opportunities, 
professionalisation of politics and the withdrawal of the family from 
the public sphere. However, it has also resulted in the concentration of 
political resources in the hands of viriarchal political organisations. By 
contrast, Confucian familism in Taiwan stresses educational 
credentialism and duties, as well as preserves some traditional 
patriarchal social arrangements and gender-specific roles. While 
women's political opportunities are limited, diffused political 
resources, some of which are gender-specific, are accessible to aspiring 
women politicians and prompt their elevation to political elites. 
The political careers of women MPs in both societies reflect these 
differences in their access to political opportunities and resources. In 
Australia, women's greater political opportunities are reflected in the 
growing proportions of women in higher education, in decision-
making positions in political organisations, and in upper level of 
occupational hierarchy. By contrast, Taiwanese women have fewer 
opportunities, but they can utilise local government service experience 
and the support of traditional family networks. As expected, the typical 
political career patterns in both societies vary: the organisational 
activist career dominates in Australia and the sponsored career is most 
frequently found among successful women politicians in Taiwan. This 
is consistent with the proposed model of political opportunities and 
resources. 
Implications for Modernisation Theory 
The simple version of modernisation theory has been based on 
Western (European and North American) experience. It does not fit 
well the experience of East Asian societies, in which social, economic, 
political and cultural change have occurred at a different pace and 
under very specific circumstances, involving colonial domination, 
authoritarian imposition and political conflicts. The complex versions 
of modernisation theory, outlined in Chapter One, help in 
understanding these uneven — and often emulative — forms of 
modernisation and their consequences for gender inequality and elite 
recruitment. 
It is found in this research the cultural factors and traditionalism 
have played an important role in shaping the paths of modernisation 
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in Taiwan, and in changing the status of women there. This implies 
that the durability and the flexibility of cultural traditions has been 
under-estimated in modernisation theory. As Archer (1988) and 
Giddens (1994) suggest, traditional norms and arrangements survive 
modernisation and adapt to new "modern" conditions. Historically, 
both Australia and Taiwan were masculine and strongly patriarchal 
societies. The woman's place was at home, and women were 
subordinate to men. However, different cultural factors have had 
different impacts on the improvement of women's positions in the 
processes of modernisation. Liberal individualism in Australia has 
helped Australian women's access to the market, education and 
political organisations. Confucian familism in Taiwan has been less 
conducive to such status equalisation, yet women in Taiwan have 
been finding their way to political elites in not much lower proportion 
than in Australia. They turn, as we argue, many aspects of Confucian 
traditionalism to their advantage. 
Uneven modernisation is characterised as a multi-dimensional 
process. Changes in each aspect of a society do not occur at the same 
pace. While some traditional cultural elements help the economic 
development and affect the formation of political culture, this does not 
mean that culture determines the outcomes of economic and political 
modernisation. What we mean is that there exists an interactive 
relationship between different aspects, and cultural tradition may, or 
may not, play an important role in this process. Thus, one needs to 
analyse the specific relationship between the economic, cultural and 
political aspects, rather than suggest a single pattern of causality 
between them. 
Thus, as far as different social dynamics in different societies are 
concerned, there exist many different patterns of modernisation. Any 
view of Western modernisation which shows a systematic fit between 
different institutional arrangements is exaggerated. Continuous 
modernisation does not necessarily eliminate asymmetry in women's 
political opportunities and resources, or increase women's 
representation in political elites. What this study suggests is that 
different patterns of modernisation have a different impact on the 
composition of political opportunities and resources. This composition 
may be changing with the changing relations between economic, 
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cultural and political aspects of society. Women's advantages and 
disadvantages in political contests form in this process. This view 
enables us to go beyond the simple attribution of women's under-
representation in political elites to such factors as patriarchy, low level 
of modernisation, or discrimination. 
Implications for Theories of Gender Inequality 
Patterns of gender inequality vary widely. Modernisation promotes 
equalisation in women's access to education and participation in the 
labour market, but it may not advance women's presence in political 
elites nor equalise domestic responsibilities. It is clear that the higher 
the political office, the fewer the women represented. Of the 159 
United Nations member states, only 4% were headed by women, and 
worldwide only 4% of the world's cabinet ministers and 10% of 
members of lower houses were women by the end of 1990 (United 
Nations 1991). 
Gender disadvantage in politics takes many forms. Political 
opportunity structure refers to overall access to societal status and it is 
affected by the universalistic modernisation processes. Access to 
political resources is not necessarily equal in modern bureaucracies, 
thus producing hidden forms of gender inequality, often diagnosed as 
"glass ceilings". In this study, we suggest that increasing women's 
political representation is able to reflect the interaction between the 
overall women's societal location, the political institutional 
arrangement and the locations of political assets. That is, women's 
access to political opportunities and resources and their political 
success are formed in this interactive process. 
Thus, while gender inequality is a common social fact of human 
societies, the nature and characteristics of gender inequality may vary 
widely. Uneven modernisation has its correlation in uneven gender 
equalisation. Some institutional domains contain more entrenched 
"inequalities" and are more resistant to universalistic and egalitarian 
trends and policies. 
Theories of gender inequality have to consider both this wide 
variation in forms of gender inequality and the adaptive patterns 
observed in Taiwan, whereby women can acquire some advantages 
within the highly genderised and patriarchal social settings. Confucian 
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familism does contain entrenched institutionalised gender inequality, 
and it derives from traditionalism based on a patriarchal structure. 
However, paradoxically, one may say, gender-specific political 
resources are preserved in the patriarchy, prompted by traditionalism, 
and mobilised through familism. Access to these gender-specific 
political resources is often overlooked by students of gender inequality. 
Consequently, recipes for gender equalisation often ignore the costs of 
the imposition of gender universalism. If gender ceases to count, 
gender-specific resources also disappear. As Australian women have 
been discovering, they may have equal rights and opportunities, but 
still lose systematically in their political competition with men. 
The experience of women's political recruitment in Australia and 
Taiwan suggests that to analyse the nature of women's political success 
is far more realistic than either blindly believing the impersonal 
processes of modernisation to be women-friendly, or arguing that 
women are politically without hope in patriarchal societies, no matter 
what social and political change occurs. 
Implications for Elite Recruitment Theories 
Gender cannot be ignored as an aspect of elite composition and 
recruitment. Modernisation has not only broken the monopoly of the 
upper social strata in elite positions, but also changed the overall 
composition of political elites, including gender composition. In this 
respect, both the classical and the contemporary elite theories need 
modification. 
Neither the classical nor the contemporary elite theories pay 
much attention to gender composition. They are preoccupied with 
psychological make up, class backgrounds, interest representation, 
internal hierarchy, and unity vs divisions among the power-holders. 
The issue of gender composition has been brought to the agenda of 
elite studies by the current wave of feminist theories stressing two 
theoretical issues. First, that gender composition of elites reflects the 
general inequality of power relations in society. It is a societal index of 
the gender gap. Second, it has been argued that the presence/absence of 
women in political elites affects the very characters of these elites. Not 
only their representativeness (though this is an important issue), but 
also their orientations and agenda are affected by gender balance. 
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While women inhabit both left and right ideological position, they 
bring into the agenda the glossed over issues affecting women in 
society. Moreover, some see them as a moderating force in politics, 
softening ideological divisions. 
Thus, the fundamental issue is why gender matters in political 
elites. Answers to this question can be summarised as follows: First, 
the inclusion of women in central roles in politics is a matter of social 
equality and justice. Second, men and women are different in terms of 
orientations and interests, and thus women cannot be properly 
represented by men. Third, valuable human resources are wasted 
when talented women are excluded from politics. Women account for 
half of the population in any society and their involvement in politics 
can enhance the quality of political leadership. Fourth, women's 
political representation concerns the legitimacy of the political system 
itself. Representative democracy embodies the idea of the "mirror of 
the nation", and the design of electoral institutions is to ensure this 
outcome. Thus, the composition of political representatives serves to 
legitimise political regimes. Male-dominated political elites are no 
longer able to serve this legitimising function (Norderval 1985: 84 in 
Phillips 1991: 75; Hernes 1987; Darcy et al. 1994). 
Taiwanese women's unequal access to political opportunities is 
relatively easy to explain — it derives from the unequal gender 
relations within patriarchal culture and social structure. Unequal 
access to political resources by Australian women is more difficult to 
account for. The major Australian political organisations are 
viriarchal, few women hold high positions within them, and the 
majority of resource managers are male. This unequal access to 
organisational statuses and resources may be understood in terms of 
elite perpetuation and self-protection. Through institutional 
arrangements, the masculine political elite affects the selection of 
recruits, and filters out those who may change the collective ethos and 
arrangements. Men, it must be stressed again, constitute the majority 
of these elites. They tend to select their successors from among the 
skilled and eligible pools, which are predominantly masculine. Thus 
women's exclusion from political elites and their unequal access to 
political resources within political organisations become a vicious 
cycle. 
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This is reflected in the fact that most Australian women contest 
marginal seatsl, but most resources are delivered to safe seats which 
are held by male candidates. By contrast, although Taiwanese women 
are limited by patriarchal tradition, they can utilise and control 
political resources from different locations through the established 
traditional social structure. Thus, a further study of political resources 
is necessary. These variations in the nature and structure of elite 
recruitment and gender inequality need to be incorporated in both 
gender theorising and studies of power. 
Recent Developments and Future Research 
The results of the latest national elections in Australia and Taiwan 
show some interesting changes. The proportion of women political 
elites increased to 20% and 14%, respectively. While the proportion of 
Australian women MPs increased rapidly as a result of the 1996 federal 
election, women continued to be marginalised and poorly resourced — 
they either held unwinnable seats or were low on the Senate tickets. 
The dramatic increase of Australian women politicians has been 
attributed to a large electoral swing. The new women MPs are seen as 
"one-term wonders", because most of them hold marginal seats. This 
vulnerability of Australian women MPs reflects male-dominated pre-
selection and resource distribution. But it also reflects a major shift in 
elite orientations. As mentioned above, gender balance is on the 
political agenda. Both parties woo women candidates. The ALP 
promises to fill 35% of safe seats with women candidates in the next 
decade. This are signs of a gender revolution of unprecedented scope2 . 
lln Australia until the 1990 election, no women members of House of Representatives 
were given "safe seats". All women, except Kathy Martin Sullivan (Liberal), won 
their seats from an opposing party. See Chapter Four. 
2 The ALP and the LP are forced to nominate more women candidates and both of them 
have introduced different strategies to help women in political contests. However, this 
is not reflected in the result of the 1996 federal election. "In percentage terms Labor 
nominated fewer women than any party other than the Nationals, despite the 
adoption by the Labor party of national rules on affirmative action which committees 
labor to a quota, ensuring that at least one third of its winnable seats would go to 
women. Women made up only about 24 per cent (42 out of 173) of the candidates 
nominated by Labor compared with 27 per cent (43 out of 160) of the candidates 
nominated by the Liberals; 8 per cent (5 out of 58) of the nationals' candidates; and 35 
per cent (59 out of 169) of the Democrats' candidates" (Thompson 1996: 5). 
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The latest national elections in Taiwan were held in 1994 for the 
Legislative Yuan, and in 1996 for the National Assembly. The 
proportion of women MPs remained stable. Major parties continued to 
nominate women candidates as the rivals from other parties. While 
they had access to diffused political resources, their political 
opportunities were still very limited. It is worth stressing that some 
women politicians from political families and local factions remained 
very successful in these elections. This shows that political 
opportunities alone cannot provide a complete explanation for 
women's political success. The role of political resources in women's 
political recruitment should be emphasised. 
Because of the limited data available, we focus here on the career 
paths of successful women politicians in both societies. In order to 
examine further the role of opportunities and resources, one needs to 
study also unsuccessful women candidates. By examining the 
experience of unsuccessful women politicians, one can further 
strengthen and extend the political opportunity and resource model by • 
identifying the critical levels of opportunities and resources, and their 
combinations critical for political success. 
There are also some other questions that require further analysis. 
What is the relationship between culture, government policy and 
organisational strategies in affecting change of women's overall 
position? How does cultural variation affect elite change? In particular, 
how does gender equalisation affect, and how is it affected by, 
democratisation in Confucian societies? To answer these questions one 
needs to explore more deeply the nature and mechanisms of gender 
equalisation and the relationship between cultural legacies, on one 
hand, and political recruitment in different societies and in different 
historical contexts, on the other. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Political System in Taiwan 
The president is the highest representative of the nation. He/She is 
elected by the members of the National Assembly. Starting with the 
coming presidential term in May 1996, each term of the president and 
the vice president will be reduced from current 6 to 4 years, and the 
president and the vice president will be directly elected by the entire 
electorate. With the consent of the Legislative Yuan, the president 
appoints the premier (the president of the Executive Yuan) and the 
auditor-general of the Control Yuan. With the consent of the National 
Assembly, the president also appoints the president, vice-president, 
and the grand justices of the Judicial Yuan; the president, vice-
president, and members of the Examination Yuan; and the president, 
vice-president, and members of the Control Yuan. 
Both the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan comprise 
the parliament. The National Assembly consists of delegates who are 
elected from each county/city or area. Its functions include: (1) electing 
the president and the vice president; (2) recalling the president and the 
vice president; (3) amending the Consititution; and (4) voting on 
proposed Constitutional amendments submitted by the Legislative 
Yuan by way of a referendum. The National Assembly meets 90 days 
before the expiration of each presidential term. However, since 1992 
members of the National Assembly are elected according to the new 
provisions, and the proportion of seats reserved for women is clearly 
specified (for details, see Appendix B). The members of the National 
Assembly serve now 4 year terms. The functions of the National 
Assembly include: (1) election of the president and the vice president'; 
1 Under some conditions, the National Assembly will elect the president and vice 
persident. Article 12 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution states: "Should the 
office of the Vice President become vacant, the President shall nominate a candidate 
within three months and envoke an extraordinary session of the National Assembly to 
elect a new Vice President who shall serve out each respective original term until its 
expiration. Should the offices of both the President and the Vice President become 
vacant, the president of the Legislative Yuan shall serve notice on the National 
Assembly to convoke an extraordinary session within three months to elect a new 
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(2) impeachment of the president and vice president; (3) amendment 
of the Consititution; (4) voting referendums on proposed 
Consititutional amendements submitted by the Legislative Yuan; and 
(5) exercising the power of consent to confirm the appointment of 
personnel nominated by the president. 
The Legislative Yuan is the highest legislative branch of the state, 
composed of popular elected representatives who serve for 3 years and 
are eligible for re-election. Its functions include: (1) exercising a general 
legislative power; (2) confirming emergency orders ; (3) examination of 
budgetary bills and audit reports; (4) consent of appointment of 
personnel nominated by the president; and (5) amendment of the 
Consititution. 
The Executive Yuan is the highest administrative organ of the 
state. It has a premier, a vice premier, eight ministers, and a number of 
ministers without portfolio as well as directors of councils and 
commissions. It needs to be mentioned that whether Taiwan is a 
presidential or cabnet system is uncertain because "the exact division 
of labour between the president and premier is unclear and depends to 
a considerable extent upon their personal power positions." The 
relationship between Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan 
resembles that of the President and Congress in the US in the sense of 
having veto and override powers (Chou et al. 1990: 45). 
The Judicial Yuan is the highest judicial organ of the state. It is 
responsible for the adjudication of civil, criminal, and administrative 
litigation, and the disciplinary actions of civil servants. It is comprised 
of a president, a vice president, and 15 grand justices. 
The Examination Yuan is responsible for the examination, 
employment, and management of civil service personnel at all levels 
of the government. It supervises all examination-related matters 
including all matters relating to qualification screening, security of 
tenure, pecuniary aid in case of death, and the retirement of civil 
servants; and all legal matters relating to the employment, discharge, 
President and a new Vice President, who shall serve out each respective original term 
until its expiration." 
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performance evaluation, scale of salaries, promotion, transfer, 
commendation, and award for civil servants. 
The examination system applies to all levels of government 
workers from rank-and-file to cabinet members. There are two main 
types of government examinations, Civil Service Examinations and 
Examinations for Professionals and Technologists. Civil Service 
Examinations mainly include Senior-grade and Junior-grade. The 
former is divided into Level I for holders of PhD, and Master degrees; 
and level II for holders of Bachelor degrees, and secondarily for those 
who have passed the Senior Qualifying Examinations or those who 
passed the Junior Civil Service Examinations at least 3 years previous 
to taking the examination. The majority of top position holders within 
the government are recruited from this channel, in inparticular from 
Level I. The latter mainly applies to graduates of senior 
high/vocational schools, and equvalents. 
The Control Yuan is the highest control organ of the state. It 
exercises the powers of impeachment, censure, and audit. Before, its 
members were elected from provincial and municipal city councils. 
Starting in 1993, it is comprised of 29 members, including a president 
and a vice president, all of whom are nominated and appointed by the 
president of the state, with the consent of the National Assembly. Each 
term of the office is 6 years. 
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B. Consitution of the Republic of China 
1947 
The National Assembly 
Article 26, 
7. "The number of delegates to be elected by women's 
organizations shall be prescribed by law." 
The functions of the National Assembly include: (1) to elect the 
President nd the Vice President; (2) to recall the President nd the Vice 
President; (3) to amend the Consititution; and (4) to vote on proposed 
Consitutional amendments submitted by the Legislative Yuan by way 
of referendum. 
The Legislative Yuan 
Article 64 
6. The number of women to be elected under the various 
items 	 shall be prescribed by law. 
Article 75. No member of the Legislative Yuan shall concurrently 
hold a government post. 
1992 Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China 
The National Assembly 
Article /. Members of the National Assembly shall be elected according 
to the following provisions without being subject to the restrictions in 
Articles 26 and 135 of the Constitution: 
1. Two members shall be elected from each Special Municipality, 
each county or city in the free area. However, where the population 
exceeds 100,000 persons, one member shall be added for each additional 
100,000 persons. 
2. Three members each shall be elected from the lowland and 
highland abrigines in the free area. 
3. Twenty members shall be elected from the Chinese citizens 
who reside abroad. 
4. Eighty members shall be elected from one nationwide 
constituency. 
If the number of seats allotted to a Special Municipality, county or 
city covered under Item One (1) above; or if the number of seats won 
by a political party under Item Three (3) or Four (4) above is between 
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five and ten, then one of the seats stipulated in the pertaining item 
shall be reserved for a female candidate. Where the number exceeds 
ten, one seat out of each additional ten shall be reserved for a female 
candidate. 
The Legislative Yuan 
Article 2. Members of the Legislative Yuan shall be elected according 
tp the following provisions without be subject to the restrictions in 
Article 64 of the Constitution: 
1. Two members shall be elected from each province and each 
Special municipality in the free area. Where thr population exceeds 
200,000 persons, however, one member will be added for each 
additional 100,000 persons; and where the population exceeds one 
million persons, one member will be added for each additional 200,000 
persons. 
2. Three menbers each shall be elected from the lowland and 
highland abrigines in the free area. 
3. Six members shall be elected from the Chinese citizens who 
reside abroad. 
4. Thiorty members shall be elected from one nationwide 
constituency. 
If the number of seats allotted to a Special Municipality, county or 
city covered under Item One (1) above; or if the number of seats won 
by a political party under Item Three (3) or Four (4) above is between 
five and ten, then one of the seats stipulated in the pertaining item 
shall be reserved for a female candidate. Where the number exceeds 
ten, one seat out of each additional ten shall be reserved for a female 
candidate. 
Article 4 	 The members representing Chinese citizens residing 
abroad and the numbers representing the nationwide constituency 
shall be elected by way of party-list propotional representation. 
Electoral and Recall Law 
As the members of each constituency are five to ten, there is one seat 
reserved for women, and another reserved seat was added whenever 
the size of the constituency increases by ten. 
214 
